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CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
It is extraordinary that no generally accepted rationale exists for the multi-
billion dollar exemption from income and property taxes that is universally
conferred on "charitable" institutions.' Due primarily to the vast array of
activities to which the exemption has been applied, it has defied all past
attempts to formulate a synthesizing concept of charitable.2 Most commentators
I The most prominent manifestation of the exemption is § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code ("I.R.C." or "Code"), which exempts from corporate income taxation
organizations that are "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,... or
educational purposes . . ." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Similar provisions exist in the
statutory or constitutional law of virtually every state with respect to property taxation. See
W. WELLFORD & J. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION? THE CHALLENGE TO TAX
EXEMPTION app. 153 (1988) (50-state survey of the laws of charitable property tax
exemption).
The federal exemption originated in 1894, but the first income tax and state property
tax exemptions arose centuries earlier, following the tradition set in medieval England. See
J. JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1931); Adler, Historical Origin
of the Exemption From Taxation of Charitable Institutions, in WESTCHESTER COUNTY
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TAX EXEMPTIONS OF REAL ESTATE: AN INCREASING
MENACE (1922). Indeed, the historical roots of the charitable exemption can be traced back
to ancient Greek and Roman times; Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax
Treatment of Charities, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6 (1975). Sierk, State Tax Exemptions
of Non-Profit Organizations, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 281, 282 (1970) ("Real property
taxation, and exemption therefrom, seems to be about as old as history.... One historian
reports that the 'economic equilibrium of the state was endangered' by the fact that the tax
exempt temples owned fifteen percent of the cultivable land and vast amounts of slaves and
other personal property during the reign of Ramses III about 1200 B.C.").
The universal character of the charitable exemption extends internationally. A survey
of 10 other countries, both eastern and western (Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Israel, Italy,
Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Germany) found that all conferred an
exemption from corporate income tax and from some form of ad valorem taxation on
nonprofit entities that we would classify as charitable, although the particular listings and
descriptions varied. B. WEISBROD, TAX POLICY TOWARD NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
AN ELEVEN COUNTRY SURVEY (1990).
2 For example, the most frequent explanation for the exemption is that the government
should not tax entities that relieve it from burdens it would otherwise have to bear itself.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("charitable exemptions are
justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit- a benefit which the
society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements
and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues"). However,
this explanation is underinclusive since the charitable exemption covers many activities such
as museums and the performing arts that the government has no obligation to undertake, or,
in the case of religion, is prohibited from undertaking. The most favored alternative theory
is that the exemption is used to support activities that provide a benefit to the community.
Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) ("certain entities that exist in a
harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its 'moral or mental
improvement,' should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation . . . . The
State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life . . . ."). However, this explanation, standing alone,
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therefore have resorted to a theoretic pluralism, or agnosticism, maintaining
that no single theory is capable of capturing the nuanced contours that
historically have shaped the charitable exemption. 3 This is an unsatisfactory
explanation, however, for it ignores the unitary structure of the charitable
exemption, which uses the single concept of charity to define its scope.
Denying that this concept has any definitional content means that "charitable"
is applied as a completely open-textured term to activities that are considered
deserving of an exemption for a multitude of undisclosed policy reasons.
Because we lack a coherent descriptive concept of what charities are, no
normative explanation for why they should be exempt from taxes emerges for
critical examination.
This unprincipled state of affairs is so taken for granted that the
fundamental basis for the exemption is hardly discussed. 4 In a previous article,
overinclusively sets no subject matter limits whatsoever since any social or economic
activity potentially benefits the community. Other discredited theories are discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 8-18.
3 See H. Dale, Rationales for Tax Exemption 1 (1988) (unpublished manuscript)
("[N]o single rationale can or should be expected to explain or justify tax-exempt status.
The not-for-profit sector of our society is complex and varied; its lineage is ancient. It
would be unreasonably simplistic to expect to capture its essence or justification within the
compass of any theory."); see generally P. SWORDS, CHARITABLE REAL PROPERTY TAX
EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE (1981). In one sense, we agree with Professor Dale that
not all exemptions can be explained by a single theory. We recognize, for example, that a
perfectly good reason for exemption is the common-sense notion that the government
should not tax itself, and hence government-funded institutions should be exempt; there are
also many other valid reasons for granting exemption. See infra note 22. In this paper, we
seek only to justify the charitable exemption. To the extent our system provides exemption
because an entity is deemed "charitable," it presupposes that the label "charitable" has some
substantive content, and that entities deserving of the label also deserve exemption. Our
theory, therefore, confines itself to explaining what the substantive content of the word
"charitable" should be. Obviously, Congress and the states could simply repeal laws
granting exemption because of charitable status and make exemption judgments on a case-
by-case basis. Until they do, however, we feel compelled to seek some reasonable
explanation for why and when "charitable" status should invoke tax exemption and a variety
of other tax benefits.
4 "[T]hink[ing] more seriously about what is meant by the concept of charity [is] a task
that is about four hundred years overdue." H. Hansmann, The Two Independent Sectors, A
Paper Presented at the Independent Sector Spring Research Forum 5 (March 17, 1988)
(unpublished manuscript); see also Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of
Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2031 (1977) [volume as a whole hereinafter
COMMISSION PAPERS] (the original federal adoption of the exemption occurred "without
debate and virtually without comment;" "The Congressional Record will be searched in
vain for any fuller expression of the policy underlying the exemption" than so that these
institutions "'may not suffer under the bill.'") (quoting Congressman Tucker, who
introduced the amendment containing the exemption); Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of
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we helped fill this voids by critiquing the conventional and academic theories of
the exemption. 6 We applied four evaluative criteria to demonstrate that each of
the previously expounded theories fails to explain why the activities the
exemption encompasses should receive an implicit subsidy through the tax
system.7 In order to place the exemption on firmer theoretical footing, we then
proposed a donative theory of the charitable exemption- one that considers as
charities only those institutions that are capable of attracting a substantial level
Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302 (1976)
(Congress has "grop[ed] along, enunciat[ing] no developed theory").
5 In 1976 and 1981, the Yale Lav Journal published two innovative, carefully argued
theories of the income tax exemption for charities, Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 4;
Hansmann, 7he Rationale for Eenpting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations], but these ideas generated essentially no response until recently. The only
direct response other than our own is that of Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations,
31 B.C.L. REV. 501 (1990); for reasons explained in Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals,
infra note 6, at 377-78 & nn.270-74, his response is directed more to the descriptive
question of categorizing various nonprofit entities than to the normative question of why
they should be exempt. The analytical framework for Atkinson's insightful critique of
Hansmann and Bittker differs sharply from ours: rather than defining a set of normative
criteria for evaluation, he proceeds by extensive description of how their theories compare
with his concept of altruism in nonprofit organizations. Atkinson, supra at 601 ("I will let
the theorists speak in their own terms, pointing out differences between the classes of
organizations they discuss and the altruistic nonprofits I have identified .... "). Atkinson
offers as an alternative to these theorists the argument that nonprofits should be subsidized
simply by virtue of their altruistic nature, a theory that superficially resembles the donative
theory that we arrived at independently. Atkinson's altruism theory is quite distinct from
ours, however: first, as discussed in Part lI.A.5 below, it covers a much larger scope of
activity (essentially any legitimate nonprofit firm) and, second, he offers very little
normative basis for adopting this theory. See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, infra
note 6, at 377 nn.270-74; Atkinson, supra at 628, 630 ("It would be logical for me here to
prove that altruism really is a good thing and thus worthy of tax favors. But that is too
ambitious.... [It] is not a matter of logical proof, but of faith, of freely chosen values and
visions."). We undertake the normative explanation that Atkinson declines, and, by so
doing, we demonstrate that his altruism theory extends far too broadly.
6 Hall & Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative
Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo,
Nonprofit Hospitals].
7 We follow the prevailing view that the charitable exemption constitutes an implicit
government subsidy to the activities it covers since it is an obvious deviation from the
ordinary tax base-either income or property. Regan v. Taxation Without Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1984) ("tax exemptions . . . are a form of subsidy that is
administered through the tax system"). See generally S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDrrURES (1988). The contrasting view looks for a justification of the exemption that
would explain why charitable income or property is not in the tax base to begin with. See P.
SWORDS, supra note 3, at 200; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 4, at 333. Additional reasons
for rejecting this minority view are developed in Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals,
supra note 6, at 379-81.
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of donative support from the public. We then demonstrated that this theory
convincingly meets each of the four criteria that other exemptions fail. This
Article expands on the donative theory of the charitable exemption, first by
summarizing the basic theory as it contrasts with conventional alternatives, then
testing this theory against a number of possible objections, and finally
describing how the exemption should be administered under this theory.
I. THE DONATIVE THEORY IN BROAD OUTLINE
A. Deservedness
The most important criterion for evaluating a theory of the charitable tax
exemption is deservedness, which has two distinct components: whether the
theory identifies activities that are both worthy of, and in need of, a social
subsidy. The chief example of a conventional theory that fails the first
component of deservedness-worthiness-is the theory that uses charitable trust
law to define the scope of the tax exemption. This body of law, which has
evolved since before the enactment of the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses,8
contains essentially no subject matter limits to its coverage. It indiscriminately
enforces trusts that pursue any public purpose that a founder might choose.9 As
one court has declared, charity, so conceived, is "broad enough to include
whatever will promote, in a legitimate way, the comfort, happiness, and
improvement of an indefinite number of persons." 10 It is manifestly absurd to
8 Trust law gives special treatment to those trusts it considers charitable by exempting
them from the requirements of a definite term of existence and an identifiable class of
beneficiaries, and by protecting the terms of their creation through enforcement by the
attorney general. This Elizabethan statute is the seminal enactment that codified this
protective attitude. Its preamble contains an historic listing of objects considered charitable
at the time, which listing has had enormous influence over the subsequent case law's
attempts to further define this term. See generally G. BOGERT, TRusTs (6th ed. 1987); 4A
A. SCor & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRusTs (1989).
9 The leading decision declares that charitable covers all "purposes beneficial to the
community." Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583; see also Ould v.
Washington Hosp., 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877) (charity includes "any thing that tends to
promote the well-doing and well-being of social man"); Wilson v. First Nat. Bank, 164
Iowa 402, 412, 145 N.W. 948, 952 (1914) ("The word 'charity,' as used in the law ....
includes substantially any scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any
considerable part thereof."). The only limitation these statements imply, and indeed the only
limitation trust law enforces, is to disqualify charitable trusts that confer only private benefit
or that are organized and operated in an inappropriate manner, such as to create a conflict
of interest in the trustee. See infra note 10.
10 Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 520, 82 N.W. 345, 357 (1900). Beyond this
basic requirement of publicness, the only limits charitable trust law sets are organizational
and operational constraints on the manner in which the activity is conducted, constraints
such as nonprofit status and a prohibition of operating the trust for the benefit of those who
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confer billions of dollars of public subsidy on activities for no other reason than
that, if they were organized as trusts, the law would not refuse to enforce the
trust terms.
Other theories more discriminating in their determination of worthiness are
nevertheless flawed under the deservedness criterion because they do not
explain why valued activities need support to exist at a socially optimal level. A
prime example is the community benefit theory, which seeks to ascertain which
activities are more desirably offered on a nonprofit than a for-profit basis. This
theory is flawed because, even assuming society has a preference for nonprofit
enterprise, it fails to explain why a subsidy is needed to effectuate this
preference. For instance, even if we accept the (unproven) argument that
nonprofit hospitals are superior to for-profits, doctors and patients are free to
patronize nonprofits to the full extent they desire. Therefore, there is no basis
for providing a social subsidy to assist in realizing this choice. 11 The
exemption is either a waste or a windfall.
The donative theory avoids these twin pitfalls in the deservedness criterion
by deriving its concept of charity from the failure of the private sector to
supply goods and services that are not sold efficiently through individual
transactions. It reasons that donative institutions deserve a tax subsidy because
the willingness of the public to contribute demonstrates both worthiness and
neediness. Donors' selections of particular objects of philanthropy from the
many available alternatives reveal those that are of special worth in the public's
estimation. The institution's resort to solicitations evidences that its needs are
not being met elsewhere. We can be assured that donations themselves will not
fully satisfy this need since donors do not lightly relinquish their assets; in the
absence of a quid pro quo return, the free rider incentive that affects the
motivation to give tells us that donors systematically will give less than the
deservedness that they perceive (as measured hypothetically by their
willingness to purchase the good if it were capable of being delivered in
ordinary market transactions). Hence, the existence of substantial donative
support from the public at large signals the need for an additional, shadow
subsidy to take up the donative slack.
B. Proportionality
After determining what activities deserve a social subsidy, the next
difficulty in understanding the charitable exemption is formulating a theory that
reasonably tailors the level of subsidy to the level of deservedness so as not to
grossly over- or undersubsidize the activity. The primary hurdle this second
control it. See generally M. CHESTERmAN, CHARITIES, TRUSTS AND SOCIAL WELFARE
316 (1979); L. SHERIDAN & G. KEErON, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARrriES 32-50 (3d
ed. 1983); Atiyah, Public Benefit in Charities, 21 MOD. L. REV. 138 (1958).
11 Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 367-68.
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inquiry presents is why should deserving activities be subsidized through the
tax system rather than by a more targeted form of direct subsidy that would
almost surely be more accurate? A leading example of a theory that fails this
proportionality criterion is one that limits the exemption to organizations that
provide some measure of free services to the poor. Under this theory of the
exemption, a tax subsidy produces an upside down effect as between qualifying
entities that provide a small percentage of free services and those that provide a
large percentage: those charities that provide the least free services will have
the most exempt property and income, all else being equal. Therefore, the
charity-care theory perversely provides the most aid to those activities that least
deserve support, among the entities that qualify. 12
The donative theory on first inspection also appears to suffer somewhat
under the proportionality criterion. While a donative subsidy is not perverse in
its effect, at best there is only a rough relationship between an institution's
donative support and the amount of its exempt property or income. There is an
approximate relationship with respect to exempt property, but there is some
question whether the income tax exemption provides a subsidy at all, given that
gifts would not count as income even absent the exemption. 13 However, a
second aspect of the donative theory-government failure-explains that, by
definition, no superior subsidy alternative exists. The donative theory operates
at the intersection of the failure of both private markets and the government. 14
Only when neither sector is capable of providing a shared social benefit at the
desired level will a substantial number of people resort to philanthropy. This
observation establishes why the donative theory elegantly satisfies the
proportionality criterion: The political stalemate that prevents a direct
government subsidy means that, however flawed, an implicit subsidy through
the tax system is the only available mechanism for subsidy.
C. Universality and Historical Consistency
A fully successful theory of the exemption must also satisfy two criteria of
secondary, but still considerable, importance. The first, a criterion of
universality, derives from the fact that the charitable exemption is structured as
a unitary, coordinated system composed of a host of benefits and burdens that
flow automatically from the determination of charitable status. Charitable
organizations at once qualify for exemptions from both local property taxes and
federal corporate income tax; these "501(c)(3) organizations" are also eligible
12 Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 349-50. Other theories of the
exemption distribute support randomly or unpredictably with respect to their definition of
deservedness. See id. at 361-72, 379-83.
13 See id. at 403 n.342; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 4, at 308-09.
14 This "twin failure" theory is developed in more detail in our prior article, Hall &
Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 386-90.
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under Code section 170 to receive contributions that are deductible in
computing the donor's personal income tax. Tax-exempt status carries with it
the requirements that the organization be truly nonprofit, that it limit its
political lobbying and campaigning activities, and that it pay taxes on earnings
unrelated to its exempt purpose. A successful theory of the exemption should
explain most or all of these tax benefits and burdens.
A satisfactory theory of the charitable exemption should also be historically
consistent with the major categories of exempt activities. Because the concept
of charity explicitly refers to over 400 years of legal precedent, it would
constitute an abandonment, not an explanation, of the charitable exemption to
construct a theory that is oblivious to this history.
Some existing theories of the exemption fail to account for either of these
considerations. For instance, Professors Bittker and Hansmann have proposed
competing theories that would explain the federal income tax exemption but
that have no relationship to the state property tax exemption. 15 Moreover, their
theories fail to explain major restrictions on the exemption and give no
coherent meaning to the term "charitable" that accords with established history
and common sense understandings. 16
In contrast, the outline form of the donative theory nicely satisfies the
universality criterion. Those institutions that receive donative support deserve
subsidy through all available tax mechanisms: income, property, and sales tax
exemptions as well as the charitable deduction. 17 The theory therefore avoids
treating each of these as a separate problem. Moreover, defining charities as
those activities that receive substantial donative support is consistent with our
intuitive and historical concepts of this term.
In particular, only the donative theory is capable of reconciling the
charitable exemption's historical connection with the law of charitable trusts.
On first inspection, it makes no sense for tax law to borrow its concept of
charity from trust law, as it purports to do, since the functions of these two
bodies of law, and the social costs of charitable characterization, are entirely
different.' 8 Focus on the donative element, however, explains this historical
connection. Charitable trusts receive legal protection because of their donative
15 See id. at 385-89.
16 For example, the only definitions that Bittker's and Hansmann's theories would
offer for "charity" (in the context of the income tax exemption) are the awkward
formulations (respectively) of any entity for which income is difficult to measure, or any
socially valued nonprofit that suffers a comparative disadvantage in capital markets. See id.
17 However, the donative theory would support only an exemption from donative
entities paying sales tax on items purchased, not on their charging sales tax on items sold,
because only the former is proportionate to their activities supported by donations whereas
the latter relates to their commercial activities. But this lrnitation is in fact consistent with
the prevailing pattern among the states, most of which confer the first type of sales tax
exemption but not the second. See id. at 399 & nn.345-47.
18 Id. at 332.
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status: the self-sacrifice entailed in the founder's formation of the trust ensures
that the object of the trust deserves at least the limited social support of legal
enforcement. We argue that a donative act also deserves the additional social
support entailed in the tax exemption. Only when we lose sight of this donative
aspect of charitable trust law and blindly transplant its subject matter to tax law
do we lose any rational subject matter limits. Therefore, retaining the crucial
donative element maintains contact between modem tax law and the centuries
of trust law precedent.
D. The Challenge that Lies Ahead
In broad perspective, the donative theory stands in fundamental contrast to
other theories of the charitable exemption in the social engine that it uses to
establish the exemption's proper scope. The theory that refers to the law of
charitable trusts unsuccessfully employs a common law judicial process to
define the subject matter limits of the exemption. Other approaches employ a
political process to make ad hoc, normative judgments of which activities
deserve the exemption based on intensely empirical inquiries, 19 despite the
absence of any political structure other than taxing agencies to make these
judgments. 20 Only the donative theory employs a market-like process that relies
on the self-interest of donors to choose for themselves the objects of charity
that deserve public support. Donors "vote" for an indirect subsidy by
participating in a "market in altruism" when they have been unsuccessful in
obtaining direct provision through actual political or market mechanisms.
However attractive the donative theory is in broad outline, its acceptability
turns on a host of minute inquiries such as precisely what acts constitute a
donation, and exactly how the exemption should be administered. The donative
theory still has not been subjected to the same detailed scrutiny that we have
given the more conventional theories of the exemption. This unfinished task
leaves a number of objections and imperfections to be addressed in the specific
application and implementation of the donative theory. This Article undertakes
this task by expanding on the donative theory in two dimensions: the theoretical
and the practical. We develop more rigorously the theory for subsidizing
donative institutions in order to repel attacks that it either goes too far or does
19 The community benefit theory requires taxing authorities to determine which
activities are performed better in a nonprofit setting, and Hansmann's capital subsidy theory
requires, in addition, a determination of which such activities suffer a disadvantage in
obtaining capital financing.
20 We do not mean that discrete political judgments could not or should not be made
by political bodies with more appropriate authority over social policy, as legislatures
sometimes do by extending ad hoc exemptions to encourage particular, favored activities.
Our point instead is that this is not what has been done through the charitable deduction, as
it has existed for over a century.
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not go far enough, and we define more carefully how donative institutions
should be identified and subsidized in order to understand how the exemption
should be administered. Our aim here is to present a fully-articulated
conception of the charitable exemption that is capable of immediate
implementation. 21
II. THE THEORY OF SUBSIDIZING DONATIVE INSTITUTIONS
In this section we employ market theory, moral theory, and tax theory to
achieve a deeper understanding of the rationale for subsidizing donative
institutions. Our examination of market theory defines more precisely what
constitutes a donation that signals an object deserving of social subsidy. We
conclude that neither the particular market defect that leads to a donation nor
the subjective motivation for a donation is relevant to whether the object of a
donation qualifies for subsidy (at most, only to the level of subsidy); all that
matters is whether a payment is in fact a donation, which is revealed by a quid
pro quo test. We also conclude that no donation exists in a nonprofit
organization's mere retention of its earnings.
Our examination of moral theory reveals that the foundation of the donative
theory is not exclusively economic; it is strongly buttressed by the leading
theories of distributive justice and by the pluralistic values that characterize the
third sector. Finally, analysis of the deep structure of tax exemption reveals
that the donative theory has a powerful explanatory force that provides a
unifying rationale for all major aspects of the taxation of charitable institutions.
A. Market Theory
The economic analysis supporting the donative theory is derived from the
considerable progress that has been made over the past decade toward a
positive theory of nonprofit enterprise. Scholars who have written about
nonprofits have identified three idealized categories of nonprofit institutions,
which are characterized by their sources of income: donative nonprofits, such
as the Salvation Army, rely on contributions; commercial nonprofits, such as
National Geographic, generate their receipts from sales; and mutual benefit
organizations, such as a country club, derive revenue from dues-paying
21 Although the donative theory is novel in its articulation, its basis is fundamentally
rooted in existing precedent. See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at
402. Because this theory derives from the existing structure and wording of the exemption,
it is possible, although not likely, to implement the theory through administrative rather than
legislative action. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (IRS
may by administrative ruling withdraw the exemption from racially discriminatory schools,
even though this criterion is not stated in the statute, because it is implicit in the legal
concept of charitable).
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members. Only donative nonprofits deserve to be classified as "charitable," 22
as is revealed through a closer examination of the reason for their existence.
1. The Role of Donations in Economic Theory: The Paradigm Case
Economists theorize that donative organizations exist to facilitate the
production of certain "public goods," which can be either products or
services. 23 Pure public goods in the economic sense are those characterized by
two conditions: (1) durability-the cost of supplying everyone is no more than
the cost of supplying a single person because the good does not wear out as
others use it; and (2) indivisibility-the nature of the good is such that, once it
is produced for one consumer, it is impossible to exclude its use by any other
consumer. Classic examples of nearly pure public goods include air pollution
control and border defense.
Under the strong public goods theory, the private market cannot be
expected to supply pure public goods at any level, no matter how valuable they
are, because no one has an incentive to pay his proportionate share of the
benefit. 24 The weak version of the theory predicts that the market will
undersupply public goods. 25 This market failure exists by virtue of the severe
"free rider" incentive that affects public goods. Because such goods, once
supplied, are available to all without regard to any individual's purchase, there
22 This does not mean that other forms of tax exemption may not apply to the other
nonprofits. For instance, mutual benefit organizations are exempt from income tax, not as
charities, but under the rationale that their pooling of members' dues does not constitute the
generation of income, only the shared use of wealth already taxed. See McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. 1972). Similarly, the donative theory does not
preclude exempting government entities, not as charities, but because it makes no sense for
the government to tax itself and, reciprocally, one government should not tax another. As a
possible extension of this theory, we observe in note 249 infra that it may be appropriate to
exempt certain research organizations that rely heavily on government grants, even though
they receive few donations.
23 Leading discussions of this public goods theory of the existence of nonprofit
enterprise include J. DOUGLAS, WHY CHARrrY: THE CASE FOR A THIRD SECTOR 129-30,
145 (1983); B. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 59-60 (1988) [hereinafter
WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY]; B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT
SECTOR (1977); Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393, 1397-98 (1988); Hansmann, 77w Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 848 (1980); Krashinsky, Transaction Costs and a 77teory of Nonprofit Organization, in
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFrr INSTrITIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY
119-21 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986) [article hereinafter Krashinsky, Transaction Costs]
[volume as a whole hereinafter NONPROFIT IN ST1TrIONS].
24 The classic statements of this theory are M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECtiVE
ACTION (1968) and Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
25 Marwell & Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, 84 AM. J. SOC.
1335, 1337-38 (1979).
[Vol. 52:13791390
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
is no incentive to pay for them if one supposes that someone else will pay. If
one supposes others will not pay, there is still no incentive to purchase public
goods at the optimal level because one who pays for such goods cannot charge
others who benefit from them. "Regardless of how the individual estimates the
behavior of others, he must always rationally choose the free-rider
alterative." 26 The same thought is also captured in terms of extreme "positive
externalities:" individual purchases will always fail to produce public goods at
the optimal level since one who chooses to pay for such a good will realize
only an infinitesimal fraction of the benefits that the good offers to society at
large.27 As a consequence of these severe free riding incentives and positive
externalities, classic economic theory postulates that the government is in the
best position to provide public goods (either directly, or by subsidizing private
production) since government can coerce purchase by everyone via the power
of taxation.
Sometimes, however, the government fails (for reasons discussed later)28
to supply the optimal level of a public good. The consequence of this twin
failure of markets and government is that people resort to voluntarism to
provide unmet public needs. On first appearance, then, classic free rider theory
is wrong since a considerable number of people are willing voluntarily to pick
up litter or staff fire protection services, for example.29 This arm-chair
empiricism has been verified by more carefully controlled and rigorously
designed social experiments, which demonstrate that free riding behavior is
severely dampened by a set of motives loosely described as altruism-a
willingness to take a collective view of social benefit and set aside narrow,
individual self-interest.30  Donative nonprofits exist as the preferred
26 j. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 88-89 (1968).
27 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 268 (1971).
28 See infra text accompanying notes 124-27.
29 Marwell, Altruism and the Problem of Collective Action, in COOPERATION AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR 207, 224 (1982) [volume as a whole hereinafter COOPERATION]
("Any look at the real world demonstrates that the problem of collective action is frequently
'solved,' at least to the extent of permitting some collective goods, if not an optimal amount,
to be provided.... In fact, voluntary collective action seems endemic.").
30 Most of these studies are reviewed and critiqued in Isaac, Walker & Thomas,
Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations,
43 PUB. CHOICE 113 (1984) and Kim & Walker, The Free Rider Problem" Experimental
Evidence, 43 PUB. CHOICE 3 (1984). See also Caporael, Dawes, Orbell & van de Kragt,
Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of Egoistic Incentives, 12 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 683 (1989) [hereinafter Absence of Egoistic Incentives], where the researchers
gave groups of nine volunteers $5 apiece and told them that if at least five members gave up
their stakes, each of the nine would receive a $10 bonus. The income maximizing strategy
for each individual under these rules is to keep the money, hoping others will contribute,
whereas the group strategy is to somehow designate five donors. Id. at 687. Under varying
conditions (group discussion, no discussion) the rate of contributing ranged from 47% to
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organizational form when an institutional setting is required for altruism.31
The observed willingness to donate conflicts with classic economics only in
its most absolute form, though, by disproving the strong free rider hypothesis.
That is, the willingness to donate conflicts with the classic economic theory that
rational people will always choose to free ride. A more subdued version of the
theory maintains only that individual purchases will produce less of a public
good than is optimally desired. This weak free rider hypothesis is in fact
validated by these empirical studies, each of which finds free riding to some
degree, as predicted, just as common observation finds that voluntarism falls
short of ideal aspirations.
The persistence of the free rider disinclination to support societal or group
causes supplies the most rigorous justification for subsidizing the objects of
altruism. The existence of a significant level of giving signals a collective
benefit that the private market (and, as explained in Part lI.B.1., the
government) is incapable of supplying-which satisfies our criterion of
worthiness. The free riding incentive tells us, however, that these donations
84%, with the resulting voluntary provision of the "public good" (i.e., qualifying for the
group bonus) ranging from 60% to 100%. Id. at 691. In a similar study, the researchers
varied the constituencies of a dozen groups according to academic majors. Each of the
groups showed some, but only a moderate, level of free riding behavior, except for the
study group consisting of graduate students in economics, who free rode almost entirely.
Marwell & Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295
(1981).
There are various accounts of what motive overcomes free riding. In the language of
sociology, the motive derives from a group dynamic or inbred sociality. See Absence of
Egoistic Incentives, supra at 695-96. See generally DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE
OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1984) (collection of essays by sociologists). Psychologists tend
to speak more in terms of a person's sense of elemental fairness, perhaps a product of the
Superego. See H. MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY 54-55
(1982). Economists postulate that some individuals' utility functions are dependent on the
utilities of others. Alchian & Allen, 7he Pure Economics of Giving, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CHARIrY 5 (Inst. Econ. Affairs 1973) ("[Ihe postulates of economic theory do not say that
man is concerned only about himself. He can be concerned about other people's situations
also."). See generally Sugden, Reciprocity: 77Te Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary
Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772 (1984) [hereinafter Sugden, Reciprocity]; Sugden, On the
Economics of Philanthropy, 92 ECON. J. 341 (1982). And biologists theorize about an
evolutionary basis for altruism, which enhances the odds of species survival. See S.
BOORMAN & P. LEVrr, THE GENETICS OF ALTRUISM (1980); R. DAWKINS, THE
SELFISH GENE (2d ed. 1989); 1 E. STAUB, POSrrIvE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND MORALITY
26-34 (1974) [hereinafter SOCIAL BEHAVIOR]; E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW
SYNTHESIS (1975); Wilson, Genetic Basis of Behavior Especially Altruism, 31 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 370 (1976). Further exploration of motive is contained below in Part
ll.A.3.
31 Atkinson, supra note 5, at 587-96. Nonprofits are preferred by donors, as explained
in more detail below, because they can be trusted better than for-profits to apply the
donations faithfully to their intended purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
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systematically fall short of supplying the objects of philanthropy at an optimally
desired level, that is, the level that would be supplied if the products or
services were capable of being purchased (or did not suffer from government
failure). A tax exemption for donative institutions helps to take up this donative
slack by using the tax system as a form of shadow subsidy. This explanation
also meshes perfectly with the rationale for allowing donors to deduct
charitable contributions in computing their personal income taxes. The
deduction encourages more giving, and the exemption helps the gift to go
further.
2. Imperfections in the Paradigm: Generalizing the Public Goods Basis
for Donations
Although the characteristics of the paradigm case for subsidizing the public
goods objects of donations are quite restrictive, the donative theory has the
power to be generalized to all instances of donative behavior. This is necessary
for the theory's survival since the paradigm case does not cover many (if any)
real world situations. The classic objects of philanthropy are not pure public
goods. Although education entails the public good of bolstering the economy
with skilled workers and religion promotes moral values, both entail significant
private goods: schools educate the children of donors and religion provides
salvation (or at least spiritual guidance) to the faithful.32 Even welfare relief,
whose public good aspect is more pure (helping the poor assuages a societal
conscience, a psychic benefit available to all), partakes only partially of public
good characterization. At least an incidental motivating factor for donations to
the poor is the localized distress that one person has in seeing another in a
destitute condition. Relief of the donor's specific distress is not a benefit shared
by the public at large.33
32 In the more economic terminology introduced at the outset, neither is completely
durable: at some point, the church hall and the classroom fills and another must be built.
Nor are they indivisible: admission could be charged (as it partially is by colleges).
33 "When Thomas Hobbes was asked why he contributed to a beggar, and was this not
due to Christ's commandment, he responded that he did so 'with the sole intent of relieving
his own misery at the sight of the beggar.'" A. ETzIoNI, THE MORAL DIMENSION:
TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 51 (1988). Economist Milton Friedman echoed a similar
sentiment in his Capitalism and Freedom: "I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am
benefitted by its alleviation ... ." M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 191 (1962).
See also Macntyre, Egoism and Altndsm, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 462,
463 (P. Edwards ed. 1967) [article hereinafter MacIntyre, Egoism and Altrusim]. Gergen
incorrectly reasons that aid to the poor is an impure public good because the primary benefit
is to the individual who receives the aid rather than to society. Gergen, supra note 23, at
1398. This is incorrect because the individuals who receive the aid do not purchase this
good; therefore, the benefit to them is also an externality. It is simply more concentrated in
them than in society at large. A good loses its public characteristic only to the extent that the
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These imperfections present no obstacle to the justification for subsidizing
donations, however. They merely demonstrate that donations support impure as
well as pure public goods. "Strictly speaking, no good or service fits the
extreme or polar definition in any genuinely descriptive sense. In real-world
fiscal systems, those goods and services that are financed publicly always
exhibit less than such pure publicness." 34 Indeed, if this were not so, the strong
free rider hypothesis would be correct and we would see no donative support
whatsoever. Thus, these impurities in the public good characteristic of the
objects of philanthropy may be necessary in order for there to be any
philanthropy. 35
The public goods theory for subsidizing the objects of donations can be
generalized even further than this to cover situations that cannot be
characterized as public goods at all without straining the meaning of this term.
This generalization comes from recognizing that the essential aspect of public
goods that invites donative support is some form of market failure. Public
goods dramatize a particular form of market failure-they present a polar case
of free riding associated with positive externalities-but the same rationale
exists for free rider defects in any of their manifestations or at any level of
intensity.36 Indeed, stated even more broadly, donations are a generic tool for
overcoming any number of market defects regardless of their free riding
characterization. Consequently, the-essential fact in the donative theory is the
existence of donations per se, not an a priori assessment of the nature of the
market defect that produces the donation. Where there is significant donative
behavior, there is a market defect that gives rise to the donation. The free
riding associated with giving, not with the particular market defect that
produces the giving, is the essential component of the rationale for subsidizing
donative institutions. 37
consumer is willing (and able) to pay for it. Only then are the benefits internalized to the
purchaser.
34 I. BUCHANAN, supra note 26, at 49; see also Gergen, supra note 23, at 1398.
35 On the other hand, these impurities may mean that those mixed objects of
philanthropy that represent more private than public goods will, on account of that fact,
receive proportionately fewer donations because they may suffer less market failure. The
effect of public goods impurities on the level of giving depends on whether the private
benefit can be obtained only through giving (as with religious salvation) or instead may be
purchased (as with education).
36 It should be kept in mind, though, that some forms of market failure do not produce
donations, perhaps because they are self-correcting within the market, perhaps because they
are corrected by government intervention, or perhaps because the contributing public views
them as insignificant or less significant than other defects that do receive donations. The
point, again, is that the focus ultimately is on the existence of the donation, not on theorized
cases for some form of subsidy.
37 James Buchanan pursues a similar analytical path in discussing public goods. He
observes that the economic theory would quickly break down if it depended on the purity of
the polar examples; consequently, he eschews any normative inquiry into which goods
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Transaction-cost analysis helps explain that the classic incidents of pure
public good status (indivisibility and durability) are not the sole economic
determinants of donative activity. 38 Many services that are said to be public
goods do not actually face an absolute indivisibility problem. Instead, it is
merely difficult or uneconomical to assess each consumer's benefit and,
therefore, charge him or her appropriately. For instance, when the government
builds a road, it sometimes erects a toll booth to charge the particular drivers
who use the road, suggesting that a private good is involved. It is not
impossible to do this for every road, but in most circumstances this form of
revenue collection is less efficient than simply taxing all residents. Thus, some
goods become "public" at one price (or level of production) but not at another.
Similarly, while it is technically feasible for churches and synagogues to charge
admission,39 such crass commercialism could be viewed as destroying the
deserve government provision. Instead, he approaches the subject in a positivistic fashion
observing which goods in fact receive government provision, and then examining the
incidents of that provision. J. BUCHANAN, supra note 26, at 50 ("the [public goods] theory
has a much wider base; . . . it retains general validity independently of the descriptive
characteristics of particular goods and services"). We take the same approach to goods that
receive donative support.
38 j. DOUGLAS, supra note 23, at 37-38 (observing that "market failure," "public
goods," "externalities," and "transaction costs" are flexible terms that provide alternative
forms for expressing a range of similar ideas); id. at 50, 52 (transaction costs provide
"another very fertile way of looking at the whole problem of market failure"; "unlike the
dichotomous pair of 'public' versus 'private' goods, it emphasizes the graduated nature of
the choice between supply through a commercial market, through voluntary action or
through coercive government action"); Gergen, supra note 23, at 1397 ("To be public, a
good need not be purely nonrival and nonexclusive. It is sufficient that the cost of excluding
an individual is greater than the marginal cost of supplying the good to her as an additional
user. It is then cheaper to supply the good freely than to charge each user for it.");
Krashinsky, Transaction Costs, supra note 23, at 114 (advocating a transaction-cost
analytical framework as providing a superior terminology for understanding nonprofits).
39 Many in fact do so:
Many Jewish synagogues raise from twenty percent to all of their income through
annual dues charged on a per family basis for membership in the local synagogue. For
seats on High Holy Days there is often a separate charge that varies with the number
and location of seats. Typical seat fees in 1982 ranged from $200 to $2000.
Synagogues also often charge special fees to participate in Passover services and meals.
Pew rental is another form of sales, one that has a mainstream Christian history in the
United States. The payment of Mass stipends, fees fixed by the Catholic Church for
Masses said in the name of or on behalf of the payor, also involves sale of services.
Note, Religious Nonprofits and the Commercial Manner Test, 99 YALE L.J. 1631, 1641-42
(1990). This account suggests that religion may receive fewer true donations than is
commonly perceived. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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spiritual values enhanced by individual contribution. This loss of spiritual value
is a transaction cost of treating religious services as a private good.
40
Professor Hansmann provides another example in which the language of
public goods does not illuminate the reasons for giving, yet a donative subsidy
is deserving nevertheless. He observes that the public goods explanation does
not easily fit philanthropic support of the performing arts because the primary
benefit accrues to individuals in the audience rather than the community at
large.41 Nevertheless, significant philanthropy occurs.42 Hansmann theorizes
that the nonprofit performing arts rely on contributions to supplement ticket
sales as a means of voluntary price discrimination by those who value the
performance more than the average ticket holder.43 Performance companies
prefer this financing mechanism, despite the burden of soliciting contributions,
because it helps to overcome a form of market failure that inheres in the fact
that the marginal costs of admitting additional members into the audience (or of
staging more performances of the work once it is rehearsed) is far below the
average cost per ticket holder of producing the show. 44 But such a system of
40 Likewise, although government provision is often the first and more efficient
alternative to the market failure associated with public goods, in some cases voluntary
provision through donations may be preferred because coerced provision through taxation
entails the transaction cost of destroying the enjoyment that comes from a sense of good
citizenship. See generally Calabresi, Comment [on Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges], in
ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND EcONoMIc THEORY 58, 59 (E. Phelps ed. 1975) ("There is a
whole category of goods or characteristics whose production cannot be bought or coerced
and yet whose presence in the society gives individuals pleasure. These goods are often
attitudes like trust, love and altruism whose value depends on their being freely given and
which are therefore destroyed if they are bought or coerced.").
41 Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts, 12 BELL J. ECON. 341
(1981). Symphony orchestras are recognized as providing some public benefit by enhancing
a community's overall attractiveness to residents and newcomers, but Hansmann correctly
argues that, much like a professional sports team, this benefit is incidental to the individual
audience benefit.
42 "The visual and performing arts received an estimated $6.82 billion in 1988."
AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON
PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1988 (1989), at 13 1.
43 The performing arts find it difficult to justify charging widely different amounts for
their tickets (perhaps the public outcry would be a transaction cost of doing so). Instead, via
targeted fund raising, they extract higher payments from patrons who place the highest
value on the arts.
44 Assuming the ticket price is set so the marginal cost of enlarging the audience equals
the marginal benefit to additional attendees, as competitive markets tend to do, then total
revenues from ticket sales would be too low in many instances for the performance to be
produced. The same point is more commonly illustrated by observing that, if an airline
were to set a uniform price at the marginal rather than the average cost of boarding an
additional passenger, it could never afford to take off the ground since marginal costs only
compensate for an extra meal, a tiny increment of fuel, etc., not the already sunk costs of
buying a plane, hiring a pilot, etc. The performing arts use donations as a mechanism to
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voluntary price discrimination allows some patrons to take a free ride on the
generosity of others. Therefore, a donative subsidy is needed to assist the
scheme in reaching its optimal funding level.
A final example of the ability to generalize the public goods explanation for
subsidizing the objects of. donations comes from charitable contributions to
public television and radio. Professor Gergen maintains that such contributions
do not deserve personal income tax deduction because broadcasting is not an
indivisible service (pay-per-view technology now exists, but was not available
when radio and television began). 45 This misconceives the basis for a tax
subsidy as depending too strictly on the purity of public goods characteristics.
Despite the technical ability to charge for public broadcast services, the fact
achieve the same result airlines achieve through discriminatory pricing schemes that tend to
charge more to business travelers who place a higher value on flying than do recreational
tourists who can fly for less by reserving much further in advance. This revenue scheme
offers some advantage wherever there is a marked differential between average and
marginal costs. See E. JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN
MARKEr ECONOMICS 28 (1986). Indeed, one way of describing public goods is those
which have extreme economies of scale. This is precisely the "durability" component of the
classic definition.
This observation, by harkening to the form of market failure typified by natural
monopolies, suggests a further application of the generalized economic basis for donations.
See J. DOUGLAS, supra note 23, at 35-41. Natural monopolies exist in those goods and
services where competition is destructive because it tends to drive prices below a level that
will sustain even a single producer. The paradigm natural monopoly is a product with large
economies of scale, that is, one with large sunk costs of initial capital investment but low
costs of additional production (in other words, one where the average costs far exceed the
marginal costs). The result of the rapidly increasing returns from ever-expanding production
is that a single firm can meet increased market demand more cheaply than can several
competing producers. Competition thus becomes self-destructive: either it leads to an
inefficient solution or, in more extreme cases, to a cyclical pattern that polarizes between
monopoly pricing and rampant market entry. Such a paradigm is found in the classic public
utilities (electric, gas, water and local telephone services), for which it is uneconomical to
have several service lines running down each street. The traditional remedy is government
intervention and protection, but Hansmann's analysis of giving to the performing arts
illustrates that an alternative to government intervention is voluntary support of prices above
those which market forces generate. The performing arts also illustrate that the incidents of
extreme natural monopoly conditions-as with the characteristics of pure public goods-are
not necessary for significant philanthropy to exist. Hospitals are another such enterprise. P.
FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 212 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing natural monopoly
characteristics of rural hospitals, but observing that in urban areas, there are only "slight
economies of scale"); B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIr SECrOR 93-98 (1977)
(describing hospital services that represent "investment indivisibilities," i.e., "facilities [that]
come in sufficiently large and costly units that marginal cost pricing would likely mean
unprofitable operations"). And hospitals historically received substantial donative support
until the government displaced most of this financing. Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit
Hospitals, supra note 6, at 400-03.
45 Gergen, supra note 23, at 1443-44.
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remains that, for whatever reason, those who devised the public broadcast
system found it preferable to rely on donations rather than subscriber fees. 46
Because, as a consequence, we can anticipate that some free riding will occur,
we know the service will be systematically underfunded, relative to the benefits
donors and nondonors would be willing to pay for if the service were sold.47
The critical observation is that, because giving in any form is voluntary,
potential donors can enjoy the organization's benefits for free. Otherwise, if the
organization refused service to noncontributors, payments would not be
donations at all; they would be purchases. The organization's decision to rely
on gifts rather than sales is bound to create a free rider opportunity on which at
least some significant number of people who benefit from the organization's
services will capitalize. As a consequence, all donative organizations will be
underfunded to some degree.
3. The Irrelevance of the Motive for a Donation
a. The Cynical View of Altruism
We have so far left it largely to intuitive assertion that significant free
riding attaches to giving in all of its manifestations. This is not necessarily the
case. If the free rider hypothesis is accepted, then one must ask why donations
occur at all. The fact that they do means that some motive operates to
overcome free riding, and, whatever this motive is, it could in theory be
capable of correcting altogether the market defect that produces the need to
give. We are (presently) incapable of resolving this apparent paradox at a level
46 The price discrimination rationale that Hansmann develops for the performing arts
potentially explains why this is so, as does the natural monopoly explanation developed in
note 44 .upra, because the marginal costs of serving additional viewers is essentially zero.
Also, the commercialization of these channels might be viewed as a transaction cost that
would detract from the public spiritedness associated with PBS (although, here, the authors
agree wholeheartedly with Gergen that the obnoxiousness of most PBS-affiliate fund raising
campaigns imposes a far greater cost).
47 To further illustrate, one could just as well argue that it is more logical for churches
and synagogues to organize like social clubs and charge admission to those who attend
services since the primary motive for filling the collection plate is the self-interested desire
to have a place to congregate each week. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, whether for ideological or practical reasons, churches and synagogues choose
to rely primarily on voluntary contributions, which signals that some degree of free riding is
present. Gergen argues that religions have a weak case for the charitable deduction because
they "probably do not suffer greatly from freeriding, or at least do not suffer as much from
freeriding as do most other charities." Id. at 1438. But this would only be a basis for
providing less of a subsidy, or increasing the level of support required to justify a subsidy,
not for denying the exemption altogether. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
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of theory, 48 which seems to leave to empiricism the task of establishing a
rigorous basis for deciding which objects of philanthropy to subsidize.49
Fortunately, significant work by sociologists and psychologists that more
closely examines the actual motives for giving50 greatly eases this task by
pointing a way towards clearly and predictably drawing the proper bounds of
the donative theory.
Those who speak of altruism usually intend some moral assessment about
the quality of motivation that prompts a gift, suggesting that it is made without
reference to self interest. However, economic theorists have observed that,
morals aside, giving is never truly altruistic because for giving to occur there
must be some positive or negative incentive that operates selectively on the
donor to induce the gift.51 While this is undoubtedly true, it is tautologically so
48 See Sugden, Reciprocity, supra note 30, at 784 ("The economic analysis of non-
selfish behaviour is still in its infancy: there is no unified theory that can explain all, or even
most, of the observed regularities in such behaviour.").
49 See Gergen, supra note 23, at 1396, 1444 ("the case for a deduction on efficiency
or equity grounds turns . . . on empirical questions" such as what motivates giving and
whether alternatives exist to obnoxious fundraising) (concluding that basis for subsidy is
inconclusive for religion and weak for public television).
50 In addition to the citations in the notes below, the following sources review various
motivations for giving and other cooperative behavior, and they provide extensive citations
to the theoretical and empirical literature: D. BAR-TAL, PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 39-50
(1976); N. EISENBERG, ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION & BEHAVIOR 30-56 (1986); J.
RUSHTON, ALTRUISM, SOCIALIZATION & SOCIErY 36-57 (1980); L. WISPE, ALTRUISM,
SYMPATHY & HELPING 303 (1978); Amos, Empirical Analysis of Motivations Underlying
Individual Contributions to Charity, 10 ATLANTIC ECON. 1. 45 (1988); Gergen, supra note
23, at 1430; Karylowski, Focus of Attention and Altndsm: Endocentric and Exocentric
Sources of Altruistic Behavior, in DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 139-40 (1984); Reykowski, Motivation of Prosocial Behavior, in
COOPERATION, supra note 29, at 355-56. An excellent discussion and extensive
bibliography are contained in M. HUNT, THE COMPASSIONATE BEAST (1990).
51 SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 30, at 7 ("An actor may behave prosocially to gain
material rewards for his act, to gain social approval and praise (or avoid social disapproval
and even ostracism).... [to] feel good (gain self-reward) because he acted according to his
values and principles (thus he maintains a positive self-concept) or when he expects
empathic reinforcement (a reduction of the distress he felt as a result of vicariously
experiencing another person's distress or an increase in his own positive feeling by
vicariously experiencing the positive feelings of another that would result from his prosocial
act)"); id. at 42-45 (canvassing reasons for prosocial behavior); Johnson, The Charity
Market: 77teoy and Practice, in THE ECONOMICS OF CHARITY 94 (Inst. Econ. Affairs
1973) (same); Kenrick, Selflessness Examined: Is Avoiding Tar and Feathers Nonegoistic?,
12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 711, 712 (1989); Oliver, Rewards and Punishments as Selective
Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1356, 1357
(1980) (a thoughtful examination of the way in which such incentives operate); Simon, The
Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 86 (W. Powell ed. 1987) [article
hereinafter Simon, Tax Treatment] ("the donor enjoys memorialization, . . . hopes for
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and therefore offers no insight into which motives are worthy ones and which
ones are not.5 2 But, this criticism accepted, the economist's challenge to the
altruist is still troubling for it says that the mere presence of a gift does not
reveal which set of motives is at play. Rejecting the strong egoistic premise that
all gifts are selfish does nothing to validate that all gifts are altruistic, nor does
it demonstrate which ones are which, or to what degree. As one court has
summarized:
Community good will, the desire to avoid community bad will, public
pressures of other kinds, tax avoidance, prestige, conscience-salving, a
vindictive desire to prevent relatives from inheriting family wealth-these are
only some of the motives which may lie close to the heart, or so-called heart,
of one who gives to a charity.53
This cynical view of altruism creates two difficulties for the donative
theory in justifying deservedness of a social subsidy. One difficulty derives
from the source of the donative incentive, the other from its strength. If the
incentive does not arise from the public benefit that the donative activity
conveys, but rather is in the nature of a "side payment," 54 the ability of
donations to signal socially worthy objects is potentially destroyed because
those who make the donation would be oblivious to the worthiness of the object
served. Moreover, if the incentive is strong enough, it may undermine the need
for an exemption because, if there is no free rider disinclination to give,
salvation or at least the expectation of perpetual prayers, the shared benefits that come with
public goods like parks or cleaner air, or the general expectation that somewhere,
somehow, the giver will benefit").
52
The proponents of [egoism] are always ready to ...extendi] the concept of
'selfishness' to include any demonstrable source of motivation not previously subsumed
under the concept. It seems advisable, therefore, to concede the [egoistic] dogma once
and for all, thus rendering the hypothesis unfalsifiable and, therefore, sterile. Then one
can go about the business of examining the rich variety of sources of human motivation
governing choices where the outcomes of those choices result in the distribution of costs
and benefits to self and others.
Rapoport, Egoistic Incentive: A Hypothesis or an Ideological Tenet?, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN
Scl. 719 (1989); accord A. ETZIONI, supra note 33, at 27-28; Harrison, Egoism, Altrism,
and Market Illusions: 7he Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1311
(1986).
53 Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146-47 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
54 Marwell, AltrIdsm and the Problem of Collective Action, in COOPERATION, supra
note 29, at 221 (1982) ("For example, individuals who contribute to building a public
museum are given public praise, or plaques are displayed as a payment in prestige or
gratitude.").
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donations may fund the good up to, or perhaps beyond, the socially optimal
level.
Stated more succinctly, the cynical view of philanthropy maintains that
donations result more from the self-interest of donors who desire to participate
in a private benefit than from the public benefit their gift provides to others. 55
Therefore, the challenge is to determine whether certain payments are spurious
donations, more in the nature of purchases than gifts. If so, our rationale for
subsidy disintegrates because our theory holds that no subsidy is appropriate
where private markets are functioning. If, however, the donative theory can be
shown to survive even the most skeptical views of altruism, then we have great
assurance that all objects of donations deserve some additional social subsidy.
In the following sections, we will examine successively four categories of
private benefit that potentially motivate donors:
(1) Direct, tangible benefits the donor receives from the supported services.
For instance, Professor Gergen argues that viewers' gifts to public television
are more in the nature of personal consumption than disinterested altruism.5 6
Likewise, one might speculate that the primary motive for giving to religion is
for the donor to provide himself a spiritual clubhouse.5 7
(2) Psychic benefits the donor receives merely from the act of giving itself,
without regard to whether the gift does anyone any material good. Thus, one
might repeatedly donate to famine relief in Ethiopia despite news accounts of
rampant corruption in the manner in which this relief is distributed, because
one feels good about even a futile attempt to do something about this human
travesty, almost as a form of sacrificial offering accompanying a prayer.
(3) Purely selfish benefits the donor receives indirectly by giving. Thus, it is
sometimes alleged that the primary motive for giving to education is the
reputational benefit from naming a building or the selfish interest of enhancing
the value of one's own degree, rather than the donor's disinterested recognition
of the value of education to society.5 8 Corporate giving is the best example of
55 See T. ODENDAHL, CHARIrY BEGINs AT HOME: GENERosrrY AND SELF-
INTEREST AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELrrE 25, 41 (1990); Bauman, Cialdini, &
Kenrick, Altrusm as Hedonism: Helping and Self-Gratification as Equivalent Responses, 40
J. PER. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1039 (1981); Worchel, The Darker Side of Gving, in
DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 382 (1984).
56 See infra text accompanying notes 65-74.
57 Cf. Johnson, The Charity Market: 77eory and Practice, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CHARrrY 92-93 (Inst. Econ. Affairs 1973) ("There is no free ride to heaven," or as Aldous
Huxley once noted, "Charity is a peculiar species of fire insurance.").
58 The second motive was suggested to us by a colleague, Ira Ellman. (We are not so
cynical as to have thought of it ourselves.) See also Atkinson, supra note 5, at 541-42
("Some donors no doubt glory in having their names attached, literally or otherwise, to
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entirely self-interested motivation since it would be an abuse of the fiduciary
obligation to shareholders for management to donate for any reason other than
enhancing the corporate image.
(4) Benefits in the nature of an exchange, in which the motive for the gift is a
material quid pro quo return to the donor. A nice example occurs in a recent
Supreme Court case that considered whether fees paid to the Church of
Scientology for spiritual "auditing" and training sessions were deductible
charitable contributions. 59
b. Donors Who Benefit Directly: Altruism Versus Egoism
One cynical version of philanthropy distinguishes truly "altruistic"
donations from those that are "egoistic," 60 arguing that the latter do not
deserve a subsidy because the donor partakes in the benefit he supports. At the
extreme, some theorists maintain that all giving is, by nature, egoistic because
it necessarily satisfies at least a desire to give. 61 Even under less tautological
definitions of altruism, some researchers contend that most giving is prompted
by the egoistic desire to benefit oneself, as by avoiding guilt or sadness, and
not by the simple desire to benefit another as an end in itself. 62 The debate
between altruism and egoism has occupied moral philosophers since the
ivied walls; others certainly seek to bask in the reflected glory of their alma mater's faculty
and future alumni.").
59 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 688-89 (1989).
60 Atkinson, supra note 5, at 526-32, who rejects this argument, describes this
distinction in terms of "weak" versus "strong" altruism. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322-24
(1977), develops this distinction in terms of gifts of "sympathy" and gifts of "commitment."
See also Harrison, supra note 52.
61 E.g., M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 10, at 311 ("It can in fact be argued that no
charitable or philanthropic disposition can ever be purely and wholly altruistic. The donor
or testator always expects some direct or indirect benefit in return, whether it be in the form
of a material or a spiritual reward."); Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 831, 880 (1979) ("charitable donors are the same as everyone else in an individualistic
society: they use their money for their own relative benefit. Even the most sincere altruist
buys the scarce resource of looking altruistic"). This view is said to have originated in 1651
from a discussion by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. There are two versions of this egoistic
position: that no one is ever motivated by a concern for another as an end in itself, and that
this motive is sometimes present but is outweighed by concern for one's own welfare. See
generally MacIntyre, Egoism and Altruism, supra note 33, at 462-63; Milo, Introduction, in
EGOISM AND ALTRUISM 3-11 (R. Milo ed. 1973) [volume as a whole hereinafter EGOISM].
62 See, e.g., Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps & Fultz, Empathy-Based Helping: Is it
Selflessly or Selfishly Motivated?, 52 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 749, 750
(1987) (presenting experimental results that indicate "that it is the egoistic desire to relieve
sadness, rather than the selfless desire to relive the sufferer, that motivates helping").
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writings of Kant, so we hold no pretense of being able to resolve it here.63 But
resolving it is not necessary to the present inquiry because the judgment here is
not a moral one; it is one of economics and social policy. The properly
formulated question for present examination asks, putting aside labels and
moral judgments, are donations still capable of signalling an activity that
deserves a social subsidy despite the potentially private consumption nature of a
donation? 64
Professor Gergen's work provides an apt illustration of the confusion that
unnecessarily confounds this inquiry. It is a misconception to distinguish
between "altruism" and "egoism," as Gergen does, by supposing that a tax
subsidy is not deserved when giving is motivated by the donor's desire to
benefit personally from the supported service rather than to benefit someone
else. 65 For instance, it is incorrect, or at least incomplete, to assert that those
who contribute to public television do so because they enjoy watching it.6 6 This
is a non sequitor. Except for those stricken by severe guilt, viewers who donate
are perfectly able to enjoy the service without paying, or, as the case with the
present authors, to give less than they would pay if forced to subscribe.
63 See generally the 30 pages of commentary following Absence of Egoistic Incentives,
supra note 30.
64 It might be thought that this question could be answered empirically, simply by
observing whether everyone who consumes the good in fact contributes to it. But, for some
goods, such as psychic gratification from the betterment of society, it is impossible to make
this determination. And, even if it were, there is no mechanism for determining whether
those who contribute do so to the full level of their benefit.
65 This criticism of Gergen holds, though, only if one views the exemption as a
subsidy. As noted earlier, see supra note 7, the alternate view holds that the exemption is
justified as part of the normative definition of the tax base. Under the tax base approach, it
is possible to argue that the degree of self-abnegation is relevant to whether a donor should
receive a deduction from income for a charitable contribution (as opposed to an exemption):
the donation should be included if the donor receives personal satisfaction (and thus has
"consumed" the donation), or on the contrary should be excluded if this consumption
element is missing. See, e.g., M. GRAErz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 478 (1989); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants, 28 TAX L. REv. 37, 47 (1972). We will not end this debate here. We note,
however, that the U.S. Treasury Department lists the charitable contribution deduction as a
tax expenditure item in the annual budget, and hence from a political standpoint, at least,
the deduction is viewed as a subsidy. See generally, S. SURREY & P. MCDANIEL, supra
note 7, at 2-25 (general overview of the tax expenditure concept as implemented in the
U.S. budget).
66 Gergen, supra note 23, at 1443-44 (most giving to public television "is easily
explained as the value donors place on the programming"); see also M. CHESTERMAN,
supra note 10, at 408 ("only genuinely altruistic, redistributive and socially useful projects
[should] be labelled charitable"; arguing that elite private schools, museums and the
performing arts do not deserve the exemption).
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Therefore, the desire to watch cannot, strictly speaking, be said to motivate the
decision to give. 67
More likely, viewers of public television give because of a sense of moral
obligation that makes the act of giving itself satisfying. That they obtain this
satisfaction from giving to a service they use themselves does not deprive the
gift of its ability to signal either worthiness or neediness. Indeed, the fact that
the donor has an interest in the service she supports verifies that the service has
real benefit, and, if donations are widespread, the benefit is one shared by a
significant portion of society at large.
Thus, a gift to cancer research motivated by the hope that the donor one
day may benefit personally from a cancer cure cannot be discounted even if this
motive is considered self-interested. The fact that the support occurs through a
donation rather than a purchase means that a sacrifice was made.68 Even under
the cynical view of giving to schools and churches, the fact that enhancing the
value of an educational degree is a benefit shared by many, as is the
construction of a spiritual clubhouse, tells us that the donation identifies a
service with a shared social benefit, however jaundiced or idealistic a spin we
might place on the benefit. 69 At the same time the donor enhances his own
welfare, he enhances the welfare of others similarly situated. This satisfaction
of the worthiness criterion will be predictably true of all donations, regardless
of the particular motive.70 The fact that the organization relies on donations
67 Few people would believe that their individual gift makes a tangible difference in
the actual quality or availability of the programming.
If Smith contributes $25 to public television, no sensible observer will suppose that
he does so expecting this will lead to $25 worth of improvement in his private viewing
of television, or indeed that his contribution will have any perceptible effect at all. Such
behavior looks extremely puzzling in terms of a nontautological interpretation of self-
interest.
H. MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY 12 (1982).
68 See Nagel, Comnent [on Arrow, Gtfts and Exchanges], in ALTRUISM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 59 (E. Phelps ed. 1975). The moral objection that might be
raised if the benefitted group is small and elite is considered below in Parts I.B. and
lII.B.2.d.
69 One might reasonably object to the government subsidizing through a tax exemption
a desire, however widely shared, to promote one's own educational degree. But this is
simply a cynical spin that might be placed on any support for education. One could equally
well argue that schools do nothing more than enable students to earn better paying jobs. A
donative exemption for education is thus no less appropriate than government funding for
schools.
70 However, as mentioned infra at note 238, if a donation is made in contemplation of
death, there may be a case for scrutinizing the degree of self-interest if one believes there is
less self-sacrifice in disposing of wealth that the donor can no longer use personally, other
than to give it to her family. In fact, the primary object of the law of charitable trusts is to
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rather than sales signals that the good is one the nature of which benefits a
number of people in a shared fashion. And the fact that the donor might have
chosen to enjoy the same benefits by relying on the contributions of others tells
us that contributions will be suppressed, at least somewhat, below the optimal
level of desired shared benefits. 71
The degree of self-abnegation in a gift is relevant, if at all,72 only to the
amount of subsidy that is deserved. A gift to an activity from which the donor
derives no tangible benefits might be thought to suffer relatively more from the
free rider inclination not to give. But it is doubtful whether it is worth the effort
to fine-tune the system of donative support to the extent that Gergen attempts. 73
determine whether a trust benefits the public or instead whether a disqualifying private
benefit is present. For instance, a trust to maintain the testator's grave (or that of his family)
is invalid, whereas one to maintain an entire graveyard is enforceable. RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 comment a (1958). Similarly, a trust to benefit employees of
the founder's company is noncharitable because, like a gift to his family, it primarily is
intended to enhance the founder's legacy. M. CHESTERMAN, supra note 10, at 313. These
fine distinctions are not necessary for inter vivos gifts, especially if giving to a particular
object is widespread.
71 Again, optimality is defined as the hypothetical level the public would purchase or
vote to support through taxes if market or government failure did not exist. Gergen
observes though that, in certain circumstances, the private benefit is large enough in
comparison to the external benefit to the public that voluntary action would not result in
undersupport. Gergen, supra note 23, at 1410-12. For instance, we can expect no
disinclination among adjacent property owners to call in a fire alarm because the benefit to
the one who voluntarily calls greatly exceeds the minimal cost. But even if these extreme
situations are classified as true donative acts (rather than quid pro quo exchanges), the very
slight effort required means that they will receive very little valuation in the measurement of
donative activity (in the example given, the value of the volunteer phone call would be 25
cents) and therefore will have an undiscernable effect on the availability of a subsidy.
72 It can be argued from one perspective that egoism presents a stronger case for a
donative subsidy than does altruism, considering that a donative subsidy requires a
government as well as a market failure (as discussed in Part JI.B.1., infra). The more
localized benefit associated with egoistic giving is more likely to suffer from such
government failure for the very reason that the benefit is less widely shared by voters at
large.
Hospitals nicely illustrate this relationship between insularity and giving. They received
a much greater portion of their revenues from donations at an earlier time in the century
when they primarily served closely knit ethnic and religious groups whose members desired
to assure for themselves a place to receive care that accomodated their particular practices
and beliefs. As community hospitals began to assume a more homogenous quality and
private insurance became more widespread, the basis for hospital giving became more
purely altruistic, but it also diminished greatly in response to the government's increased
funding. See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 400-03.
73 "You might buy a family television set not only because you enjoy it, or because
you enjoy seeing your spouse enjoy it, but because your spouse enjoys your own
enjoyment, and you enjoy the pleasure he or she receives in that indirect fashion. In other
words, rewards tend to reverberate through an interdependent, altruistic system . .. ."
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Absent the ability to read minds, it is impossible to know with any precision
the level of self-interest and free riding in personal motivations for giving. The
donative theory can survive these adulterations of motive just as it
accommodates the imperfections in the public goods rationale for giving.
The point of this analysis, simply put, is that the donor's participation in
the benefits conferred by the charity does not, standing alone, disqualify the
gift since all gifts partake of some form of self-interest. Otherwise, the gift
would not have been made.74 The quality of the motivation that the
egoism/altruism distinction attempts to capture is a moral assessment, not an
instrumental one that determines whether the donation signals a worthy and
needy activity; therefore, this assessment is not relevant to the justification for a
tax subsidy.
Still, the cynic maintains that some motivations are so crassly self-
satisfying or so unrelated to the worthiness of the recipient as to deprive the
Marwell, Altruism and the Problem of Collective Action, in COOPERATION, supra note 29,
at 220; see also SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 30, at 9 ("there seldom are characteristics
of the act that unequivocally indicate" the motive; "since altruistic intentions are socially
valued, actors are motivated to present their intentions as altruistic, and thus their reports
might not be reliable"); Simon, Tax Treatment, supra note 51, at 86 ("Ignoring motive may
be a necessity for the tax system; the search for purity of charitable intention would be an
unmanageable task, even ignoring the complications caused by psychoanalytic theory.").
This view has significant support in the decisions that wrestle with whether particular
payments qualify for the charitable deduction. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
690 (1989) (the IRS "has customarily examined the external features of the transaction in
question. This practice has the advantage of obviating the need for the IRS to conduct
imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers. The lower courts have
generally embraced this structural analysis.") (collecting citations); Crosby Valve & Gage
Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146-47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967)
("Were the deductibility of a contribution . . . to depend on 'detached and disinterested
generosity,' [language from the Commissioner v. Duberstein decision cited below] an
important area of tax law would become a mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial
value judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality.").
Justice Brennan might be thought to express a contrary view in his famous opinion in
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960), which maintains that the gift
characterization for purposes of what counts as income turns on an assessment of "affection,
respect, admiration, charity or the like impulses," an assessment that must be left to the
"mainsprings of human experience." This opinion makes clear, however, that objective
factors are important in measuring intent. Id. at 287 ("[There must be an objective inquiry
as to whether what is called a gift amounts to it in reality"). See generally Sliskovich,
Charitable Contributions or Gifts: A Contemporaneous Look Back to the Future, 57 U. Mo.
K.C. L. REV. 437, 470-87 (1989); Atkinson, supra note 5, at 530 n.92.
74 SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 30, at 7 ("If behavior that demands various
sacrifices is not reinforced in any way, it would extinguish over time.... When a person
behaves prosocially out of altruistic intentions, purely to benefit another, he is still likely to
have some anticipation of, and certainly the experience of, such reinforcement."); Broad,
Egoism as a 77teory of Human Motives, in EGOISM, supra note 61, at 97-98 (all giving is
ultimately self-regarding in some sense).
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gift of any ability to signal a deserving activity. These further attacks on the
donative theory can be countered more effectively, however, by abandoning
egoism/altruism and turning to a more useful distinction some theorists draw
between the "act utility" and the "result utility" of voluntary activity.
c. Giving for Giving's Sake: Act Versus Result Utility
A number of theorists have postulated two polar categories of motivation
for a gift. 75 A gift satisfies a donor's "act utility function" if the donor desires
to participate personally in addressing a social need. Such donors give perhaps
to obtain a sense of righteousness, 76 perhaps to attach their names to the
projects supported, perhaps to avoid social ostracism, 77 or perhaps to advance
their careers. By contrast, charity satisfies a potential donor's "result utility
function" if he desires only the social good that the charity produces. Act
utility stresses means; the donor is satisfied by participation without regard to
whether participation produces a beneficial end. In contrast, result utility
stresses ends; satisfaction occurs by bettering some social condition regardless
of the individual's actual participation in bringing about this result.78 The act
75 This distinction is recognized and developed in a number of sources using varying
terminology. The source from which we borrow this particular terminology is Ireland, The
Colculus of Philanthropy, in THE ECONOMICS OF CHARITY 70-71 (Inst. Econ. Affairs
1973) [article hereinafter, Ireland, The Calculus of Philanthropy], which observes that act
utility is sometimes called the "Kantian" motive. Id. at 67-68. The same distinction has
been drawn in terms on "endocentric" versus "exocentric" motives for giving. Karylowski,
Two Types of Altrdstic Behavior: Doing Good To Feel Good or To Make the Other Feel
Good, in COOPERATION, supra note 29, at 397. Recent economic theory has focused on
"pure" versus "impure" altruism. E.g., Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public
Goods: A 7heory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990) [hereinafter Andreoni,
Donations to Public Goods]; Andreoni, Giving With Impure Altrds: Applications to
Chady and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447 (1989); see also H.
MARGOLIS, supra note 67, at 21; Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUiSM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 17-18 (E. Phelps ed. 1975); Calabresi, Comment [on Arrow,
Gifts and Exchanges], id. at 58-59. For particularly helpful illustrations that give flesh and
bones to this distinction by showing how it classifies specific motivations taken from real-
world hypotheticals, see Karylowski supra, at 407, and Karylowski, Focus of Attention and
Altruism: Endocentric and Exocentric Sources of Altruistic Behavior, in DEVELOPMENT
AND MAINTENANCE OF PRosOCIAL BEHAVIOR 141-43 (1984).
76 E. JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN MARKET
ECONOMICS 25-26 (1986) (describing the "buying-in" mentality that allows donors to feel
good about the charity's activities and claim them partially as their own).
77 "An arts fund may reward contributors... by printing their names in a program.
Workers ensure cooperation with a strike by threatening to ostracize or beat up
strikebreakers." Oliver, supra note 51, at 1356.
78 An everyday analogy might help to further clarify this distinction. Some people
view shopping simply as a pleasurable activity in itself, a way to spend a rainy Sunday
afternoon, even if they find nothing they want to buy, whereas others enjoy acquiring new
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utility of a particular gift is individualized to the donor, whereas the result
utility is shared broadly by other like-minded concerned citizens. The act/result
distinction is similar to egoism/altruism 79 but is more revealing for our
purposes because it directs our focus away from a primarily moral assessment
of donative motive.
If pure act utility characterized a significant number of donations, the
donative theory of the exemption would be seriously weakened.80 If one gives
to Ethiopian famine relief solely because the act of giving is gratifying and
wholly without regard to whether the food ever reaches the starving population,
then the donation meets neither the worthiness nor the neediness test. The
existence of such a gift does not serve as a reliable indicator of public need; it
is more in the nature of a sacrificial offering. Like a prayer, the only benefit it
definitely provides is the donor's private psychic gratification. No free riding
attaches to such pure act utility donations. The donor reaps all of the benefits of
giving but does so only if he gives. Because the full benefit of this gratification
is internalized to the donor, he can be expected to contribute up to the desired
level, and because the benefit obtains only if the donor participates personally,
an indirect tax subsidy to the recipient would not enhance this private benefit.
However, it is only in this hypothesized world of extreme act utility that
the donative exemption would be a complete waste. It seems quite likely that
virtually all gifts are motivated by a mix of act and result utilities. 81 Unless
there were some form of act utility, the donor would have no reason to make
the personal sacrifice of a gift. And, unless the object of the donation were at
possessions but would prefer, if possible, to avoid the hassle of doing the shopping
themselves.
79 Egoism seems to align with act utility and altruism with result utility, but this is not
necessarily the case. One could view as selfish an individual's purely abstract interest in the
betterment of society because such a person has no interest in doing anything personally to
help, or one could view as noble a person's desire to contribute to a charitable cause even if
prodded by the value of name recognition.
80 See Calabresi, supra note 75, at 59 (such giving entails no public good problem);
Lee & McKenzie, Second Thoughts on the Public-Good Justification for Government
Poverty Programs, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 189, 194 (1990) (same). The theory would not be
destroyed unless all donations fell at this polar extreme.
81 Karylowski, Two Types of AltM'dc Behavior: Doing Good To Feel Good or To
Make the Other Feel Good, in COOPERATION, supra note 29, at 397-98; Steinberg,
Voluntary Donations and Public Expenditures in a Federalist System, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
24 (1987). One telling method for determining the relative mix of act and result utility is the
extent to which an increase in government expenditures on a public good "crowd out"
private donations. If government spending crowds out at a 1:1 ratio, it is likely then that
donors are concerned only with the result, not their personal participation. However, if
increased government expenditures fail to displace any private giving, pure act utility is
suggested. Empirical findings suggest that the crowd-out effect is somewhere between these
two extremes. Kingma, An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-out Effect, Income Effect,
and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1197 (1989).
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least somewhat successful in achieving its desired ends, the donor would not
likely derive any pleasure from personal participation, or at least would not
continue to support the particular object in the future. In short, one can suppose
that, all else being equal, those charities that do the most good will also
produce the strongest act utility.
This mixture of personal satisfaction in helping, with an eye to the results
that obtain, is precisely the condition that characterizes the paradigm case for
the economic theory of the donative subsidy. Act utility can be thought of as
the private good aspect of giving that motivates individual donors to reveal the
existence of some unmet public need, whereas result utility can be thought of as
the public good aspect of giving that maintains a free rider disinclination to
meet the need at an optimal level. 82 For example, the personal gratification that
comes from helping to address world hunger motivates donors to reveal their
concern for world hunger; however, the generalized nature of the gratification
that society receives in the more abstract knowledge that fewer people are
starving is a benefit that is affected by free riding.
Still, it is a matter of psychological empiricism whether act utility fails to
match result utility, that is, whether one's pleasure in participating is less than
the actual social value in avoiding starvation (value as measured by
hypothesized market or political spending decisions). In the cases examined
earlier of support for public television and religion, the donor received directly
the societal benefit supported. Because the donor's portion of the benefit in
those cases is a small fraction of the whole, there is a predictable basis for
concluding that the private benefit will induce a suboptimal level of support.
Here, however, the private benefit is of a secondary nature: it is the donor's
gratification in doing something to make others better off that induces a gift.83
But it is not this private gratification that the exemption subsidizes (nor is it, in
rigorous theory, the welfare of the primary recipients);84 the exemption
addresses society's shared concern over the welfare of the primary recipients.
The difficulty is that there is no necessary relationship between the proxy and
the primary object. Conceivably, the level of gratification that donors receive
from gifts to pediatric oncology wards could (1) fall short of, (2) equal, or (3)
82 See Ireland, The Calculus of Philanthropy, supra note 75, at 70.
83 The demarcation between these two cases is not as sharp in reality as we have
drawn it here for purposes of illustration. We have already observed that, because the
direct, tangible benefit to a viewer who supports public television is actually quite small, it
is probably the psychic value of giving that serves as the prime motivation. Nevertheless,
we use this as one analytical peg because of its contrast with instances of giving for which
the motivation can only be psychic.
84 Therefore, it is technically not on point to argue that the donor's empathetic
experience of the recipient's suffering is likely to be less than the actuality of that suffering.
The case for a donative subsidy turns on showing that donors contribute less than they and
others empathize.
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exceed the reality of how much society as a whole actually benefits from saving
children from cancer. 85
This is a troubling observation because it means that, although mixed
act/result donations signal worthy causes, they do not necessarily signal needy
causes: the level of donations may already be sufficient to meet the
hypothesized societal optimum. 86 Nevertheless, there is some assurance in
recognizing that the incentive to give has a self-correcting nature that tends to
(but does not necessarily) weed out the possibility of excessive donations and
depress them below the socially optimal level. We call this mechanism a
market in altruism.
The market in altruism works as follows. Those donors who desire to
make some personal contribution to the betterment of society will have many
choices from which to satisfy this desire. They will naturally tend to choose the
outlet that provides the most satisfaction. We can generally assume that, for
most donors, this will be the worthy objects they perceive as needing the most
support. However, as gifts combined with subsidies begin to approach the
socially desired level (as measured through the perceptions of those inclined to
give), gifts will begin to taper off. In stable social settings, these countervailing
forces may settle at an equilibrium, but as social conditions change, this market
in altruism redirects philanthropy and the accompanying tax subsidy to new
objects. That some giving is uninformed, over-reactive, or otherwise might
come from donors who are oblivious to social worth or need is troubling, but
no more so than similar defects in the private or political markets. Moreover,
the fact that a recipient must show a substantial level of donative support
before qualifying for the charitable exemption means that minor aberrational
patterns are usually screened out.
d. Promotional Gifts: Self-Regarding Versus Other-Regarding Motives
The prior section demonstrates that dividing the universe of donative
motives between act and result utilities further reinforces the conclusion that
motive does not matter. We still have not addressed, however, the most
troubling case: where the motive to donate is entirely selfish. To clarify, we
85 See Ireland, The Calculus of Philanthropy, supra note 75, at 71 ("The amount of
funds individuals seek to provide [for reasons of act utility] is not directly related to the
amount they would seek to have in terms of the public goods motives... . This dichotomy
leads to the paradox that individuals might voluntarily contribute for the provision of a
public good in excess of the amount of the public good which would be justified by [result
utility] efficiency conditions.").
86 This is possible, even if some public good aspect exists, because the private benefit
that donors derive merely from the act of giving conceivably is sufficient to exceed the
desire by those who consume, but do not pay for, the social benefits. See Lee & McKenzie,
supra note 80, at 194.
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introduce a third distinction in donative motives: self-regarding versus other-
regarding motives.87 Both egoism and altruism, and both act utility and result
utility, can be reconciled with the assumption that the motive to give springs
from some regard for the welfare of another being, which regard forms the
basis for the gift's signalling function. Some giving, however, can be shown to
be entirely selfish in the sense that the donor's gratification is wholly driven by
his own material well-being. This might be termed either a strong version of
egoism88 or an extreme form of act utility.8 9
To illustrate, a donor may give large sums to education solely as an act of
crass self-promotion to obtain the community recognition that comes from
naming a building or a professorship, caring nothing about the quality of
education or even the values of gift-giving. This possibility does not rob gifts
of their ability to signal worthiness for the simple reason that the social
approval desired by the donor would not be forthcoming unless the object of
the publicized gift were considered worthy by a broad segment of the public.
Thus, even the most self-interested donation qualifies under our deservedness
criterion if the private reputational benefit enjoyed by the donor serves as a
proxy for social worthiness, in the same way that act utility serves as a proxy
for result utility.90
The epitome of this category of purely self-interested giving is corporate
philanthropy, which occurs primarily (if not solely) as a marketing strategy to
enhance the corporation's image in the community. 91 "Few corporations
engage in philanthropy because others need money, as though a corporation
87 This is suggested by the discussion in MacIntyre, Egoism and Altruism, supra note
33, at 463.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 75-86; Ireland, 77e Calculus of Philanthropy,
supra note 75, at 74.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 75-86. By way of analogy, it makes no
difference if the present authors are motivated to write this article solely by the professional
prestige that attaches to its publication in this fine journal, rather than by any consideration
of the good this article might do for society or for the body of academic knowledge. If the
prestige associated with this journal depends on the worth of its articles, our (hypothesized?)
selfish motives serve as a proxy that motivates us to improve the quality of our work.
91 See Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than a
Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARmETIES AND GOALS 246
(R. Magat ed. 1989); Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 340, 348 (W. Powell ed. 1987) (containing extensive bibliography).
To verify this, one study "found that the percentage of a utility's gross income contributed
to nonprofit organizations is strongly correlated with the company's advertising and
customer service expenditures . . .. [indicating] that charity is, in part, an extension of
advertising and customer relations. . . . [I]ndustries with high levels of contact with the
public, such as insurance, retail, and lodging, maintain significantly larger advertising and
contributions programs than do mining, construction, primary metals, and other industries
whose contact with the public is far more limited." Id.
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were a well-heeled uncle who should spread his good fortune around the
family. For the most part, corporations give because it serves their own
interests-or appears to." 92 Indeed, any other motive would be a breach of the
corporate managers' fiduciary duty to use corporate funds to benefit
shareholders' economic interests. This public relations strategy, however, is
successful only to the extent that the objects supported by corporate
philanthropy are perceived by the public as being worthwhile.
Still, a reputation-driven donor does not signal an object in need of a social
subsidy if the rewards from public reputation are strong enough to induce the
optimal amount of giving. As a matter of theory, there is no guarantee that
slippage always exists; if it does not, there is, in effect, no free riding since the
private rewards from giving (reputation enhancement) are enough to overcome
fully the market defect that gave rise to the donation. Nevertheless, there is
strong reason to suppose that pure selfish giving signals an object that needs
subsidy. Again, this likely assurance is found in the concept of a market in
altruism. One who gives for crass self-promotion will choose the object of
giving that produces the most bang for the buck, all other factors being equal.
This choice will likely be the worthy object among the donor's range of choices
that is perceived by the target population as being the most in need of support.
It can be expected that, as the perceived need is more closely met, the
reputational value of giving will fall off, shifting reputational value and
attendant donors' dollars to other, more recognized causes. This market in
altruism creates some confidence (but not a guarantee) that the money of even
the most selfish donors is not wasted on unneedy objects.
Only in rare instances will the motivation for giving be wholly divorced
from an assessment of the object's worthiness. One example is a gift prompted
entirely by the nuisance value of avoiding harassing solicitation, with no
thought to the cause being served. Consider, for instance, the harried traveler
accosted in an airport by religious fanatics. The traveler might give some small
change rather than pausing to consider how to extract himself politely.
Although such a gift arguably supports a public benefit, this benefit plays
absolutely no role in motivating the gift. Therefore, the gift serves no
worthiness-signalling function. The donor might be entirely ambivalent, or
even hostile, to the cause.93
92 Smith, The Unsentimental Corporate Giver, FORTUNE, Sept. 1981, at 121.
93 Another application of this principle is found in Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States,
699 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which considered the deductibility of a property
owner/developer's donation of land for a new high school. The court found no qualifying
gift because the IRS determined that the primary motive was that construction of the school
would necessitate building access roads adjacent to the owner's property, which would
increase the value of his land. Because this benefit is unrelated to the value of the school, it
does not serve as a valid proxy of the donation's worthiness.
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Undoubtedly, a nuisance element plays some role in giving. But unless an
organization relies entirely on pure nuisance gifts, this simply becomes a partial
impurity in the process, which might affect the level of tax support we should
provide donative institutions, but which does not eliminate the case for
exemption altogether. Even then, it is questionable whether it is worth the
administrative costs of detecting this minor noise factor in the philanthropic
sector.
This analysis demonstrates that, even in the extreme case of a pure act
utility donor motivated entirely by selfish considerations of personal reputation,
the object of the donation in all likelihood still deserves subsidy. This being
true for the weakest imaginable case for social subsidy, we can be confident
that donations generally deserve subsidy without engaging in close empirical
examination of the precise motives behind individual acts or categories of
philanthropy.
e. Donors Who Receive a Quid Pro Quo: Gifts Versus Purchases
Are there any situations, then, in which apparent donations fail to satisfy
the requirements for subsidy? There are, but they may be considered cases of
spurious donations in which it is proper to say that no gift exists at all; rather a
purchase is made from the recipient. The test for such pseudo gifts is whether
the gift is prompted by a quid pro quo, not merely an incentive.94 By quid pro
quo, we mean an exchange between the "donor" and the recipient in which the
value of the return consideration is independent of the gift itself. Thus, what
distinguishes a social club from a church is not a theoretical analysis of the
presence of a public good, altruistic motive, or private benefit, but the simple
fact that the club chooses to charge membership fees, excluding those who do
not pay, whereas the church chooses to rely on donations, making its services
available even to those who do not contribute.
The quid pro quo test is familiar to courts that have wrestled with gift
characterization problems for purposes of the charitable deduction. 95 One who
94 Atkinson adopts this test in his extensive discussion of altruism: "What is distinct
about my donors is not that they give without gain, but that any satisfaction they derive
from giving is not in the form of a material quid pro quo for their donation." Atkinson,
supra note 5, at 526.
95 The most oft-quoted test for what constitutes a "contribution" under § 170 of the
Code is the "detached and disinterested generosity" language contained in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (to be a gift,
transaction must proceed from a "detached and disinterested generosity" on the part of the
taxpayer), a case that dealt with when an economic receipt constitutes a gift excluded from
income under § 102 of the Code, rather than what constitutes a "contribution" under § 170.
See B. BHTKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 35.1.3, at 35-38 (1990); M. GRAEMz, supra note 65, at 482. Although this test
implies an analysis of subjective intent, courts generally have looked to objective factors
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pays for spiritual training sessions that are not delivered absent payment makes
no donation,96 nor does a developer who dedicates park land to the city in
order to obtain zoning concessions. 97 The purchase of a ticket to the
policeman's ball, however, does constitute a gift to the extent that the ticket
price exceeds its market value.98
The participation enjoyment derived by an act utility donor might be
characterized as a form of quid pro quo: the donor purchases psychic
signifying motive when applying it to charitable contributions. See supra note 73, Dockery
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 317, 321 (1978) (reviewing a number of alternative tests for
charitable contributions, especially for contributions by business entities). See generally
Sliskovich, supra note 73.
96 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1989) (payments for spiritual
"auditing" sessions conducted by the Church of Scientology do not constitute gifts; "[a]s the
Tax Court found, these payments were part of a quintessential quid pro quo exchange: in
return for their money, petitioners received an identifiable benefit, namely, auditing and
training sessions . . . in each branch church. . . .Each of these practices reveals the
inherently reciprocal nature of the exchange."). We would hold the same for churches and
synagogues that charge for pews, membership or special services. See supra note 39.
Naturally, this presents issues of line-drawing when the requirement of payment is not
overt, yet strong pressure is exerted to make the payment. These lines, however, are
nothing new. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46, in which the IRS
recharacterized "donations" to private schools as tuition payments.
In contrast, an instance of truly sham religious donations occurred recently in
California:
They say they are practicing the world's oldest religion. But police say their
enterprise resembles the world's oldest profession. Such is the debate surrounding Will
and Mary Ellen Tracy, a Canyon Country couple who have hit the national talk-show
circuit to promote the unorthodox theology of the Church of the Most High Goddess, a
"sex church" the Tracys operate in West Los Angeles.... Mary Ellen Tracy says she
and other women act as priestesses who absolve the sins of male followers through
sexual religious rites that predate Christianity. So far, she says, she has brought more
then 2,000 male converts into the church. "Anything God wants from me, I will give
him," said Tracy, 46. "If he wants me to be monogamous, I'll be monogamous. If he
says go have sex with 20,000 men, I'll do it."
Last week, Los Angeles Police Department vice officers arrested the Tracys-
Mary Ellen on suspicion of prostitution and Will on suspicion of pimping-citing the
couple's request for donations to the church .... Will Tracy, 51, acknowledged the
church followers must contribute money or services to participate in the rituals that
involve sexual intercourse. But he said the contributions are religious sacrifices.
Padilla, Is Church Old-Vime Religion or Prosttuon?, L.A. Times, April 16, 1989, at 6,
col. 1 (Metro section). The couple was ultimately convicted. L.A. Times, Sept. 9, 1989, at
10, col. 4 (Metro section).
97 Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009
(1971); Sliskovich, supra note 73, at 460-70.
98 Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (bifurcating charity ball ticket price into sales
and contribution elements).
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gratification in exchange for the gift. But this is a benefit integral to the act of
giving. By analogy to the doctrine of consideration, it is not given by the
recipient, and cannot be characterized as having been bargained for.99 A closer
case is presented by one who receives the opportunity to name an educational
building in exchange for a large gift-a return benefit that, if it were bargained
for, would likely be viewed as legal consideration. 100 However, because the
reputational value associated with the naming opportunity flows from the very
act of making the gift and serves as a proxy for the social worth of the
recipient, the value is not independent of the gift itself and so we classify it as a
true donation. With these prototypes in mind, the quid pro quo test should
serve as a reliable guide for differentiating true purchases from the self-interest
that might be said to attend any donation.
4. Summary: The Market in Altruism
The paradigm case for subsidizing the objects of donations is the role of
altruism in rectifying the market failure that afflicts public goods. This
paradigm, however, covers few instances of actual giving. There are two
imperfections: the objects of most gifts are not true public goods, and the
motives for giving are not purely altruistic. The donative theory avoids these
difficulties because of its great generalizeability: it applies to virtually any act
of giving, regardless of the object or the motive. The existence of a significant
level of giving identifies a product or service the production of which is desired
but not available through private markets. And, due to the free rider
disinclination to give, we know that donations systematically will fail to
support the optimal level of production (as measured by production if there
were no market or government failure).
The power of this theory is that we need not understand why orchestras
solicit and baseball teams do not, why social clubs charge admission but
churches do not, or what is altruism and what is egoism. Motive matters only
for the limited purpose of separating donations from purchases, but this is best
done by looking for objective manifestations of an exchange whose return value
is unrelated to the mere making of the gift. Discussion in terms of egoism
confuses self-interest, which is always present to some degree in every
99 See A. FARNswORTH, CONTRACTs 41-49 (1982). As tax scholars have noted,
nearly every charitable contribution is prompted by some inherent benefit that might be
called a quid pro quo. B. BrTrKER & L. LoKKEN, supra note 95, at 35.1.3; M. GRAETZ,
supra note 65, at 482-87. For instance, surely one reason Texaco has sponsored the
Metropolitan Opera broadcasts for over 50 years is the image-polishing publicity it receives.
Nevertheless, case law establishes that such incidental benefits do not disqualify a payment
from donation status. B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra, at 35.1.3 (collecting cases).
100 Allegheny College v. National Chautaugua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E.
173 (1927).
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transaction, with a quid pro quo, which indicates an act of pure private
consumption.
This distinction is most easily seen in the case of donors who receive
tangible benefits from the services they support. Their direct participation in
the benefits makes their gifts stronger, not weaker, signals of social worth.
Subtler forms of self-interest, such as the donor who receives only psychic
benefits from giving, and crasser forms, such as the donor who cares only
about the reputational value of giving, are more challenging, however, because
the proxy relationship between the motive to give and social worth tends to
weaken our confidence that donations necessarily reveal causes that are both
socially valued and in need of additional support. Nevertheless, even these
motivations can be rehabilitated by observing that a market in altruism operates
to direct these gifts to those objects that society perceives as most deserving.
Like other markets, this one will not operate flawlessly, but it should operate
predictably enough so that we can avoid the need to engage in intensive
empirical examination of the subjective reasons for giving.
5. Retained Earnings as Donations
The preceding discussion addresses objections that the donative theory goes
too far. In reality, few such critics are likely to surface since our theory will be
seen as a significant retraction of the existing scope of the charitable exemption.
Nevertheless, answering these objections is essential to establishing the
donative theory on a firm analytical foundation. But, of more immediate
significance are objections that the donative theory does not go far enough.
Principally, it is possible to argue, following the comprehensive discussion
of altruism recently published by Professor Atkinson,101 that our application of
the donative theory incorrectly excludes from its coverage some organizations
that deserve subsidy even under the theory's own terms. We maintain that the
only nonprofits that qualify for an exemption are those that receive a significant
portion of their revenues from donations. Atkinson, however, argues that
virtually all nonprofit organizations 102 should be exempt because implicit in
their formation is an act of altruism that deserves a social subsidy: in choosing
the nonprofit over the proprietary institutional form, the organizer is agreeing
in advance to devote the entirety of her potential stream of earnings to the
enterprise that the institution is established to further. 10 3 This donative act is
101 Atkinson, supra note 5, at 542-57, 616-20.
102 The sole exception is for so-called mutual benefit organizations-social clubs,
mutual insurance companies, and the like-which are nevertheless exempt under a different
rationale. See supra note 22.
103 "[The net revenues that otherwise would have been distributable to its founders
are now committed to the purposes for which the organization was created. Thus, the
founders' initial contribution of their potential earnings has an on-going aspect; the
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implicit in the formation decision by virtue of the core defining characteristic of
nonprofit corporations: they are prohibited by law from distributing their
earnings and so must retain them for use within the institution. Therefore, even
if the organization receives no donations whatsoever but derives all of its
income from sales in the commercial marketplace, Atkinson would still classify
it as a donative (" altruistic" ) institution. 104
This nonsuperficial argument for applying the otherwise restrictive
donative theory, paradoxically, would greatly expand the charitable exemption
beyond its present bounds. This argument, however, is based on a flawed view
of what constitutes a donation, as can be seen by applying the principles just
explicated. First, the company's yearly act of retaining its earnings is in no
sense a form of corporate philanthropy for the very fact that this retention is
compelled by law. This lack of choice in the matter means that a nonprofit
organization's annual retention of earnings neither serves as a disinterested
assessment of its own social worth in that year nor is it accompanied by a
disincentive to "give"-the two qualities necessary for donations to deserve tax
exempt support.
If the mere existence of nonprofit enterprise is to constitute donative
activity, it is only by virtue of the initial organizational decision. However,
there are at least two reasons to reject the initial organizational decision as a
form of donation.10 5 First, corporate organizers who forgo a stream of
organization embodies their altruism." Atkinson, supra note 5, at 551; see Weisbrod,
Private Goods, Collective Goods: 7he Role of the Nonprofit Sector, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS 151 (1980).
The result of this position-that all nonprofits should be exempt because they retain
their earnings rather than distribute them to shareholders-is the same as the result under
the argument we previously examined which we described as the "plow-back" variant of the
community benefit theory. Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 383-84.
There, however, the justification for exempting all nonprofits was different from the
justification examined here.
104 Atkinson offers as an example the Orton Ceramic Company, a trust founded by
Mr. Orton at his death with instructions to continue his life's work researching and
producing parts used in the ceramic firing process. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 545-46. One
can speculate that Mr. Orton's desire to promote the craft of ceramics motivated him to
make an enduring donation to this enterprise of all its future earnings. However, the
argument for this entity's exempt status does not rest solely with the organizational decision
to retain future earnings, for the formation of the trust itself entailed the making of an
actual, substantial donation from Mr. Orton's estate. Ultimately, though, we would not find
this company to be donative because, for reasons explained in the text accompanying notes
252-56, infra, we would require greater evidence of deservedness than simply one gift from
a single donor.
105 The analytical path we follow here is identical to that used by the Supreme Court in
the analogous context of determining whether purchasers of insurance policies from the
ABA could claim tax deductible contributions for allowing the ABA to keep the dividends
that the insurance policies earned. United States v. American Bar Found., 477 U.S. 105
(1986). The Court rejected the ABA's argument that the policyholders' decision to forego
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potential profits give away something that they never had. This decision does
not partake of the same level of self-sacrifice as one who pays hard-earned cash
out of pocket. Second, for many nonprofit organizations there are several
reasons to suppose that the organizational choice was strongly influenced by the
organizers' own financial interests.
Professor Hansmann offers one such reason. He explains that nonprofit
organizations exist in most of their manifestations' 06 to correct certain
"contract failures" (i.e., market defects) in the ability of consumers to monitor
the quality of services they purchase from the organization. The constraint on
distributing profits that attaches to nonprofit firms remedies the inability to
monitor by removing managers' ability to divert firm funds to their own
pockets-the major form of abuse. 10 7 The principal application of this trust
theory is to donative nonprofits since the "patrons" of these companies have
the least ability to monitor what happens to their payments. But Hansmann also
applies the theory to commercial nonprofits, arguing that consumers prefer to
patronize nonprofits for complex services whose quality is difficult to
monitor. 10 8 Thus, some commercial entrepreneurs may choose the nonprofit
dividends reflected their desire to further the ABA's public service mission. The Court
reasoned that no donations occurred from year-to-year because the policyholders were
bound by contract to forego the dividends, and that no donation occurred at the time
policyholders signed up because there was no evidence they were motivated by generosity
as opposed to the inconvenience of bargaining more aggressively with the Foundation. Id. at
113-14.
106 Hansmann recognizes that there are exceptions to this theory, primarily for so-
called mutual benefit organizations described in note 22 supra. Hansmann concludes that
these organizations are peripheral to the nonprofit form because they more accurately
represent a third and distinct form of organization-cooperative corporations. Hansmann,
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PENN. L. REv. 497, 582-83 (1981).
Ellman, however, sees mutual benefit organizations as central to the nonprofit form.
Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REv. 999 (1982). This
debate is not germane to our analysis since the exemption of mutual benefit nonprofits
stands on separate footing from the subsidy theories that this article discusses. See supra
note 22.
107 Hansmann, supra note 106, at 506; see also infra text accompanying notes 156-59
(further elaboration of Hansmann's trust rationale).
108 Several scholars, though, disagree with this assertion, noting that many complex
services are not nonprofit and that those that are nonprofit are not uniquely difficult to
evaluate. See J. DOUGLAS, supra note 23, at 100 ("Private medical practice, dentistry, the
law, the learned professions generally, the supply of pharmaceutical drugs, electrical
contracting, any number of building trade crafts, automobile and television repairs are all
fields in which the for-profit form is dominant."); Ellman, supra note 106, at 1032-33
(parents routinely evaluate child care services); Krashinsky, Transaction Costs, supra note
23, at 121-22 (stressing the difference between the two types of monitoring problems);
Yoder, Economic Theories of For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations, in INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, FoR-PRoFrr ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 20 (B. Grey ed. 1986) (noting that
for-profits have large share of child care and nursing home markets and no share of legal
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form simply to attract more customers.10 9 This organizational motive is fully
justified on a quid pro quo basis and therefore signals no need for a subsidy.
Since there is no systemic bar 110 to organizers' self-interested choice of an
organizational form that maximizes its receipts, a subsidy is superfluous. 111
Another welfare-maximizing explanation is that organizers choose the
nonprofit form merely to obtain the exemption itself." 2 If the combined
financial benefits of the property, sales and income tax exemptions, together
services, personal computers, or used cars). For purposes of our argument, however, it is
not necessary either that all complex services be nonprofit or that all commercial nonprofits
entail complex services. Our argument stands as long as this explanation applies to some
nonprofits.
109 Atkinson's response to this possibility is that it is irrelevant since, regardless of the
founder's motive, the institution's earnings are used to subsidize the purchases by its
customers. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 553. This explanation seriously misunderstands the
significance of a donation to eligibility for a tax subsidy. It is nice that retained earnings are
so used, but the question is why such an operation deserves a further subsidy from
taxpayers. The only possible basis is if the founder's decision is driven by a disinterested
recognition of social need. Declaring motive irrelevant in this circumstance removes from
the organizational decision its signalling function.
110 True enough, barriers to entry and expansion may exist in particular areas of
nonprofit activity. For instance, Hansmann explains why some commercial nonprofits may
suffer from a comparative disadvantage in accessing capital markets. Hansmann, Exempting
Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 5, at 84. But these and other conceivable barriers do
not apply to all nonprofits. Therefore, they do not provide a convincing reason to link tax
exemption to nonprofit status generally. See generally Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit
Hospitals, supra note 6, at 387-89 (critique of Hansmann's capital subsidy theory).
Ill This analysis is nicely illustrated by the several explanations for the predominance
of nonprofit hospitals. Nonprofit enterprise is thought by many to proliferate in the hospital
industry because doctors find it more attractive. There are varying accounts, different in
their positive and negative emphases, on why doctors have this preference. See supra Hall
& Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, note 6, at 367-74. However, they all share the premise
that hospital organizers choose the nonprofit form to attract the most doctors, which
maximizes the flow of patients.
112 Witness the periodic news reports of "self-declared religious leaders whose faith
emerges only at tax time." Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal
Church Disputes, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1378, 1442 (1981). For instance, 88% of the residents
of Hardenburgh, New York once became ordained ministers of the "Universal Life
Church" in order to turn their homes into temples and thereby claim a tax exemption. Id. at
1442 n.182.
Presently, the only way taxing authorities have to police such abuse of the exemption is
for the government to determine whether the organization constitutes a "genuine" religion,
yet "such external definitions are notoriously difficult to frame or administer; one is always
on the edge of constitutional catastrophe." Id. at 1442-43; see Slye, Rendering Unto
Caesar: Defining "Religion "for Purpose of Adminstering Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6
HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL. 219 (1983). The donative theory skirts this danger by using
actual donations as an objective guide to the public's assessment of the genuineness of the
organization.
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with reduced postal rates, access to tax-exempt bond financing, and other
economic advantages, are greater than the enterprise's expected earnings, then
the trade-off of profits for exemption is nothing more than a purchase of an
exemption. In labor-intensive service businesses, for example, the business
organizers often pay out most, if not all of the potential profit in the form of
salaries to employees and owners. 113 If the exemption helps avoid an entity-
level tax,1 14 more money is left to distribute as salary or to pay for workplace
amenities. The consequence of applying the donative theory in this scenario
would be an entirely self-justifying, viciously circular application of the
exemption that would rob it of any test for deservedness: the exemption would
go to whatever organization chooses the nonprofit form for purposes of
obtaining the exemption-in other words, to whomever wanted it.115
113 Atkinson, supra note 5, at 544-45.
114 Observe, though, that such enterprises can be organized in a manner that avoids an
entity-level income tax. For instance, because the 1986 Tax Reform Act put corporate tax
rates below personal rates and repealed the General Utilities doctrine that had permitted
corporate owners to pay a single capital gains tax on corporate income upon sale or
liquidation of the corporation, conventional tax advice for service businesses has been to
organize as a partnership or Subchapter S corporation to avoid the double level of tax
inherent in the regular corporate structure. See Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the
Methodical Disincorporation of America After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 64 TAXEs 962
(December 1986); Gonyo, Tax Planning Opportunities Using S Corporations Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 65 TAXES 552 (August 1987). These alternative structures, however,
have their own limitations: partnerships require at least one person with unlimited liability,
while Subchapter S limits the number and kind of investors. See I.R.C. § 1361 (West Supp.
1991); W. McKEE, W. NELSON & N. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 3.06 (2d ed. 1990). Moreover, neither avoids a property
tax. Therefore, one can easily conceive of situations in which a regular corporation with a
tax exemption remains the most attractive form.
115 Nevertheless, one can attempt to rehabilitate the argument for exempting
commercial nonprofits under the donative theory by observing that a valid social signalling
function occurs in the decision of customers to patronize a nonprofit over a competing for-
profit facility. Some people may choose to give their business to the nonprofit simply
because they approve of the nonprofit's activities. For instance, in United States v.
American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986), the Supreme Court considered whether
ABA members make deductible contributions when they purchase ABA Endowment-
sponsored insurance policies. The Court held no; the policies were competitively priced and
therefore the members received a full, quid pro quo exchange. Nevertheless, one could
argue that the members' decision to shop with the ABA operates as a quasi-donation
because it signals their approval of ABA activities.
However, the problems under this variant argument for crediting retained earnings as
donations are the same as under the main line. We have no easy way to determine whether
customers make their shopping decisions based solely on self-interest (perhaps because of
Hansmann's trust rationale for preferring commercial nonprofits) or from a sense of public
spiritedness. Even if we assume some level of eleemosynary intent, we face the difficulty of
measuring the significance of this intent. Actual donations, and even the main line of the
retained-earnings argument, offer us some basis for hard quantification of the size of public
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Still, it is possible that a significant number of nonprofit formations are
altruistic to some degree. The difficulty is that, as noted above, there is no
objective method to test for the accuracy of assertions about the founders'
subjective motives. 116 But the fact that significant numbers of nonprofits do not
deserve the exemption counsels that, if only for prophylactic reasons, the
organizational decision should not be counted as a donation. 11 7
An additional factor puts the case to rest. Even for worthy organizational
motives, crediting the organizational decision as a once-and-for-all donation
would have the result of forever exempting the organization's stream of
income, no matter how it fits into the changing social milieu. This is proper
only if we are convinced that the organizer's initial decision operates as a
continuing signal of social need, but at some point down the road this initial
decision loses its social significance as it becomes more distant from the
contemporaneous scene. In effect, these organizations are removed from the
marketplace in altruism, which serves as a barometer of present social needs
and preferences. Therefore, the same policies against dead-hand rule that
prohibit various restraints on alienation also counsel against forever exempting
all nonprofits at the outset of their corporate lives. 18
support, but this variant argument leaves us to pure speculation. (It is incorrect, under this
variant argument, to measure the value of the retained earnings generated by sympathetic
sales. Nonprofit customers do not donate the profit portion of the sales since they would
have had to pay this portion in any event as a cost of for-profit capital. Therefore, it is
inseparable from the manufacturing cost of the products they purchase.)
116 See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.
117 Throughout this section we refer strictly to the decision to organize, not to any
actual donations of start-up capital that are made at the organizational stage. These present
out-of-pocket contributions do qualify as donations.
118 Perhaps the one arena in which the retained earnings argument potentially merits
acceptance is for commercial organizations that serve a redistributive function. A charity
that uses a large portion of its retained earnings to support free services to the poor can
safely be assumed to be pursuing a worthy purpose because helping the indigent is the
quintessential charitable activity, one that has enjoyed per se charitable status for over four
centuries. This status is not likely to change soon. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
founders who choose a nonprofit form in order to serve the poor act from public
spiritedness and that their decisions have continuing social validity into the future. Only by
this convoluted route is the donative theory arguably capable of covering a nonprofit entity
that serves the poor, yet receives no overt donative support.
However, accepting this argument creates several difficulties. First, one must be able
to draw the boundaries of this special category of cases. Precisely who are the poor, and
how much aid must go to them in order to qualify? These are the type of ad hoc, normative
decisions that revenue agents make in the present, unhappy state of affairs which the
donative theory seeks to avoid. Second, assuming a valid case of deservedness can be
established, the resulting subsidy suffers under the proportionality criterion since, without
the presence of donations to measure the extent of the entity's benificence, there is no
mechanism for adjusting the level of subsidy to the level of deservedness. Thus, a very
large commercial nonprofit enterprise that happens to generate very little income might
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B. Moral Theory
1. Ethical Objections to an Implicit Tax Subsidy
In the view of some, the style of reasoning we have employed so far is
antithetical to its subject since altruism operates on a plane of human
experience that is removed from baser considerations of economic efficiency
and analytical logic. 119 This section responds to this attitude by demonstrating
that the charitable tax exemption also gathers strong support from moral
theory, support that depends on the donative status of exempt organizations.
This support is all the more impressive because it comes from each of the two
leading schools of liberal moral theory: contractarian and libertarian. The tenets
of these theories of distributive justice are set forth in two modem
masterpieces-John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick's
Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974)-that promise to frame the parameters of
moral and political debate well into the twenty-first century.' 20
enjoy tremendous property tax relief simply by giving away all of its earnings. Finally, one
must ask, if such an organization is really deserving, why is it not able to structure its
operations in a manner that would qualify under the main line of the donative theory? The
lack of donative support suggests that we may be too generous in assuming its worthiness or
neediness. As one court has explained:
The rationale behind requiring an institution [to] be maintained by public or private
charity goes to the essence of tax exempt status: The expense of the [free] services must
be defrayed by donations... to the institution, rather than the costs being borne by
paying customers. Big business does the latter-it passes its expenses onto its
customers; charity does not or should not.
School Dist. v. Hamot Medical Center, No. 138-A-1989 (C.P. Erie Cty., Pa., May 18,
1990), at 35.
Thus, if tax law is to continue to exempt entities that serve the poor but that receive
insubstantial donations, it should do so on some basis other than the donative theory, such as
the theory that these entities relieve the government from a burden it would otherwise have
to undertake. But such a theory would encounter the difficulties summarized in our prior
article, Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 354-63.
119 Cf. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 630 (In deciding on the scope of the charitable
exemption, "[w]e come, directly or indirectly, to a basic question: What is ultimately good?
... I must admit my suspicion that the question of inherent goodness may not be subject to
proof, in the case of either altruism or other proposed desiderata. . . . [The case for
subsidizing altruism] is not a matter of logical proof, but of faith, of freely chosen values
and visions.").
120 See Murphy, Rights and Borderline Cases, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 228, 228 (1977)
(These two competing theories of justice "are currently dominating discussion within
contemporary Anglo-American moral, social, political, and legal philosophy."); C.
KUKATHAS & P. PErr, A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND rrs CRITICS (1990) (discussing
impact of, and contrast between, the two works); J. PAUL, READING NOZICK 1-2 (1981)
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Rawls draws from the "social compact" theories of Locke and Rousseau to
posit that those principles of justice should control by which every rational,
self-interested person would agree in advance to be bound, under certain
idealized conditions that Rawls describes as the "original position."121 For
instance, Rawls argues that anyone in the original position, not knowing his
actual status in society, would, following a "maximin" strategy, adopt a
principle that requires society to distribute its resources to the advantage of the
least well off individuals. 122 In sharp disagreement, Nozick maintains that
Rawls' original position is a loaded theoretical construct designed to produce a
set of redistributive principles in conflict with the preeminent moral principle:
that the state must "treat[ ] us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in
certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources, [and must
treat] us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this
constitutes." 123 Remarkably, a charitable tax exemption derived from the
donative theory fits squarely within both of these competing theories of
distributive justice. Indeed, the donative theory of the exemption provides what
might be considered a paradigm case for each school of moral thought. But in
order to realize this easy fit with moral theory, it is necessary first to explain in
more detail the government failure component of the donative theory.
The case for a donative subsidy is marked by the twin failures of private
markets and the government to supply a desired product or service. Economists
ordinarily conceive of government taxation as the best means to overcome the
market defects that attend public goods. 124 Public choice theory, however,
informs us that governments can also fail to supply these goods at an optimal
level. 125 This is most easily seen in the case of goods for which the public's
desire varies widely.' 26 For such goods, voting support falls off as the cost of
(same); T. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 15-16 (1989) (same); see also R. NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 183 (1974): "A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep,
subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral philosophy which has not seen
its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. It is a fountain of illuminating ideas,
integrated together into a lovely whole. Political philosophers now must either work within
Rawls' theory or explain why not." See generally J. STERBA, JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVE
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 2-12 (1980) (outlining modem theories of justice); Griffin,
Reconstructing Rawils' 7heory of Justice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of the
Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 715 (1987) (discussing relevance to legal thought).
121 J. RAWLS, supra note 27, at 11-12.
122 Id. at 83, 153.
123 R. NOZICK, supra note 120, at 333-34; see also id. at 149-55, 198-204
(responding to Rawls).
124 See supra Part II.A.1.
125 We develop this explanation somewhat more fully in Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit
Hospitals, supra note 6, at 392-94. The principal source of this theory is B. WEISBROD,
THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECrOR (1977).
126 However, this is not the only explanation for government failure. As with market
failure, Part II.A.2., supra, the precise cause of government failure, whether voting logic or
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production (and therefore the level of taxation) exceeds the majority of voters'
desire for the good. As a rough approximation, then, public goods are supplied
only to the level desired by the median voter. 127 The consequence for high-
demanding (supramedian) voters is that the only option available is voluntary
support, which is suppressed by free riding. Therefore, their demand for the
public good can be fully met only through an additional, implicit subsidy (a
direct subsidy having, by definition, failed).
This account leads, however, to the possible objection, as described by
Professor Hansmann, that the exemption unfairly raises the taxes of the
majority to benefit a small and possibly elite minority:
[The Metropolitan Opera] is a public good only to individuals who actually
attend performances, . . . a small and exceptionally wealthy subset of the
general population. Should working people in Peoria pay higher taxes to
subsidize the consumption of such conspicuously expensive entertainment by
the rich in New York?128
If the majority of voters have rejected an explicit subsidy, how can it be
legitimate to systematically impose an implicit subsidy? Moreover, a system
that allocates governmental support according to the degree of private donative
these other possibilities, is not crucial to the conclusions we draw. Thus, dissatisfied voters
may simply decide as a matter of transaction costs that it is easier to encourage contributions
than to solicit the government, Krashinsky, Transactions Costs, supra note 23, at 125, or
voters may conclude that production through government coercion diminishes the value of
production that obtains from the mere existence of voluntarism. See Calabresi, supra note
75, at 59-60 (citing as examples "goods [which are] attitudes like trust, love and altruism
whose value depends on their being freely given and which are therefore destroyed if they
are bought or coerced"). In developing the latter point, theoretical economists have
demonstrated that direct government provision of public goods may actually decrease
overall societal welfare by depriving donors of the opportunity to give themselves, which
they value to the extent that giving is motivated by act utility. Andreoni, Donations to
Public Goods, supra note 75, at 470; Lee & McKenzie, supra note 80, at 198. Therefore,
an indirect government subsidy that matches or amplifies the effect of private donations, as
the charitable exemption does, is a superior form of government provision. Andreoni,
Donations to Public Goods, supra note 75, at 471.127 See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 136 (1962).
128 H. Hansmann, "Trouble Spots" in the Law Affecting Nonprofit Organizations 8-9
(Sept. 1989) (unpublished paper presented at "Research Agenda-Legal Issues Affecting
Nonprofit Organizations," New York University, Nov. 10, 1989); see also T. ODENDAHL,
supra note 55, at 3 ("wealthy philanthropists divert decision making in [the nonprofit sector]
from public representatives to a private power elite"). Gergen makes the same point in the
more technical jargon that tax support for charities whose benefits are widely shared meets
Pareto-optimal criteria for efficiency since it leaves no one worse off, but that tax support
for more localized or unique benefits is only Kaldor-Hicks efficient since it tends to leave
worse off those taxpayers who do not share in the benefit, or, indeed, who might
affirmatively oppose the charity's service. Gergen, supra note 23, at 1412-13.
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support gives more weight to the needs and tastes of those with the greatest
financial ability to give. Thus, several commentators have observed that a
donative subsidy "has a decidedly elitist caste to it." 129
2. Rawls' Contractarian Theory of Justice
A Rawlsian analysis directly responds to these objections. The donative
theory serves as a model for Rawlsian justice because the government failure
component of the theory so nicely exemplifies the effect of imposing the "veil
of ignorance"-the principal condition that characterizes the original position-
from which the terms of the idealized social contract are generated. The core of
Rawls' unique insight 130 is that principles of justice derived by hypothesized
societal consensus must be blind to the contracting parties' knowledge of their
particular circumstances in life in order to remove any individual bias toward
designing principles to favor one's own condition. Among the essential features
of this original position are that no one knows "his place in society, his class
position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall
even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their
special psychological propensities." 131 Applying this analytical framework to
particular laws, one legal scholar explains that we
should ask whether the challenged legislation could reasonably have been
adopted by community members if no one in the community knew, at the time
the law was adopted, whether they would be in the advantaged or
129 McDaniel, An Alternative to the Federal Income Tax Deduction in Support of
Private Philanthropy, in TAX INmTrUtE OF AMERICA, TAx IMPACTS ON PHILANTHROPY
87 (1982); see also Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, in
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 23, at 246. Observe that these objections have been
made to the charitable deduction, which, due to the bracketed nature of individual income
taxation, has a far greater regressive effect. (Although the corporate tax rate varies some
among entities, this variation does not create an equity problem since it occurs irrespective
of the wealth of donors.) Thus, the "flat-tax" effect that these commentators argue should be
given to charitable donations by replacing the deduction with a tax credit, already exists for
the charitable exemption, which (with certain exceptions noted in Part III.B.2., infra) would
count all contributions equally in measuring whether a recipient qualifies as a charity.
However, the objection still remains that certain economic classes are far more able to give
than others, and would therefore have a stronger force in the market in altruism.
130 C. KUKATHAS & P. PETr1r, supra note 120, at 36-59 and R. WOLFF,
UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 60-63 (1977) are useful for parsing the essential from the
nonessential in Rawls' complex and often dense exegesis.
131 J. RAWLs, supra note 27, at 12; see also id. at 136-42.
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disadvantaged class. If the law might have been adopted by voters operating
behind this 'veil of ignorance,' then [it is just]. 132
In our context, the veil of ignorance provides a convincing answer to why
low demanding majorities are required to pay higher taxes in order to support
the public good desires of high demanding minorities. Under the veil of
ignorance, we have no notion of whether, for a particular collective good, we
will be in the majority of the electorate that subsidizes high demanders or
whether we will be in the minority that is forced to rely on voluntary initiative.
Therefore, from the original position, we should be eager to endorse a use of
the exemption that spreads over society generally a portion of the cost of
providing a needed public service that the majoritarian political process is
structurally incapable of subsidizing directly. We are protected if we should
land in the disenfranchised group, but the burden is not oppressive if we do
not. Thus, the charitable tax exemption might be thought of as a form of
mutual social insurance that most people 133 would agree to opt into. 134
132 Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Lm: Controlling AIDS, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 739, 787 (1986). As Merritt observes, "Rawls himself saw that the idea of
the original position can be used to measure the fairness of specific laws." Id. at 786 n.232.
Rawls describes a "four-stage sequence" by which the technique of the hypothesized
consensus in an original position is applied: first, to produce very general principles of
justice (such as "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others"); second, to construct a constitution and a basic
political form; third, to enact specific laws; and fourth, to apply those laws in particular
situations. Each step is to be governed by the dictates produced by the prior: the constitution
must be consistent with general principles of justice, laws consistent with the constitution,
and adjudication consistent with laws. Thus, Rawls does not advocate that we harken back
to the rarified original position at each stage. Nevertheless, he retains elements of the
original position at each stage, since at each the decision makers are still subject to a form
of the veil of ignorance. The veil is nearly (but not absolutely) complete at the first stage, it
is partially lifted in order to form the constitution, and lifted still further to enact
legislation-all as needed to make the decision with the particularity required at each stage.
But we are still to suppose that, in crafing just legislation, legislators (acting as model
ethicists and not as political representatives) are not to consider the particulars about
themselves or their constituents. J. RAWLS, supra note 27, at 196-201, 358.
133 We have relaxed the unanimity principle, as is appropriate under Rawls' analysis,
because as the decisions to be made become more specific and less in the nature of broad
principles of justice, more facts about society must be revealed in order to inform the
hypothesized decisionmakers, and, as this occurs, it is more likely the decisionmakers will
adopt idiosyncratic views. See J. RAWLS, supra note 27, at 200. Nevertheless, we believe
the argument is powerful enough that a high degree of consensus can be expected, perhaps
even unanimity.
134 The donative theory is also consistent with Rawls' "difference principle," which in
essence is a much stronger, but more controversial, application of the analysis contained in
text. In simplified form, Rawls reasons that one of the two primary principles of justice that
derives directly from the idealized original position is that an unequal distribution of
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Elitism is not a valid objection because of the reciprocity of the charitable
exemption among different donative groups. 135 Using Hansmann's illustration,
rich Met-goers will pay somewhat higher taxes to support the perhaps more
provincial interests that happen to attract donations in Peoria. 136 Thus, the
apparent unfairness exists only at a charity-specific level. At a more structural
level of rule optimality, all taxpayers are likely to benefit from the donative
exemption since those who unwillingly contribute to the charitable causes of
others will likewise receive support for their philanthropic interests. The fact
that those able to give the most will tend to receive the larger subsidy is a just
inequity because it is necessary in order for those who are least advantaged to
receive any subsidy. 137
economic privileges is just only if it is reasonably calculated to enhance the position of those
who are in the worst position. Id. at 83. Thus, Rawls assumes that everyone in the original
position is an extreme risk avoider: each chooses governing principles according to the
"maximin rule" which assumes that one's place in society is selected by his worst enemy.
Id. at 151-57. A use of the exemption that protects political minorities satisfies this
condition. However, Rawlsian support for the donative theory does not depend on his
controversial difference principle or maximin strategy. A donative theory may be derived
directly from the original position analysis without adopting the extreme assumptions of risk
aversion that underlie these arguments. See B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUsTICE
108-15 (1973) (critique of the maximin rule); C. KUKATHAS & P. PErrrr, supra note 120,
at 39-42 (same).
135 This explanation assumes that everyone donates, but under certain assumptions, it
holds up even for those who do not donate to anything. There may be potential donors who
desire to support undersupplied public goods, but who do not wish to engage in the "search
costs" to determine which, among many competing objects of charity, are the most
deserving. For them, the exemption would operate like the United Way: they pay
marginally more taxes to be distributed as an implicit tax subsidy according to the donative
choices made by others. Such a system benefits all participants even though some
participants are not actual donors.
136 Hansmann's observation highlights another concern of more significance, however.
The smallness of the group may weigh against crediting its donations if, as a result of
greater group cohesiveness, social stigma, ostracism, or the like, very little free riding
occurs in group donations. This defect can be corrected by adjusting the threshold level of
donative support required to qualify for the exemption, or by disqualifying altogether
organizations that do not attract donations from a sufficiently large number of donors. See
infra text accompanying notes 232-39, 252-56.
137 Cf. Simon, Tax Treatment, supra note 51 (concluding that the "dynastic" quality of
the deduction is an acceptable imperfection in the system). It might be possible, however, to
correct for social inequities by counting gifts from rich patrons less than those from the
poor, although this would impose extreme administrative burdens. Cf. Part ]II.B.2.d.
(differentiating between the size of gifts, relative to other gifts received by the same entity).
Also, this would not help those who are the very worst off and, therefore, unable to donate
at all. Indeed, the wealth-neutral approach is likely to benefit the poor more because they
are frequent objects of donations and thus the accompanying tax subsidy. Finally, the
apparent regressivity of a donative exemption is countered by observing that the reciprocal
support the rich will provide through the tax system to the favored activities of others will
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The donative theory is necessary for this justification of the charitable
exemption to hold because, from the original position, it is impossible to
compose an ideal statute that compiles a permanent itemization of those
activities that meet our criteria for exemption. As a result, in order for every
deserving group in society potentially to benefit from the exemption, we must
employ a concept of charity that is open-ended as to subject matter but bounded
by a requirement of some demonstrated need for public subsidy. The donative
theory of the charitable exemption operates precisely in this fashion by
automatically subsidizing whatever activities garner substantial voluntary
support from the community.
Thus, properly understood, the charitable exemption has a much stronger
moral base than most legislation. Like the principles theories of justice derived
from Rawls' original position, it is blind to individuals' "conception of the
good." As Rawls states, "other things equal, one conception of justice is to be
preferred to another when it is founded upon markedly simpler general facts,
and its choice does not depend upon elaborate calculations in the light of a vast
array of theoretically defined possibilities." 138 The donative theory of the
exemption, in stark contrast to other tax legislation, partakes remarkably of
these qualities of generality.
3. Nozick's Libertarian Theory of Justice
According to Nozick, any activity of government that goes beyond the role
of a "minimal, nightwatchman state" violates the rights of its citizens. The
minimal state is "limited to the narrow functions of protection against force,
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on." Consequently, "the state
may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to
aid others ... ." 139 In other words, any taxation that accomplishes a
redistributive purpose (rather than a protective, policing purpose) is
illegitimate. The illegitimacy of taxation by the welfare state might suggest as a
Nozickian justification for the charitable exemption the banality that an absence
of taxation, in whatever form, is better than its presence. But generalized tax
opposition does nothing to justify the particular form of exemption that applies
to charities, or to instruct us what are charities for purposes of the exemption.
On surface inspection, a Nozickian appears to have nothing more to contribute
to the debate than the argument that all tax exemptions are equally valid,
whether they are for charities or for brothels, since Nozick's brand of extreme
libertarianism provides no half-way principles for shaping society's laws within
an imperfect structure. Although in the ideal state of affairs one might favor
tend to be characterized by at least an equal degree of progressivity (perhaps more) since
the rich have more income and property to tax, and are sometimes taxed at a higher rate.
138 . RAWLS, supra note 27, at 142.
139 R. NOZICK, supra note 120, at ix.
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private initiative and cooperation as a complete alternative to government, we
do not live in a world that even approximates this ideal. Instead, philanthropy
exists on a small island surrounded by a sea of government filled with its many
funding vessels. It seems of little consequence that this island too might be
swamped by taxation.
Indeed, one might expect a Nozickian to argue against the charitable
exemption on the grounds that, within an impure state where taxation is the
norm, an exemption constitutes an implicit subsidy to the exempt activity.
Therefore, the failure to tax some institutions itself might be viewed as a form
of illegitimate redistribution.
Deeper reflection on Nozick's philosophy, however, reveals powerful
theoretical support for a charitable exemption founded on donative principles.
Under the libertarian view, philanthropy is not merely residual to the failure of
government to supply a good that is not available through the private
marketplace; instead, given the libertarian view that government's proper role
is limited to preventing citizens from encroaching on each others' rights,
philanthropy is the primary alternative to market failure. 140 "The only morally
legitimate way that will work for society to provide [public] goods is the
encouragement of private philanthropy. So there is a major role for private
philanthropy in a free democratic society, a role that becomes more and more
significant as one becomes stricter and stricter in one's libertarian
approach." 141
The donative theory garners additional support from the libertarian moral
outlook by undoing the redistributive characterization that otherwise might
apply to an implicit tax subsidy. Under the donative theory, the exemption's
implicit subsidy is conferred not to those who are deemed by government to be
less advantaged, but instead to those objects that individual donors desire but
are unable to purchase in a market transaction. 142 Thus, the donative theory,
properly understood, confers a subsidy in order to satisfy the donor's desire to
rid the world of hunger, not principally to satisfy the appetites of the hungry
per se. In rigorous theory, the subsidy benefits the recipients of the charity
secondarily only as a means of accomplishing the donors' desires.143
140 Id. at 265.
141 Brody, Private Philanthropy and Positive Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POLICY 79, 85-
87 (Spring 1987).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 9-20; supra note 33. In the case of donors who
seek only public recognition from their gifts, the subsidy is conferred to those proxied
(putative) donors whose recognition the actual donor seeks.
143 Nozick can be read as opposed to this conceptualization when he devotes several
pages to debunking the public goods justification for government spending. R. NOZICK,
supra note 120, at 265-68. In so doing, Nozick maintains that no free-rider disincentive to
giving disables voluntary relief of societal ills because the following two options are open to
all who are concerned about those ills: (1) donating to specific individuals, which will fully
confer to the donor the satisfaction of having solved a discrete portion of the problem; or (2)
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This conception of the exemption's subsidy dampens its redistributive
quality by orienting the purpose of the subsidy from one of taxing the wealthy
in order to support the needy, to one of relieving from government burden
those acts of individual initiative that are directed toward satisfying a private
desire that can only be met through a public good. The donative theory of the
charitable exemption is necessary to save it from the libertarian accusation of
being merely another redistributive tool of government because only this theory
judges the needs of the recipients by the desires of voluntary donors. In sum, in
a society where illicit taxation exists, libertarians must view the implicit
support for philanthropy conferred by the charitable exemption to be at least a
second best option. In the libertarian view, if there is any proper governmental
role in supporting social causes, it would be this minimal role of conferring a
shadow subsidy.
4. Classic Liberalism and the Value of Pluralism
Rawls and Nozick present very intricate versions of liberal moral theory,
but even the most rudimentary form of liberalism requires the donative theory.
A fundamental tenet common to all liberal theories of justice is that members of
society are autonomous moral agents, each free to pursue his own notion of the
good. This elemental freedom constitutes a basic constraint on the political
sphere. The charitable exemption partakes of this autonomous tradition. It is
said to be born out of the "spirit of classic liberalism," whose "dominant tenets
• . .were distrust of government and faith that the progress and well-being of
mankind could best be achieved by natural forces, harmonizing the individual
actions of men who were left untrammeled." 144 Perhaps the strongest statement
of this view is a frequently-quoted explanation from Harvard President Charles
to the extent the donor is satisfied only by curing the societal ill at a macro level (by wiping
out poverty, hunger etc.), those who are like minded are free to band together voluntarily to
form a consortium that agrees to give only on the condition that all other members
contribute. However, Nozick fails to grapple with the considerable transaction costs that
inhibit the formation of such large contractual organizations of contributors, as well as the
practical difficulty of ensuring that all who in fact derive psychic gratification from the
organization's activity are identified and signed up. Nagel, Libertarianism Without
Foundations, in J. PAUL, supra note 120, at 199 (this reliance on voluntary relief of poverty
"is no more plausible coming from Nozick than it was coming from Barry Goldwater").
Nozick is willing to overlook these obstacles to philanthropy because, ultimately, he views
the alternative of government coercion as illegitimate regardless, unless every single
individual who is taxed in fact consents to the tax.
144 Belknap, supra note 4, at 2031; see id. at 2030 (stressing the consistency of the
charitable exemption with "the spread of the laissez faire doctrine" which "lent color of
philosophic sanction to a process" where "[pirivate relief was deemed more efficacious than
governmental").
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Eliot in 1872 of why a system of private educational institutions supported by
tax exemptions is superior to one of direct government funding:
[T]he exemption method fosters public spirit, while the [government] grant
method ... annihilates it....
. . . The exemption method fosters the public virtues of self-respect and
reliance; the grant method leads straight to an abject dependence upon that
superior power-Government. The proximate effects of the two methods of
State action are as different as well-being from pauperism, as republicanism
from communism. 145
In order for these liberal, pluralistic benefits to be fully realized, however,
it is necessary to formulate the charitable exemption according to the donative
theory. Only under this theory is the charitable subsidy distributed
automatically based on autonomous decisions by individual donors that
determine which activities within the nonprofit sector are socially valued. 146
Fashioning the exemption under the community benefit theory, for instance,
would relegate it to merely another mechanism for the government to make, in
effect, direct spending decisions by selecting which nonprofit activities confer a
sufficient benefit to the community to deserve tax relief.147 We might instead
call on the judiciary to define charitable, as occurs under the approach that
draws the exemption's substantive content from the common law of charitable
trusts, but it is impossible to promote pluralism and diversity of view by
145 2 CHARLES W. ELIOT, THE MAN AND His BELIEFS 690, 691 (W. Nielson ed.
1926) (quoted in Belknap, supra note 4, at 2038-39). Further quotations of Eliot and more
explanation of the context of his remarks are found in Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 4, at
332. See also Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 13 n.2 (1989) (religious groups are
exempt because they "enhance a desirable pluralism of viewpoint and enterprise");
Belknap, supra, note 4, at 2036-37 (the tax exemption "maintain[s] [a] rich diversity of
values and abilities .... intellectual freedom, multiplicity of viewpoints and interest, and
diversity of individual inspiration and action"); cf. J. DOUGLAS, supra note 23, at 129 ("It
is [the] ability to tolerate different views of the public good that the pluralistic philosophy
sees as the characteristic of a free society. Voluntary organizations are one of the means-
indeed a necessary and essential means of putting that philosophy into practice.")
146 Cf Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The
Need for a National Policy, 20 U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 27, 39 (1968) (the charitable
deduction affords citizens the chance to participate in public service, organizes part of our
society through nongovernmental means, allows individuals to voluntarily tax themselves
and effectively direct where a portion of their (otherwise) tax dollars will go, and allows
individuals to make their influence directly known on the public's welfare).
147 More troubling still, these normative political judgments would be made by
revenue agents rather than elected officials or agencies in charge of substantive social
policy.
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making these judgments through an institution that necessarily reflects
collective societal values.148
Those moral theorists who stress the value of pluralism in the third sector
thus help us to understand why only the donative theory is compatible with the
present structure of the charitable exemption. Whereas any other theory
delegates discrete value judgments to government decisionmakers,
the essence of the advantage of th[e donative] system is that it is automatic. The
government does not control the flow of funds to the various organizations; the
receipts of each organization are determined by the values and the choices of
private givers. The donors determine the direction of their own funds, and the
distribution of "tax savings" as well. 149
One must be careful, though, in relating these noble thoughts to the humble
tax exemption, for some exemption advocates would rely on such arguments of
moral superiority to extend the exemption to the entire nonprofit sector,
contending that, in any of its activities, it offers a valued alternative to markets
and government. 150 This position too loosely accounts for the benefits of
148 Cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369, 370-71 (1989) (eighth amendment
requires the Court to look to "conceptions of decency... of modern American society as a
whole" and to find a "settled national consensus"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
121-27 (1989) (same, in order for an asserted liberty interest to be protected by substantive
due process).
This conflict would be particularly severe if courts were asked to play the role of social
arbiter for the worth of religious organizations. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 13 n.2, (1989) ("inquiry into the particular contributions of each religious group
'would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of
particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of day-to-day relationship which
the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.'").
149 Belknap, supra note 4, at 2039.
150 For example, see J. DOUGLAS, supra note 23, at 160:
mhe way the idea of democracy is developed in the western world, [it] contains two
different strands; one emphasizing the individual and hence diversity and one
emphasizing the collectivity and hence uniformity. . . . The institutions of the Third
Sector are one of the principal sources of the flexibility that enables a free society to
preserve both strands. They thus avoid both the practical injustices and the logical
contradictions that would flow from relying too heavily either on self-regarding market
forces or an all-embracing role for government.
See also Atkinson, supra note 5, at 629 (Extending the exemption to virtually all
nonprofits "would necessarily promote the acknowledged metabenefit of pluralism, because
[nonprofit] provision of goods and services is an alternative to both market and
governmental provision."). Atkinson's analysis of pluralism bears superficial resemblance to
ours, for he speaks in terms of the pluralistic benefit of "altruism," but his definition of
altruism is so broad as to encompass virtually all nonprofit organizations, regardless of their
donative status. See supra text accompanying notes 100-18.
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pluralism and the need for the exemption to promote those benefits. As
Professor Gergen has explained, using the exemption simply as an
encouragement for "self-expression" is not defensible because self-expression
is not unique to nonprofit enterprise. "My purchase of season tickets to see the
Texas Longhorns play football is a form of self-expression. Why is it not
equally deserving of a tax preference?" 151 Only the donative theory of the
charitable exemption successfully identifies the particular acts of self-expression
that deserve subsidy, without undermining through excessive government
involvement the pluralism that self-expression fosters. We value most the form
of pluralism inherent in voluntary support of public causes because this support
is the only clear sign that the benefits fostered are not available elsewhere.
C. Tax Theory
We previously advanced as one of the donative theory's strengths its
unique ability to tie together all of the major components of the taxation of
charities. It explains the deduction for charitable contributions, the income tax
exemption, and the property tax exemption. 152 So far, however, we have not
examined whether the donative theory is capable of explaining the major
restrictions on exempt status other than by merely accommodating them as side
constraints unrelated to the core theory. 153 If the theory does accommodate
these restrictions, its explanative power would be quite remarkable. We will
examine in turn the four major restrictions on the eligibility for tax exemption:
the requirement of nonprofit status, which includes the prohibition on private
inurement; the exclusion of activities judged contrary to the public interest; the
limitation on political activity; and the tax on unrelated business income.
Although the particular justifications that underlie these disparate components
of tax exemption have each generated considerable separate discussion and
151 Gergen, supra note 23, at 1395.
152 See supra text accompanying note 17; Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra
note 6, at 402-05. The donative theory also nicely explains the prevailing pattern of
conferring on charities an exemption from paying sales tax on their purchases, but not on
charging sales tax on their sales. Purchases are correlated to the level of donative support,
while sales are not. See supra note 17.
153 For example, Simon explains these limitations in terms of the tax law's "border
patrol function," that is, as necessary "to keep nonprofit organizations from wandering off
their reservation into the territory of government and business." Simon, Tax Treatment,
supra note 51, at 89-90. This metaphor, although descriptively appealing, is entirely
question-begging as a normative explanation. Who is to say these areas are not the territory
of nonprofits, other than the border police themselves? Without some explanation that
defines the border, the proper metaphor for these restrictions is a border-creating function.
Simon in fact offers some explanations for how the borders have been drawn, but few relate
to the core rationale for exempting charitable entities.
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litigation, the donative theory can integrate each of these components into a
comprehensive theory of charitable taxation.
1. Nonprofit Status
The various federal and state manifestations of the charitable tax exemption
uniformly require that exempt organizations be organized as nonprofit entities.
Usually, this restriction is enforced through a prohibition on the distribution of
the exempt entity's assets or profits to private individuals (the "private
inurement" prohibition). 154 While it is sometimes quite difficult to draw the
boundaries between forbidden profit distributions and permitted payments of
salaries and expenses, 155  the basic nondistribution requirement is
uncontroversial.1 56 Nevertheless, it further reinforces the donative theory as the
core explanation for exemption to observe that this limitation can be derived
immediately from the donative status of exempt organizations.
The relevance of nonprofit status to the charitable exemption can be
established by examining Henry Hansmann's rationale for the existence of
nonprofit enterprise in (what he characterizes as) all of its major manifestations.
Hansmann posits that nonprofit firms exist in those activities where the
distribution prohibition solves one of a variety of market imperfections that he
refers to as "contract failure." Contract failure is any instance in which
consumers are unable in normal market transactions to solve effectively a
difficulty in monitoring the firm's output. The primary example is the desire of
donors to contribute to various forms of public goods production. 157 Such
154 One of the requirements of exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is that "no part
of the earnings [of such organization] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual. . . ." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1976); see B. HOPKINS, THE
LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 80-85 (5th ed. 1989); P. TREUSCH, TAX-EXEMPT
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 92-95 (1989). State laws uniformly include a prohibition on
private inurement either as an express statutory requirement or as part of the common-law
interpretation of "charitable." See, e.g., Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note
6, at 330 n.74 (collecting citations).
Note that the nonprofit requirement is a prohibition on the distribution of profits, not a
prohibition on an entity making a profit. See, e.g., B. HoPKINS, supra at 232-34;
Hansmann, supra note 106, at 501.
155 This has been a particularly vexing problem with health care entities, where the
IRS has perhaps gone too far in its zeal to avoid private inurement. See Colombo, Are
Associations of Doctors Tax Exempt? Analyzing Inconsistencies in thte Tax Exemption of
Health Care Providers, 9 VA. TAX REV. 469 (1990).
156 To our knowledge, no one has argued against it as a basic component of charitable
status.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 28-31. Hansmann also applies this explanation
to commercial nonprofits-those that derive their revenues primarily from sales. As
explained in the text accompanying notes 106-09, supra, he reasons that a similar
monitoring problem can arise for complex services that are difficult for consumers to
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payments suffer from a form of contract failure described as "marginal impact
monitoring": donors to a joint product cannot determine whether their small
portion of the production costs has been used to enhance the output. Because a
public good is not divisible, there is no severable portion that could be said to
have been produced only by virtue of a particular donor's contribution. 158 This
is precisely the same phenomenon that gives rise to free riding, and it is the
characteristic of a donation that makes it a gift rather than a purchase. As a
consequence of the inability to engage in marginal impact monitoring, donors
have no easy way to determine whether their gifts have actually been applied to
the intended purpose.
Because of the monitoring problem, donors require some assurance that the
gift was actually used for the intended purpose, rather than siphoned off by the
firm's managers. The nondistribution constraint provides this assurance by
denying the firm's managers the legal right to pay the contributions to
themselves, other than as fair market value compensation for their services.
This limitation enhances donors' trust by creating some greater assurance that
nonprofit firms will use their funds to increase output. It is this enhanced trust
that explains why donors prefer to give to nonprofits rather than to for-profit
businesses.
This positive economic theory for the existence of nonprofits also suggests
a normative explanation of why only nonprofits should be eligible for the
charitable exemption. The size of the monitoring problem and the resulting
temptation for abuse suggest that a rational donor would always choose a
nonprofit over a for-profit recipient, all else being equal. If a person makes a
"donation" to a for-profit firm, therefore, some mechanism must have
overcome the marginal impact monitoring problem. If no marginal impact
monitoring problem exists, this in turn suggests that the "donation" is not a
donation at all, but rather a quid pro quo exchange. Such exchanges do not
suffer from the free-rider disincentive to give; hence, no case exists for a tax
subsidy because the complete level of public desire is satisfied through the
"donation" itself.159
evaluate, such as day care and nursing home care. A number of other nonprofit scholars
take issue with whether the trust rationale properly extends to any commercial nonprofit.
See supra note 108. But these objections, which essentially go to whether there is a
legitimate role for commercial nonprofits, are not germane to the present analysis since
none of Hansmann's critics disagrees that donative nonprofits serve the useful role that he
identifies.
158 This is true of only pure public goods, of which there are none. See supra text
accompanying notes 32-35. Therefore, at some level, donations are specifically identifiable
to portions of production, such as a large donation that funds an entire building.
159 This situation is analytically identical to the hypothesized case of a pure act utility
donation discussed earlier. The fact that giving to for-profits in fact is virtually nonexistent
confirms our previous speculation that free riding attends all donative activity and that pure
act utility is a rarity. See supra text accompanying notes 75-85.
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This analysis shows that the nonprofit restriction is intimately related to the
donative status of exempt organizations. In contrast, other theories are unable
to centralize this basic restriction. 160 For instance, the government burden
theory is unable to explain why the exemption should not extend to profit-
making institutions that equally relieve a governmental responsibility-say, a
for-profit school that relies entirely on tuition. The typical response is that the
nonprofit restriction is necessary to keep the firm's owners from siphoning off
the exemption to their own proprietary advantage. But competitive restraints
should prevent the owners from earning more than a fair market return on their
investment, and earning a fair profit benefits the community by better attracting
investment capital. 161 Similarly, one could say that nonprofit firms that obtain
their financing from 'borrowed capital unfairly use the exemption to the
advantage of their lenders. 162 The donative theory elegantly resolves these
quandaries by drawing a direct connection between the existence of nonprofit
firms and the justification for a tax subsidy.
2. Activities Contrary to the Public Interest
Current exemption law contains a public policy overlay that allows the IRS
to deny exemption to groups that otherwise qualify but that pursue certain goals
To take a concrete example, one might argue that, when a donor gives to C.A.R.E. in
order to "adopt" a starving child, the identifiability of the aid recipient cures the monitoring
problem that attends donations. (Perhaps pictures are sent to the donor each month
documenting the child's improvement.) If what motivates the donor is solely and literally
the welfare of this one child, then there is no reason not to patronize a for-profit firm, just
as one does in feeding one's own children. But, like family provision, no actual donation
would occur since the putative "donor" has every incentive to give to the full extent of
benefit derived. More likely, though, "adopting" a child is a marketing gimmick; the child
would be fed by C.A.R.E. anyway and the absence of a particular $100 gift would have an
undiscernible effect on any particular recipient. From the donor's perspective, the gift is
likewise probably not motivated solely by the welfare of this one child but at least in part by
a more generalized desire to address child starvation worldwide, a desire that is shared by
others. Thus, such a gift is most likely a classic public goods donation. The fact that few
people, if any, give to for-profits for hunger relief signals that this latter motive
predominates.
160 See, e.g., Note, supra note 39, at 1634-39 (struggling to explain why for-profit
religious publishers do not deserve the exemption). Hansmann's capital subsidy theory of
the income tax exemption is an exception, for he explains the exemption as a means to
overcome the relative disadvantage that nonprofits face in the capital markets. Hansmann,
Exenpting Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 5, at 72-75.
161 Indeed, property tax exemptions are frequently given to for-profit firms as
inducements to locate in a community that needs new jobs.
162 Or one could observe that the case for the nonprofit restriction is no greater than is
the case for preventing the government from ever offering research grants to for-profit
firms.
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contrary to established public policy. 163 For example, in Bob Jones University
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the exemption may be denied to
racially discriminatory private schools, despite the statute's omission of a
general public policy requirement, and that such a requirement exists implicitly
in the common law concept of "charity." 164 A potential objection to the
donative theory is that it would overturn this public policy screen by blindly
exempting any activity that attracts significant donative support from some
segment of society. Such a result would force taxpayers to support a subsidy
that validates the worst prejudices and meanest spirits of our populace. Of
course, we could simply declare that certain donative objects are inconsistent
with our core notions of what activities deserve a public subsidy, but this
subjective approach to setting the definitional boundaries of the exemption
imposes an external and theoretically arbitrary constraint on the donative
theory. 165
The donative theory solves this dilemma by offering a much more
theoretically satisfactory rationale for the public policy limitation. This
rationale derives from the government failure component of the donative theory
discussed above. 166 This aspect of the donative theory posits that a subsidy for
donative activity is necessary because of the apathy of the majority of the
electorate: low demanding voters who could vote for a direct government
subsidy will not do so because they do not value the undersupplied good or
service enough to incur the entire cost of providing it. These voters, however,
are willing to incur the cost of a partial, indirect subsidy (exemption) because
they are not actively opposed to the subsidized activity per se; they simply do
not want as much. 167
However, if the donative subsidy is used to support activities of which the
majority of voters disapprove, not due to diminished interest but due to
affirmative distaste, there is no social mechanism for expressing these negative
preferences, other than the selective withdrawal of the exemption. As a
consequence, we can have no confidence that the social cost to those who
disapprove of supporting the exempt activity will be paid back through others'
163 For a general discussion, see B. HOPKINs, supra note 154, at 65-71. The public
policy requirement appears to harken back to charitable trust law. Id. at 69; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 comment c (1959).
164 461 U.S 574, 586 (1983).
165 Comments by Jeff Murphy and Paam Samuelson were helpful to our presentation of
this problem.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
167 Their inducement comes in the form of an implicit social contract: if those who
benefit the most from an undersupplied good donate a portion of the costs of additional
production, those who benefit the least will agree to the tax burden of an implicit subsidy
because they in turn will receive tax support for their favored projects.
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support of their causes. 168 The efficiency and fairness of the donative theory,
therefore, is enhanced by a public policy screen that attempts to detect those
extreme cases where support for an activity entails a substantial social evil, not
just economic cost.169
3. The Limitations on Political Activity
The federal income tax law contains two separate limitations on the
political activities of charities. First, charities lose their eligibility to receive
tax-deductible contributions and certain other tax benefits related to charitable
status if they engage in legislative lobbying to any substantial degree.' 70
168 In economic jargon, when the donative theory is applied to public goods for which
the negative externalities outweigh the positive, the result is neither Pareto optimal nor
Kaldor-Hicks optimal since, not only would some voters be worse off, but their suffering
might exceed the enjoyment fostered by the exemption.
169 This position is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Bob Jones that the
purpose of a charitable entity may not be "illegal or violate established public policy." Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983). Obviously, judgments concerning
when public policy is "established" in other circumstances require a modicum of
subjectivity and with subjectivity comes the potential for misapplication. The Supreme
Court recognized this problem, which is especially troublesome when the initial authority
passing on exemption is the tax collector, and admonished in Bob Jones that the exemption
should be denied "only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to
a fundamental public policy." Id. at 592. For instance, public policy opposition could be
safely asserted if the majority of voters have expressed a specific legal prohibition, such as
by enactment of anti-discrimination legislation.
170 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) states that an entity will be exempt only if "no substantial part of
[its] activities . . . is carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Although a violation of this prohibition (repeated in
§ 170) can result in loss of exemption under this subsection, entities that engage in
substantial legislative lobbying may be eligible for exemption under § 501(c)(4). B.
HOPKINS, supra note 154, at 311-13. Accordingly, the lobbying restriction really translates
into a limit on the ability of organizations to qualify for the special tax benefits that are
inherent in § 501(c)(3) status (as opposed to 501(c)(4) status), such as the ability to receive
tax-dedctible contributions under § 170, and the ability to issue bonds on which the interest
income is tax-exempt under § 145.
I.R.C. § 501(h) contains mechanical tests to determine when expenditures for
legislative lobbying have become "substantial," although an entity is not required to use this
procedure and can instead rely on sparse common-law interpretations of "substantial."
I.R.C. § 501(h) (1988). For a general discussion of the lobbying limitations, see B.
HOPKINS, supra note 154, at ch. 13; P. TREUSCH, supra note 154, at 263-303; Chisolm,
Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201
(1987) [hereinafter Chisolm I].
The IRS recently issued detailed (and highly controversial) regulations concerning the
scope of lobbying permitted by § 501(c)(3). See generally McGovern, Accettura & Skelly,
77e Final Lobbying Regulations: A Challenge for Both the IRS and Charities, TAX NOTES,
Sept. 3, 1990, at 1305.
1438 [Vol. 52:1379
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
Second, the organization cannot to any degree participate in political campaigns
on behalf of candidates for public office. 171 State case law similarly indicates
that excessive political activity will result in a denial of charitable classification
for state property and sales tax exemptions. 172 Prior commentators have noted
that the rationale for these provisions is muddled, seemingly a conflux of
historical accident and political expediency. 173 Although specific abuses have
played a role in shaping current law, political activity is not inherently evil;
indeed, it is the foundation of our system of government and enjoys a number
of legal protections.174 Moreover, initial impressions suggest that the donative
theory would support political activity inasmuch as entities that qualify for
exemption under this theory by definition suffer from government failure and
therefore are demonstrably in need of more political clout. 175
171 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) states that an entity cannot "participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) (1988). The IRS
has indicated that there may be a limited de minimis exception to this rule. See Chisolm I,
supra note 170, at n.55. But even with this allowance, the nearly absolute ban on
campaigning is more strenuous than the limitation on legislative lobbying, which clearly
contemplates that exempt organizations may engage in lobbying to some (insubstantial)
degree. Direct campaign activity also appears to be prohibited under § 501(c)(4), see B.
HOPKINS, supra note 154, at 313, which means that direct participation in campaign activity
disqualifies a charity from tax exemption as well as deductible donations and the other
benefits attaching to 501(c)(3) status.
172 However, the state statutes are generally less specific in this regard. See Hall &
Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 330 n.74.
173 See P. TREUSCH, supra note 154, at 263-64; Clark, 77w Limitation on Political
Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 466 (1960);
Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. U.L.
REV. 308, 337 n.130 (1990) [hereinafter Chisolm II']; Chisolm I, supra note 170, at 207-
08.
174 The major one, of course, is the first amendment protection for free speech. See
generally, B. HOPKINS, supra note 154, at 275-80; Chisolm I, supra note 173, at 319-26.
175 In fact, this is exactly the conclusion reached by Professor Chisolm in her detailed
work on the legislative lobbying prohibition. Chisolm I, supra note 170, at 277-99.
Professor Chisolm argues that current law discriminates against organizations that use
legislative lobbying instead of other tools such as litigation or public education to foster
"system change." (She also questions the IRS's apparent uneven enforcement of the
lobbying limitation.) However, she does not argue for a complete lifting of the lobbying
restrictions. Instead, she, like us, and like the current law, would strike a compromise
between the need to lobby and the goals of the charitable exemption. Her compromise,
however, would be somewhat more generous toward lobbying than ours. Her basic
conclusion is that certain entities which provide representation for chronically
underrepresented minorities should be exempt from lobbying restrictions. Identifying these
organizations would be based upon a combination of objective criteria, such as donations,
and a subjective test regarding the organization's purposes. See id.
The written debate on the political activity limitations spans every conceivable
variation. See id. at 288-89. As Chisolm notes, other commentators have suggested that the
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Further reflection on the government failure component of the donative
theory, however, demonstrates support for at least some limitation on political
activity by charitable entities. A case for indirect subsidy through the tax
system exists only if the benefitted group is unable to convince the government
to provide a direct subsidy. To the extent that an organization is engaged in
lobbying or campaigning, we must assume that this activity is directed at
improving its legislative fortunes, either by achieving direct government
subsidy for its activities or by the passage of favorable legislation making it
easier to accomplish its objectives. 176 The political activities of such an entity
do not demonstrate government failure; they negate it.177 A tax subsidy for a
lobbying or campaigning organization becomes a "double-dip:" it subsidizes
the activity of attempting to achieve further subsidization, much as if one were
to count as donations those funds that are used merely to generate more
donations. 178
lobbying restrictions be dropped completely, Fogel, To the IRS '7is Better To Give 1tan To
Lobby, 61 A.B.A. 1. 960, 961 (1975); that lobbying restrictions be liberalized through
"more flexible" Treasury interpretation but that the restrictions on political activity be kept
intact, Clark, supra note 173, at 462, 464; or that permissible lobbying be judged by the
relationship between the lobbying and the exempt purpose of the entity, Caplin & Timblie,
Legislative Activities ofPublic Charities, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (1975).
176 This assumption mirrors the lobbying limitation in current law, which does not
include "nonpartisan analysis, study or research" in the definition of impermissible
lobbying. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(A) (1988). That is, prohibited lobbying occurs only when the
organization promotes a specific legislative result favorable to itself. However, the line
between permitted nonpartisan activity and prohibited lobbying is not always clear, and IRS
enforcement may be variable. See Chisolm I, supra note 170, at 229-33. The final lobbying
regulations attempt to clarify both the definition of lobbying and what constitutes
"nonpartisan analysis." Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2 (1990); see McGovern, Accettura &
Skelly, supra note 170, at 1306-09, 1311-12.
177 See Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, Legislative Activities of Charitable Organizations
Other 7han Private Foundations, in 5 COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 4, at 2917, 2923,
for a similar argument based upon the government burden theory of exemption. These
authors observe that the government only increases its burden by exempting entities that
attempt to squeeze more money out of the government. Professor Chisolm responds that
this "double dipping" argument is weak because allowing charities to lobby is unlikely to
cost the government much, either because taxing charities is unlikely to generate much
revenue or because their lobbying efforts are feeble. See Chisolm I, supra note 170, at 249.
This response does nothing to counter the solid theoretical basis for restricting lobbying; it
only argues that the restriction is likely to have little effect in practice. But this is an
argument that cuts both ways. If the restriction is of little practical importance, why bother
to remove it? If, on the other hand, lobbying is important to charities (as Chisolm surely
must believe), it must work to some significant degree and, to that extent, it will indeed
increase government burden (or, under our theory, negate government failure).
178 Accordingly, as noted below, see infra text accompanying notes 280-83, in
determining what percentage of an organization's revenues come from donations, we would
deduct expenses for fundraising and use only the "net" donation figure. Our rationale is that
the proportionality criterion requires that the subsidy provided by tax exemption be aimed at
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Political activity tends to undermine the case for a donative subsidy
because, where such activity plays a significant part in attracting donations, the
donations no longer signal the undersupply of a good through market or
government mechanisms. 179 For nonpolitical organizations, donations partially
replace purchases or grants by supporting additional production of the
undersupplied good, but only partially because of the free rider disincentive to
give. If, instead of supporting increased production, donations are used to
negate the government failure, there is no systematic basis for assuming that
donations alone are not enough to achieve the optimal level of production.180 In
contrast, attempts to meet the entity's objectives through litigation or public
education are not tainted by their ability to self-correct for government failure
because they are outside the political arena. 181
We do not mean to suggest, however, that all political activity by charities
should be prohibited, any more than a donative entity should have its
exemption revoked for engaging in unrelated business activities. 182 Admittedly,
the chance exists that an entity's lobbying efforts will fail, resulting in a
corresponding need for subsidization. The need to lobby is particularly acute
the undersupplied good, not at expenses for achieving donative status. Here, we face an
analogous problem of unduly amplifying the subsidy; accordingly, we have suggested a
similar approach for subtracting lobbying costs from the donative base in order to control
the incentive to generate funds to do nothing but lobby. See infra text accompanying notes
284-86.
179 One might attempt to collapse this analytical distinction between the undersupplied
good and the government failure that causes the undersupply by arguing that lobbying and
campaigning are themselves public goods, which indeed they are. (This, essentially, is
Chisolm's argument. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.) But this supposes that
political activity is an end in itself rather than a means to achieve some personal or social
reward. The reward may be "political" in some measure-such as the right to vote-but if
the reward is posited to be simply political activity simpliciter, the argument for subsidy
becomes nonsensical, or, at best, question-begging. It is as if one argued for a government
subsidy to be more litigious.
180 True, particular groups will continue to claim they are underrepresented, but since
all political action groups rely on donations, this is not predictably more true for one group
than for another based simply on their donative or nonprofit status. We might conclude that
underrepresentation exists for other, external reasons such as the poverty or social status of
the members that make up the group, but this is not a characteristic that is shared commonly
by all "charities," as that term is conventionally interpreted by the law or as we would
interpret it under the donative theory. Therefore, Chisolm's proposal to use the tax
exemption as a mechanism to correct for political inequality is administratively
cumbersome, theoretically inelegant, and has no more foundation than using the tax
exemption to correct for other economic and social inequalities. We agree that these
inequalities should be addressed; we do not see why the charitable tax exemption is
necessarily or even conveniently designed to accomplish this goal.
181 Consequently, the IRS's advocacy group rule, if in fact it exists, is wrong, as
Chisolm argues. See Chisolm I, supra note 170, at 215-52.
182 See infra Part I1.C.4.
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where the goal of the entity cannot be purchased but must be achieved through
legislative reform (e.g., civil rights). So some sort of compromise is necessary.
Unfortunately, we do not know in advance when lobbying efforts will be
unsuccessful or necessary; organizational goals cannot be neatly
compartmentalized. The substance of civil rights might also be achieved
through public education or through litigation; pollution control could be
achieved through hiring workers to pick up litter as well as by enacting laws
against littering. Thus we need some kind of compromise that does not prohibit
political activity, but does guard against the "double-dipping" effect noted
above.
In fact, a compromise is precisely what current law accomplishes. It
permits some level of political activity without loss of any tax benefits and only
partially withdraws those benefits when the limits are exceeded. 183
Nevertheless, we believe that a better compromise is possible within the
confines of the donative theory that would eliminate the current disparity
between legislative lobbying and political campaign activity and at the same
time simplify the rules regarding political activity. 184 This proposal is discussed
below in Part 11I.B.5. along with other aspects of implementing the donative
theory. Our only desire at this point is to demonstrate that the donative theory
supports a partial restriction on political activity and thus is broadly consistent
with both limitations and allowances that have been part of the lore of
charitable exemption virtually since the inception of the tax laws.
4. Unrelated Business Income
Since 1950, the federal government has taxed income of an otherwise
exempt organization that is "unrelated" to its charitable purpose. The unrelated
business income tax (UB1T) resulted largely from certain highly-publicized
instances of exempt organizations owning businesses completely unrelated to
183 See supra text accompanying notes 170-71. For example, I.R.C. § 501(c)(4),
which grants exemption for social welfare organizations, does not contain a lobbying
restriction. Such organizations, however, are not eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions under I.R.C. § 170, nor under the corresponding estate or gift tax provisions
for charitable contributions. See B. HoPKINs, supra note 154, at 311-14.
184 As noted below, text accompanying notes 284-86, infra, we cannot conceive of any
reason to treat legislative lobbying differently from direct campaign activity. Both are tools
for improving the fortunes of the entity through legislation. In contrast, other commentators
have viewed the restrictions on direct campaign activity as more supportable than limitations
on lobbying. Compare Chisolm I, supra note 170 (arguing for relaxed lobbying limitations
for certain types of chronically underrepresented groups) with Chisolm If, supra note 173,
at 344-52 (refusing to permit a tax subsidy for any campaign activity by charities for the
same reasons rejected in the first article). See also Clark, supra note 173, at 462, 464
(taking a more firm stand on campaign activity than lobbying).
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their charitable purpose, such as NYU's ownership of a macaroni factory. 185
Prior to the UBIT, court cases generally had upheld the tax exemption of an
entity engaged in such unrelated businesses, as long as the profits from the
business were used by the entity for its exempt purpose. 186 Logically, this old
"destination of income" test made sense under conventional theories of the
charitable tax exemption. After all, if charitable status is based upon relief of
government burden, aid to the poor, or community benefit, what difference
does it make where the money to perform these services comes from, as long
as the funds are destined to further the worthy goal?
The conventional response to this question is that the UB1T polices "unfair
competition" by exempt entities. The UBIT arose from congressional concern
that the tax exemption gave an unfair economic advantage to exempt
organizations competing with for-profit firms. This concern led in 1950 to the
decision to tax unrelated business income as the best way to "level the playing
field." 187 Nevertheless, commentators have noted the lack of any coherent
rationale for the UBIT. The test for taxing income under the UB1T depends on
whether the business is related to charitable activities and not on whether the
business competes with for-profit entities.188 Accordingly, exempt entities may
operate businesses which in fact compete with their for-profit counterparts in
the same markets, yet escape the UB1T. 189 In addition, the IRS has often been
185 See Dale, About the UB1T . . ., 18th Conf. on Tax Planning for 501(c)(3)
Organizations § 9.02, at 9-5 (1990) (unpublished manuscript); Kaplan, Intercollegiate
Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1432 (1980).
186 The "destination of income" test essentially permitted a tax-exempt charity to
operate unrelated businesses tax-free as long as the proceeds from the unrelated business
were used to further a charitable purpose. See generally Dale, supra note 185, at 9-3 to 9-5;
Kaplan, supra note 185, at 1433.
187 See Dale, supra note 185, at § 9.02. Similarly, most state property exemption laws
limit the exemption to property used by the entity only for its exempt purpose. A hospital
may be tax-exempt, for example, but an office building for private physicians owned by the
hospital would not be, since it is not part of the operation of a hospital. Mason Dist. Hosp.
v. Tuttle, 61 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 378 N.E.2d 753 (1978). Likewise, a portion of a building
owned by a church and used for religious worship might be exempt under state law, but not
those portions of the building rented to retail stores, First M.E. Church v. Chicago, 26 Ill.
482 (1861), or church-owned buildings used as residences for pastors or other religious.
Pearsall v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 315 Il. 233, 146 N.E. 165 (1924); Carson v.
Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 137 N.E. 863 (1922). This limitation is less controversial than the
UBIT since, under either conventional or donative theories of exemption, the limitation
directs the tax subsidy to property actually used for the exempt purpose and thus serves to
better satisfy the proportionality criterion.
188 Dale, supra note 185, at 9-5.
189 This is the case in the health care industry, for instance. See Colombo, supra note
155, at 515-17. Many commentators, moreover, have questioned whether the UBT is
necessary or even desirable to police "unfair competition." A number of commentators
agree that a nonprofit firm is no more likely to engage in predatory pricing (a common
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less than successful in defining the boundaries of relatedness. 190 These
difficulties have recently led Congress to revisit the UBIT, inquiring whether
enforcement can be strengthened and simplified, or instead whether the UBIT
should be largely abandoned. 191
The present confusion in federal policy regarding unrelated businesses
results largely from the failure of conventional charitable exemption theories to
justify the integral part UBIT plays in their explanations for the exemption.
Therefore, the UBIT exists as an external constraint, imposed to control what
some view as harmful side effects of the exemption. In contrast, the donative
theory itself provides a theoretical rationale for some limits on unrelated
activity as well as for allowing some such activity to continue. Because both the
relatedness concept and the income destination argument are integral to the
donative theory, it is capable of providing a much more satisfactory resolution
of these two competing policies previously at war with one another.
According to the donative theory, the tax exemption is a subsidy to correct
the undersupply of a good or service that suffers from the concurrence of
private market and government failure, as evidenced by donative support.
Thus, this subsidy should be limited to the good or service for which twin
failures have occurred, that is, the good or service that induces donations. Put
more concretely, a person contributes money to NYU presumably because of
its educational mission, not because of any undersupply of macaroni. 192 As a
result, there is no demonstrated need to facilitate more macaroni production;
"unfair competition" complaint) than for-profit firms. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition
and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 610-11 (1989); Kaplan,
supra note 185, at 1465-66; Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. Rev.
13, 65-66 (1972); Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1982). While some commentators recognize that entry of
nonprofit firms into a particular market can create injury to for-profit investors, id. at 1025-
30, the remedy proposed by one of these commentators is to repeal the UB1T completely so
that business operations of nonprofits will be spread throughout the entire economy, thus
creating less havoc in one sector. Id. at 1038-39. Cf Hansman, supra at 626-35 (generally
defending the current scope of UBIT).
190 In the health care field, for example, the IRS has been blatantly inconsistent in its
use of the "promotion of health" standard to define the scope of the exemption. Despite
professing this as the basis for which nonprofit hospitals are exempt, it refuses to extend the
exemption to health-related income that is not strictly hospital-related (out-patient care,
pharmacy sales, etc.), probably because a number of peripheral health-care activities are
undertaken by for-profit entities which might thereby be subjected to unfair competition.
Colombo, supra note 155, at 516-17. But the same is true of the core hospital functions
themselves.
191 See, e.g., Unrelated Business Income Tax, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
192 One advantage of the donative theory is that it provides a more objective basis for
defining the scope of "related." Related activities can be detected by inquiring of donors
what induces their contribution.
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any such subsidy would be disproportionate to the need for support evidenced
by the existing level of donations.
This theoretical argument supporting a "relatedness" limitation on
exemption, however, is somewhat at odds with the practicalities of precisely
how the income tax exemption creates a subsidy effect. For instance, an
exemption for an entity that receives nothing but donations produces no income
tax subsidy at all since, under current definitions of income, a purely donative
entity would have no income taxes to pay even absent an exemption. 193
Therefore, in order to create any subsidy from the income tax exemption, we
must allow the exempt entity to produce a substantial amount of other
nondonative income. 194 How much other income is appropriate becomes a
question of proportionality, matching the subsidy to the level of deservedness
demonstrated by donative support. This rough matching of the tax subsidy to
the donative base is precisely what we accomplish when, in the following
section, we set a one-third donative threshold that an exempt entity must meet
in order to qualify for charitable status.195
Once we set this threshold of one-third donative support, however, the
source of the other, nondonative income is of no concern. It does not matter
whether it is related or unrelated. 196 As long as the tax savings are used to
193 See I.R.C. § 102 (1988) (excluding gifts from gross income). We note, however,
that commentators have questioned the theoretical propriety of § 102: because a gift
increases the consumption ability of the donee, an argument can be made that the gift
should be included in the income of the donee. See generally M. GRAErz, supra note 65, at
163-65; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsIc TAX REFORM 37-41
(1977). Nevertheless, an entity that must rely entirely on donations probably spends most of
the money it receives, so even if donations were counted as income, they most likely would
be offset by expenses. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 4, at 309 (noting that certain
charitable organizations essentially act as conduits, spending their receipts on their
charitable purpose). However, an exemption from property tax might still be a major
subsidy. For further discussion of the relationship between the degree of donative support
and the size of the tax subsidy, see infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
194 This is not necessarily true of the property tax exemption since, absent an
exemption, property owned by a donative entity would be taxable. Nevertheless, the size of
the tax relief may still fall short of the need for a subsidy. Depending, then, on the
legislature's assessment of the extent of free riding, see infra text accompanying notes
235-36, states may or may not want to extend the property tax exemption to portions of
property that are not donated, that are not supported entirely by donated revenues, or that
are not related to activities that receive substantial donative support.
195 See infra text accompanying notes 228-3 1.
196 For example, assume two museums with similar collections, each of which receive
donations of $400,000 per year, and expend $500,000 on museum costs. Museum A gets its
extra $100,000 from admission revenues ("related" income) using volunteer workers.
However, Museum B charges no admission because it receives $100,000 income from
macaroni sales (net of $300,000 of expenses in macaroni production). Both entities meet
the one-third donative threshold (Museum A is four-fifths donative; Museum B is one-half
donative ($400,000 out of $800,000)). Since each entity is expending the same amount of
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produce the undersupplied good or service, the donative theory would exempt
unrelated business income (up to two-thirds of the entity's total operations) in
order to overcome the market failure that induced the donations.19 7 Thus, as
we propose to implement the donative theory, there would be no need for the
UBIT as a separate check on exempt status.
This end result of the implementation of the donative theory appears
superficially to be nothing more than an adoption of the old destination of
income test, and a refutation of the relatedness test. In fact, the donative theory
resolves these competing theories through the compromise entailed in setting
the donative threshold. Unlike the destination of income test, which would
permit exemption of any amount of income from unrelated business as long as
the money is spent on a purpose that is in any way "charitable," our
implementation of the donative theory contains a substantial restriction on the
subsidy given to unrelated activity: the receipts from unrelated activity may not
exceed by a certain percentage the entity's donative base. Thus, to the extent
we retain the requirement of a substantial donative base, we recognize the
cross-subsidization concerns that form the basis for the UBIT; but to the extent
we allow the exemption to extend to other, nondonative activity, we recognize
the logic of the income destination argument. In sum, the threshold requirement
embodies in theory the idea that the subsidy must be matched to the level of
deservedness, while avoiding the practical difficulties of defining relatedness or
identifying undue competitive effects.
mII. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DONATIVE THEORY
The donative theory is theoretically superior to other theories of the
charitable tax exemption in explaining not only the core concept of what is a
charity but also the major limits on the exemption of charitable organizations
under both federal and state tax law. Nevertheless, the most theoretically
elegant theories can fail in the face of insurmountable problems of practical
money on its museum activities, and those activities are substantially supported by
donations, we would give each the same amount of subsidy (an abatement of taxes on the
$100,000 of otherwise taxable income).
197 This assumes, of course, that the exempt entity in fact uses the tax savings to
enhance its donative activity, which suggests a troublesome need to assess and police
operational spending decisions. Fortunately, the donative theory avoids this difficulty
through its threshold requirement of a significant percentage of donative support. If donors
are not satisfied with the organization's spending decisions, the operation of the market in
altruism will cause donative support to drop off, threatening its exempt status. See supra text
accompanying notes 86-87 (discussing how market in altruism will adjust donations over
time to account for variations in perceived deservedness). Even if this does not occur, the
mere fact that the organization chooses to invest more in the unrelated business will increase
its overall revenues, thus tending to dwarf the donative base that is in place and threaten the
organization's exempt status.
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implementation. 198 Fortunately, most of the mechanisms necessary to
implement the donative theory already exist in the Internal Revenue Code and
Treasury Regulations. Our analysis in this section establishes the administrative
feasibility of the donative theory by proceeding in two parts. First, we present
an overview of the current regulatory scheme aimed at distinguishing publicly-
supported charities from private foundations. As noted below, this regulatory
scheme is not aimed at granting exemption, but rather controlling the amount
of deductible contributions to different entities and guarding against abusive use
of those contributions. We then compare this current scheme with the donative
theory and suggest how this current regulatory system can be adapted to that
theory and hence become the basis for granting exemption. We note at the
outset that our intent is to cover only the major issues of practical
implementation in broad outline. Undoubtedly, we will brush over some
important topics that would be the subject of significant further discussion if the
donative theory were adopted; at this stage, we hope to demonstrate at least
that implementing the donative theory would not require a major overhaul of
the existing tax systems.
A. Defining a Publicly-Supported Entity Under Current Law
Since 1954, the Internal Revenue Code has distinguished between certain
types of charitable entities for purposes of limiting the deductibility of
charitable gifts. As originally enacted, section 170 generally limited the
deduction for charitable donations to twenty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income; however, donations to churches, certain educational institutions,
and hospitals were permitted up to thirty percent. 199 In 1964, Congress added
certain publicly-supported organizations to the higher contribution limit,200 but
it wanted to make sure that these benefits were available only to organizations
with broad-based public support and not to "private foundations," which
198 We note, however, that critics of new theories too frequently overstress the
impossibility of perfect implementation while downplaying the imperfections of the status
quo. As Professors Surrey and McDaniel have noted, the taxing system can be as simple or
as complicated as one desires. See S. SURREY & P. McDANIEL, supra note 7, at 101-02.
199 I.R.C. § 170 (1954). The stated reason for the differentiation was "to aid these
institutions in obtaining the additional funds they need, in view of their rising costs and the
relatively low rate of return they are receiving on endowment funds." S. REP. No. 1622,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621,
4660.
200 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209(a), 78 Stat. 19, 43 (1964). The
specific reason for this addition was Congressional recognition of the "many beneficial
activities carried on by various philanthropic organizations not now eligible for the [higher
deduction limit]." S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, repinted in 1964-1 (part 2)
C.B. 562.
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typically are funded by large contributions from a single donor.201
Accordingly, the 1964 law limits the availability of the higher contribution
limit to those organizations that receive a "substantial part" of their support
from the government or general public.20 2
A parallel provision emerged from the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which
enacted a comprehensive set of rules to regulate the conduct of "private
foundations." 203 To identify those entities potentially subject to abuse, section
509 first creates a presumption that all section 501(c)(3) organizations are
private foundations. It then excepts from private foundation status those entities
already subject to the higher contribution limits of section 170 and certain other
entities that demonstrate broad-based public support.20 4 The new class of
publicly-supported organizations is then given the benefit of the higher
contribution limits by virtue of a cross reference in section 170.205 The result
of the 1969 legislation is two sets of rules designed by Congress to differentiate
those charities that are broadly supported by the public from those that are
not.206
Since many of the rules already in place under sections 170 and 509 can be
adapted to implement the donative theory, a somewhat detailed introduction to
these rules is in order. We begin with section 509. In order to be classified as a
publicly-supported organization under the private foundation provision, an
entity must meet two tests. First, it must "normally" receive more than one-
third of its total support from a combination of: (1) gifts, grants, contributions,
and membership fees; and (2) gross receipts from admissions, sales of
merchandise, performance of services or rental of facilities, provided that such
gross receipts do not constitute an unrelated trade or business. 207 Two limits
exist on counting support for purposes of this test. Gross receipts from sales or
201 S. REP. No. 830, supra note 200, at 563-64.
202 I.R.C. § 170 (1964).
203 The classic private foundation is a trust funded by a single family (for example, the
Fords) which uses its funds to make contributions to other charities. Throughout the late
1950s and 1960s, tax policy analysts became increasingly concerned that the general
retention of control over family funds represented by the private foundation device created a
potential for self-dealing between the foundation and its managers/founders. See generally
Council on Foundations, Private Foundations and the 1969 Tax Reform Act, in 3
COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 4, at 1557-59.
204 I.R.C. § 509(a) (1988).
205 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(viii) (1988).
206 One set, contained largely in the regulations under § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), derives from
the 1964 legislation adding certain publicly-supported organizations to the higher
contribution limit enacted in 1954. The second set, which is a combination of statutory tests
set forth in Code § 509(a)(2) and the regulations thereunder, drew on the IRS regulations
under § 170 to further refine the difference between organizations that received broad-based
public support and those that did not.
207 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A) (1988).
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admissions (category (2)) from any one source are counted only to the extent of
$5000 or, if higher, one percent of the entity's total support for the year. 20 8 In
addition, by virtue of a complex cross reference,a 9 donations, grants,
contributions, and membership fees (category (1)) will count toward the one-
third support test only if the item does not exceed the greater of $5000 or two
percent of the total contributions received by the organization since its
inception. 210 Grants or contributions from government or other publicly-
supported organizations generally are not subject to either limitation.
The second test for publicly-supported status under section 509(a)(2) is that
the organization may not receive more than one-third of its annual support from
a combination of investment income and net unrelated business income. In
short, these tests require calculation of two fractions: under the first test, the
denominator is total support and the numerator consists of donations, grants,
contributions, membership fees, and gross sales receipts as limited by the Code
rules. This fraction must be more than one-third. The second fraction also uses
total support as the denominator, but the numerator consists of gross
investment income and net unrelated business income. This fraction must be
one-third or less.
"Support" for these purposes is defined in section 509(d), and generally
includes all types of gross receipts other than gains from the sale of capital
assets. 211 In addition, the regulations interpret the word "normally" by
averaging the preceding four taxable years, and special rules are provided for
excluding from both the denominator and numerator of the relevant fraction
unusual gifts that might unfavorably skew average numbers. 212 The tests used
by the IRS to identify "publicly supported" organizations under section 170 are
similar, but differ in material respects. Although the section 170 regulations
208 Id.
209 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)Cii) states that items will count toward meeting the one-third
of support test only if they are not from "disqualified persons" as defined in Code § 4946.
Section 4946(a)(2) includes in "disqualified persons" a person who is a "substantial
contributor," which § 507(d)(2) defines as explained in text.
210 Id. This limitation differs from the $5000/1% limit discussed previously in a
number of ways. First, the $5000/1 % limit applies only to gross receipts from sales,
admissions, etc. (items often referred to as "exempt function income") and not to
contributions, grants or membership fees. The $5000/2% limit, however, applies to
everything, including contributions, grants and membership fees. Moreover, the $5000/1 %
limit is based upon support (as defined in § 509) for the year in question; the $5000/2%
limit is based upon total contributions for all prior years of the entity.
211 I.R.C. § 509(d) defines "support" as the sum of (1) "gifts, grants, contributions, or
membership fees;" (2) gross receipts (not gross income) "from admissions, sales of
merchandise, performance of services" and the like; (3) "net income from unrelated
business activities;" (4) "gross investment income;" (5) tax revenues levied for an
organization and expended on its behalf; and (6) "the value of any services or facilities"
furnished by government to the entity free of charge. I.R.C. § 509(d) (1988).
212 Treas. Regs. § 1.509(a)-3(c)(1) & (3) (1986).
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also use a one-third-of-support threshold, they apply different limits on what
"counts" as support. First, per statutory directive, gross sales receipts from
activities related to the entity's exempt function are eliminated from support.2 13
Thus admission charges by an exempt symphony orchestra society would not
count either in the denominator or numerator of the support fraction.214
Second, individual donations count in the numerator of the support fraction
only to the extent they do not exceed two percent of the total support for the
year. As with the tests under section 509, however, government grants and
donations from other public charities generally count in full toward the
threshold. 215
While these rules are complicated, they provide an outline of two similar
approaches to the problem of identifying organizations receiving broad-based
donative support, which is the essential practical problem in implementing the
donative theory. Moreover, as noted below, we believe that the key provisions
of these rules integrate well with the donative theory and, subject to the
changes and suggestions noted below, can be used as the basis for a system
implementing the donative theory.
B. The Donative Theory Compared
1. Setting the Donation Threshold
Our analysis of the practical aspects of implementing the donative theory
must begin with the relationship between the tax exemption and the level of
public support necessary to invoke exemption. As noted above, private
philanthropy indicates a twin failure of government and private markets to
supply a good or service and, because of the free-riding disincentive to donate,
a need for an additional, indirect government subsidy to correct this
undersupply. The question of an appropriate donation threshold essentially asks
for a line beyond which we believe that a tax subsidy is both worthy and
needed. Obviously, the best case for exemption is one in which the entity in
question receives all its support from private donations, but very few, if any,
213 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (1988); Treas. Regs. § 170A-9(e)(7)(i)(a) (1986). The
statute states that support is "exclusive of income received in the exercise or performance
by such organization of its charitable... function .... "
214 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(9) example (4) (1986).
215 The § 170 regulations also provide an alternative test for organizations that fail the
one-third safe harbor. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(3) (1986). In such a case, the regulations
provide that an organization can still meet the "substantial part" test of § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) as
long as at least 10% of its total support comes from government grants or donations, and
the organization meets a "facts and circumstances" test which identifies other factors that
indicate broad-based community support. See infra note 233 for a further discussion of this
alternative test.
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organizations would meet this test.216 Even churches, which empirical studies
show are most dependent on philanthropy for their existence, 217 engage in bake
sales, raffles and that most ubiquitous nondonative activity: bingo. An
exemption tied to complete donative support, moreover, would be no
exemption at all. 2 18 Accordingly, what we need is a level of giving that
signifies a great enough market failure that subsidization through the tax system
is warranted to correct the undersupply of a desired good or service, yet not so
high that the effect of the subsidy is nil. 219
The discussion of a threshold, however, requires as a prerequisite a base
against which to measure the threshold. The relevant inquiry here is the
significance of the aggregate level of giving relative to the entity's output
capacity. Put another way, we desire to measure the importance of donations to
the amount of money an entity could spend to produce the undersupplied good
or service. The simplest measure of the significance of giving is the entity's
total revenues. 220 The portion of such revenues from donations, as opposed to
216 See WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 197, Table C.4 (citing
Smith & Rosenbaum, The Fiscal Capacity of the Voluntary Sector (unpublished paper)).
Relying on statistics compiled from 1980 data, Weisbrod found that the class of
organizations that relied most heavily on donations were religious organizations, with 93 %
of total revenues coming from private giving.2 17 1d
.
218 See supra note 193.
219 We would require all organizations to meet the donative threshold, even if they
engage in an activity that might be considered "per se" exempt by virtue of being
specifically listed in the relevant statute as qualifying for charitable status (religion,
education and social welfare are the classic examples). Our rationale is, first, that this
specific enumeration is illustrative of and inclusive within the concept of charitable, rather
than cumulative to that concept. See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at
311-12. For this reason, all such institutions must continue to meet the basic requirements
of charitable status. Imposing a donative threshold is therefore just as consistent with the
statute as excluding those institutions that engage in activities contrary to the public interest,
or imposing other implicit concepts of charity. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983). Thus, it is more accurate to say that these enumerated activities are
presumptively exempt, not per se exempt, since their historically donative status is subject
to rebuttal by a showing that a particular institution fails to follow the historical pattern. See
infra note 229 (discussing educational institutions as border-line cases under the donative
threshold); see also infra text accompanying notes 232-33 (recognizing special status of
historically exempt activities).
220 See generally B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIt SEcTOR 75 (1977);
Weisbrod, Private Goods, Collective Goods: The Role of the Nonprofit Sector, in THE
ECONOMICS OF NONPROPRIErARY ORGANIZATIONS 150 (1980) [article hereinafter
Weisbrod, Private Goods] (both using gross revenues as a measure of various types of
goods output). Obviously, one could choose other measuring sticks, such as net worth, net
revenues or some modification of these or other measurements. None of these other
yardsticks, however, seems as relevant as gross receipts to the issue at hand: whether the
undersupply of a good or service is significant enough to warrant subsidization through the
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other sources such as sales, investment income or government grants, will
indicate the extent to which the entity's production is still suboptimal due to the
free riding disinclination to give. Moreover, the entity's entire operation is
what will receive the benefit of the exemption and will produce the subsidy
effect. Accordingly, the base against which to measure donations is simply the
gross revenue of the organization.
Section 509(d) conveniently provides a good definition of the gross
revenue base, with two exceptions. We see no reason to eliminate receipts from
the sale or exchange of capital assets from the base against which to measure
the importance of donations. This exclusion is not explained in the legislative
history to the 1969 Tax Reform Act and such receipts represent funds available
to the entity to supply goods and services. 221 Second, we would include in full
tax system. Obviously, net revenue means nothing in this equation, since an exempt
organization may (perhaps ideally would) spend all its receipts on delivery of goods and
services to its market and be left with zero net revenues. While a comparison of total
donated assets to total net worth might have some bearing on the importance of donations to
an entity's overall operation, the major problem with using a net worth comparison is that it
says little about the importance of donations to an organization's delivery of goods and
services in the current year. As set forth below, see infra text accompanying notes 273-76,
we would require periodic re-testing of an entity's donative status, whereas an entity's net
worth may have resulted entirely from a large donation made generations ago. Such an
entity should not automatically be exempt today.
221 Note that current law exempts "gains" from such transactions. We would continue
to include just the gain, rather than the total receipt, since only the gain represents new
revenues. The amount previously invested in the property (its basis, in tax jargon) has
already been accounted for in the donative measurement, and hence should not be counted
again. To illustrate, assume an entity received $100 in donations in year one, and invested
the money in stocks. In this year, the entity is 100% donative-that is, all its current output
capability arose from donations. In year two, the entity receives $1 in donations, but sells
the stock for $100. In this year, the entity has $101 of output capability, but only $1 of
"new" money. The other $100 was already counted in year one, and should be excluded
from the year two calculation.
In adopting the test of "support" from § 509(d), we expressly reject the notion
contained in the § 170 regulations that exempt-function income (that is, income from sales
related to the performance of the entity's exempt purpose) should be excluded both from the
support base and the threshold. Excluding exempt function income from the base and
threshold potentially permits an entity to qualify as publicly-supported with a minor amount
of donations. For example, one could envision a museum which earns $1,000,000 in
admissions receipts, and $10,000 in donations. Although donations constitute only 1% of
the total revenues in this case, excluding exempt-function income from the test base would
leave us with an entity that received 100% of its base from donations. The current
regulations under § 170 handle this problem by stating that an organization will not meet the
tests of public support (i.e., the 33% test or the facts and circumstances test) if the entity
receives "almost all" its support from gross receipts from exempt functions. Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 170A-9(e)(7)(ii) (1986). We believe, however, that the simpler approach, as well as the
better measure of the importance of donations to the entity, is to include all receipts in the
measuring base.
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the receipts from unrelated businesses, rather than only the net income of such
business. As noted above, 222 we would not keep the UBIT as part of the
administrative machinery of the tax exemption, because we believe the use of a
donative threshold properly controls for unduly extending tax benefits beyond
the core exempt activity. Thus we would not treat receipts from an unrelated
business any differently from receipts from a related business. 223
Having defined the base, we can now move to the threshold-that is, the
percentage of the base of gross revenues that needs to come from donations in
order to qualify as a "charity." The difficulty we encounter is that, for the
income tax deduction, the two relevant considerations are competing. The more
donations (as a percentage of revenues) that an organization attracts, the better
is its case for subsidy since the higher donation level indicates a more highly
valued service and a more serious market/government failure. On the other
hand, the higher the threshold, the less help the income tax exemption is in
correcting this failure. Since donations themselves are not considered income
even in the absence of an exemption, 224 the value of an income tax exemption
per dollar of donation declines as donations increase. For instance, consider
two organizations that produce and distribute religious literature, both with
$1,000,000 in gross revenues. One organization receives $100,000 in
donations and the other $900,000. The subsidy effect created by exempting the
nondonative income is eighty-one times greater for the first organization-the
less deserving of the two. 225 The same dilemma does not present itself so
starkly with respect to the property tax exemption, for there the value of the
exemption will not vary according to the threshold, only according to the size
222 See supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
223 In fact, including only net income from an unrelated business would run counter to
the proportionality criterion. Assume, for example, two entities, one which receives $1000
from donations and expends that $1000 on, say, famine relief, and another which has $100
in donations and $900 in receipts from an unrelated business as against $850 of expenses for
that business and as a result spends only $150 on famine relief. Obviously, the first entity is
producing a far greater output of famine relief, and because that greater output is funded
totally by donations, it is in greater need of subsidization. If the measuring base included
only net income from the unrelated business, both these entities would be substantially
donative (100% vs. 67%); by including gross receipts from the unrelated business in the
measurement base, we can see that in fact the second entity is far less deserving.
224 Of course, if they were, they would likely be offset by the "business" expenses
entailed in spending the donations. See supra note 193.
225 To see this, suppose the nondonative receipts of each organization are produced by
selling their literature at a net return of 10% of sales revenue. The first organization has
$900,000 of sales revenue and a resulting $90,000 profit which is otherwise taxable income;
the second has $10,000 of profit. If the corporate income tax rate were 30%, exempting the
first would produce a subsidy of 27 cents per dollar of donation ($27,000 of forgiven taxes
versus $100,000 of donations), whereas exempting the second would produce a subsidy of
only one-third of a cent ($0.0033) per dollar of donation ($3,000 versus $900,000).
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of its property holdings.226 Nevertheless, since we assume that both income
and property tax exemptions will be determined by the same threshold, 227
setting a threshold still involves compromising these two competing
considerations of deservedness and proportionality.
While this basic value judgment ultimately must be resolved in the political
arena, historical experience suggests a threshold in the vicinity of one-third of
gross revenues. First, the pioneering work on the economics of nonprofit
institutions done by Burton Weisbrod indicates that the traditional "charitable"
institutions-religious, cultural and social welfare organizations-all receive
more than one-third of their revenues in the form of donations. 228 Thus the
226 Drawing from the example just given, assuming both organizations have the same
property holdings (a reasonable assumption since they each spend the same amount-$1
million per year-on distributing religious literature), the subsidy effect per dollar of
donation from a property tax exemption would be 9 times less disproportionate than from an
income tax exemption (9-fold discrepancy versus 81-fold).
227 See infra text accompanying note 236.
228 Weisbrod, Private Goods, supra note 220, at 151-60. Based on data taken from
1973-1975, Weisbrod calculated for various classes of entities the following percentage of
total revenues that consisted of donations:
Cultural 90
Religious 71
Public Affairs 47
Social Welfare 41
Agricultural 41
Educational 34
Health 2
Weisbrod refers to this calculation as the "Collectiveness Index." We note that
Weisbrod's Collectiveness Index included government grants but did not include the value
of donated labor. As explained below, see infra text accompanying notes 248-49, we would
exclude government grants from the donation threshold, but we would include the value of
donated labor. We do not believe, however, that our modifications fundamentally change
Weisbrod's observations that those organizations most associated with public goods receive
more than 33 % of their revenues from donations. Statistics cited in Weisbrod's later work
indicate that in 1980, religious, civic, and cultural organizations all received more than 33 %
of their gross receipts from private donations exclusive of government grants. WEISBROD,
NONPROFrr ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 197, Table C.4. With respect to donated labor,
Weisbrod observed that its inclusion in the Collectiveness Index likely would cause little
change in the relative rankings of organizations' Collectiveness Index, under the assumption
that a correlation exists between donated labor and monetary donations. Weisbrod, Private
Goods, supra note 220, at 154-56. In fact, Weisbrod's later work shows that the value of
donated labor is very high in traditionally-exempt sectofs, such as religious, health,
educational, and cultural institutions. WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY, supra note 23, at
203. For example, the value of volunteer labor to religious organizations is over twice the
cost of paid labor; for educational organizations, volunteers are worth half the total paid
labor costs. For the nonprofit sector as a whole, total private monetary contributions were
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one-third threshold appears supported by history. 229 Second, the one-third
number already exists in Code section 509(a)(2) and the Treasury Regulations
under section 170 and therefore already has been approved by the political
process and tax administrators to differentiate between levels of public support
relevant to determining the level of tax subsidy?230 Accordingly, the one-third
number appears to be at least a good starting point for the threshold.231
$49.1 billion in 1980, which constituted one-third of total expenditures by nonprofits. That
same year, the estimated value of donated labor was $64.5 billion. Id. at 195. Given these
statistics, it is likely that the inclusion of donated labor (in both the denominator and the
numerator) would result in donations being a higher percentage of total revenues for most
traditionally-exempt institutions.
229 However, there is some doubt about education. Curiously, its Collectiveness Index
dropped from 34% to 21% between Weisbrod's 1975 data and his 1980 data, and the latter
figure consists of only 12% private giving (as opposed to the 9% of government grants that
Weisbrod also included in his index). Compare Weisbrod, Private Goods, supra note 220,
at 154, Table 3, with WEISBROD, NONPRoFIT ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 197, Table
C.4. Given the historic charitable status of educational institutions, we are somewhat
troubled by the prospect that they might now fail the one-third threshold. Weisbrod did not
speculate on the reasons for this change. However, an answer is suggested by observing that
the earlier data was based upon a relatively small sample of 33 educational institutions,
while the later data states that it is "by industry," evidently including all or nearly all
organizations within the industry classification. Compare Weisbrod, Private Goods, supra
note 220, at 154 with WEISBROD, NONPROFrr ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 197, Table C.4
and id. at 72 (noting that comprehensive sample of educational institutions for 1974-1977
included 9,160 institutions, including 1,400 libraries, as opposed to the 33 institutions
sampled for the Collectiveness Index in Weisbrod's earlier work). It is likely that the
smaller sample reflected more traditional privately-supported institutions, while the data
from the entire industry is skewed by commercial nonprofit institutions such as vocational,
preparatory or early childhood schools that in fact rely mostly on tuition income as a source
of revenue. As we note below, see infra text accompanying notes 271-72, we would test
exemption on an entity-specific, rather than industry-wide, basis. Therefore, it may well be
that many educational institutions would continue to fare well under the one-third threshold,
even though the educational sector as a whole does not meet this test. Moreover, we
observe in the text at note 233, infra, that the threshold could be lowered for traditionally-
exempt activities such as education on the grounds that we are more confident of their
deservedness. Finally, we also observe in text and notes at notes 238-39, infra, the
possibility of adopting a tiered approach to the tax subsidy that would still provide some
lesser measure of tax benefits for institutions that fall below the basic threshold. See also
infra note 249 (regarding tax treatment of institutions funded primarily by government
grants). For all of these reasons, we are confident that many educational institutions would
continue to receive some form of charitable tax exemption, which reinforces the historical
consistency of the donative theory, although we would not be particularly suprised to find
that some schools are no longer exempt.
230 Actually, § 509(a) uses a threshold of "more than" one-third. For no other reason
than ease of expression, we will stick with just one-third.
231 We observe in favor of this threshold that, in contrast with the extreme
disproportionality noted for a hypothesized one-tenth threshold, supra note 225 and
accompanying text, the difference in subsidy effect per dollar of donation between a one-
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We note, moreover, that considerable flexibility exists in designing the
threshold while still taking into account the basic donative theory. The
following modifications are possible. First, the one-third test could be applied
to a portion of the entity seeking tax exemption. This would invite exempt
entities to segregate their operations into units that meet the threshold. As long
as such units meet the one-third threshold, no reason exists not to permit a
subsidy to that unit.232 Second, one might want to relax the one-third threshold
to, say, twenty percent for certain categories of historically-exempt
organizations, such as schools, churches, hospitals and the like, according to
the reasoning that there is already some measure of confidence that these
institutions are deserving and therefore are under less of a burden to
demonstrate their worthiness and neediness for a subsidy.233 Third, our support
for the one-third threshold is drawn primarily from the federal income tax
exemption, where a rather large percentage of nondonative revenue is
necessary to create any significant subsidy effect.234 Because the same is not
third donative organization and a two-thirds donative organization would be only four-fold
under the income tax exemption and two-fold under the property tax exemption, using the
assumptions we stated earlier.
232 Such segregation avoids the possibility of cross-subsidizing activities which do not
need a subsidy, while permitting a subsidy for those activities that do.
233 This is suggested by the regulations under § 170, which contain a "facts and
circumstances" test that permits an entity to be classified as a public charity if it both
receives 10% of its support from donations and demonstrates certain factors designed to
show that the entity is responsive to public needs. Treas. Regs. § 1.170A-9(e)(3) (1986).
However, we do not favor this route (and we think that 10% is too low in any event), since
this exception is designed with a different purpose in mind. The facts and circumstances
identified in this regulation attempt to identify organizations providing "community benefit"
(for example, a governing body representative of the public at large), a test for exemption
which we have explicitly rejected. See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6,
at 358-79. Under the donative theory, it cannot be presumed that any particular activity is
forever deserving of subsidy; each organization must continue to show its social worth and
its need for a donative subsidy. Witness the example of hospitals, which we discuss at length
in our prior article. Moreover, even among worthy charities, there is the continuing
requirement of demonstrating neediness. Gergen argues persuasively that churches and
synagogues suffer from less, not more, free riding than other traditional objects of
donations; Gergen, supra note 23, at 1438; therefore, they should have to meet a higher
threshold in order to deserve the same level of subsidy. In short, allowing certain classes of
charities to qualify for the same set of tax benefits under a lower threshold would create a
systemic disproportionality in the subsidy. A superior manner in which to apply the "facts
and circumstances" exception to allow a relaxation of the threshold is to show that the gifts
to a particular entity suffer from a greater degree of free riding than do most gifts generally,
for reasons suggested infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 193-95.
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necessarily true for the property tax exemption,235 individual states may wish
to set a higher threshold.23 6
Fourth, it is possible to treat differently under a single threshold gifts of a
different nature. A single threshold assumes that all donations signal about the
same level of worthiness and neediness, based on our analysis in Part II.A.3.
that the motive for donations is not relevant to whether they deserve a subsidy
at all, since some level of free riding attends all giving. But we did
acknowledge in that section that motive might matter for purposes of
determining the amount of subsidy. 23 7 One way to accommodate predictable
variations (those that do not average out over donations and institutions
generally) is to give less weight to donations that we conclude systematically
suffer from less free riding by discounting them in the numerator of the one-
third threshold. 23 s
Finally, it is possible to depart from a uniform threshold by adopting a
tiered approach to subsidizing charities, whereby varying degrees of tax benefit
are conferred according to the level of donative support they demonstrate. This
is already suggested by the present structure of the Code, which distinguishes
between 501(c)(3) charitable organizations eligible to receive both an income
tax exemption and tax deductible contributions, and 501(c)(4) "social welfare
organizations," which are still tax exempt but lose their eligibility to receive
deductible contributions. 239
235 See supra note 194.
236 However, we recommend sticking to a single threshold, since a 50-state variation
would wreak havoc on charities. Moreover, given the modest subsidy effect created by the
income tax exemption even for minimal, one-third donative institutions, it is reasonable to
assume that a large base of exempt, nondonative property is necessary to fully overcome the
market/government failure.
237 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
238 Thus, one might contend that there is more willingness to give at death (or in
contemplation of death) than during life since the donor does not have the alternative of
personal consumption. (On the other hand, we have no confirmation for this speculation,
and it may well be that legators value as strongly the desire to leave their wealth to their
families as they value consuming it during life; indeed, spending on one's own family is
usually considered a form of personal consumption.) Second, it might be shown that, for a
given activity, donors are more willing to give to capital than to operating expenditures
because, with the former, there is more of a lasting, tangible embodiment of one's altruism
and therefore more psychic ("act utility") gratification. (Again, this is just speculation; we
have no evidence.) Third, there is good reason to believe that, as between two equally-sized
gifts, one from a rich donor is more easily given than from a poor donor. This would argue
for differential accounting according to the wealth of donors, a rather complex proposition.
239 See supra notes 170-71. Combining this observation with those just preceding, we
might gingerly suggest a system in which different subsidies "kick in" at different donation
levels as follows: at 10%, an entity qualifies for income tax exemption, but not donation-
deductibility or property tax exemption; deductibility of donations and the other
"charitable" income tax benefits could kick in at the 33% level; while full exemption
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We stress, however, that each of these potential variations adds a
considerable level of complexity. As we noted at the outset, with each
increment of accuracy added to the system, one sacrifices a measure of ease in
administration. Whether the trade-off is worth it is a value choice we leave to
those in charge of determining and implementing public policy.
2. Measuring Donations
The second practical issue of implementation that arises is defining exactly
what "counts" as a donation for purposes of computing the threshold. This
overall issue, however, breaks into a number of subcomponents each of which
can be examined separately.
a. Defining a Donation
As noted earlier, a large body of case law in federal taxation has examined
what constitutes a donation for purposes of the charitable contribution
deduction under section 170 of the Code.240 Although court decisions
sometimes vary in their exact rationale, the key attribute of a donation is that
no direct quid pro quo exists for the payment. As we previously have
explained, this common-law definition of donation fits well with our donative
theory.
The quid pro quo definition obviously excludes from the threshold
payments for goods or services rendered by the entity in question. Similarly, it
would exclude membership dues, since such payments are in exchange for the
direct quid pro quo of membership privileges. 241 As a result, our measurement
of the donation threshold would more closely track that used by section 170
than that used by section 509. Nevertheless, even the section 170 regulations
include in the donation base certain items that we would exclude, such as
government grants, 242 and they exclude certain items that we would include,
such as donated labor. In addition, other aspects of calculating the donation
(income, property and deduction) might be limited to organizations with over 50% donative
support.
240 See supra Part II.A.3.e.
241 However, it would be appropriate to bifurcate membership dues when there clearly
are both quid pro quo and donative elements to the "membership." For example, one
becomes a "member" of the Metropolitan Opera Society by making a $100 payment. This
payment entitles a member to a biweekly magazine (Opera News) which otherwise would
cost $30 per year, and discounts on certain other merchandise. Clearly, a substantial portion
of the dues are nothing more than a donation. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(7)C'l)
(1986) (support includes membership fees unless fees are for the purpose of purchasing
goods, services, access to facilities or the like).
242 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(7)(i)(b) (1986).
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threshold, such as whether to require breadth in donations and whether to
differentiate capital gifts from gifts for operations must be examined.
b. Donated Labor
The reasons for the exclusion of donated labor from the definition of a
publicly-supported entity under section 170 are unclear. 243 The donative theory
would require inclusion of donated labor, in both the support base and the
calculation of the donation threshold, for the simple reason that donation of
services worth $100 is as indicative of the need for subsidy as is the donation
of $100 in cash used to purchase the same services. Moreover, donated labor
constitutes a very large percentage of the total value of private gifts to nonprofitintittions .244
Requiring an organization to value all its contributed services, however,
would not only be a significant reporting burden, it also would be an open
invitation to abusive overvaluing of those services in order to meet the
contribution threshold. To ease the administrative problems, taxing authorities
could adopt a standard valuation system, much as the IRS already has standard
mileage rates for deduction of automobiles used for charity. 245 For instance,
academic studies have valued donated labor by assuming that each worker
could earn the average hourly wage of nonagricultural workers, plus twelve
percent for fringe benefits. 246 While this is a relatively crude measure,247 it
indicates the possibility of constructing a standard valuation system.
243 Although the tax laws have long prohibited a deduction for contributed services,
M. GRAErz, supra note 65, at 487, this prohibition is based upon the technical argument
that the charitable deduction requires a "payment," which can only be made in cash or
other property. B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 95, 35.2.1, at 35-17. A more
convincing theoretical basis of the prohibition is that allowing a deduction for contributed
services without requiring the value of those services to be included in the income of the
contributor results in a double tax benefit. See, e.g., B. BrTKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note
95, at 35-17; M. GRAEr, supra note 65, at 487. The exclusion of donated labor from the
definition of a publicly-supported entity under § 170 or § 509, therefore, may simply have
been out of a desire for statutory symmetry.
244 Statistics cited by Weisbrod show that in 1985, the value of donated labor was
$110 million, as opposed to $68 million of cash contributions for the 1984 year.
WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 132-33.
245 I.R.C. § 1700) (1988) (12 cents per mile).
2 46 WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 132.
247 Under the donative theory, we believe that a more appropriate measure of the
value of donated labor is what the labor would have cost the recipient on the market (as
opposed to what the donor would have earned for the donated time), because this is a more
appropriate measure of the "savings" in labor costs which can then be used to increase
output of goods and services, and it is a fair estimate of the "opportunity cost" of a
volunteer's time (e.g., what they would receive if they sold the same services in the labor
market).
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c. Government and Private Grants
The donative theory dictates that government grants not be counted toward
meeting the donative threshold. 248 While an entity dependent upon government
grants for operational revenue clearly has experienced private market failure,
government grants definitionally negate the existence of government failure,
the second prong of the donative theory. A grant occurs because the democratic
process (government) already has provided a mechanism for direct funding of
the particular activity. Accordingly, government grants do not indicate a need
for additional indirect subsidization through the tax system.249
We do recognize that inclusion of donated labor could create administrative problems,
especially in monitoring productivity. An entity "walking the line" on the donation
threshold would be tempted to call for far more volunteers than it actually needs to staff the
litter pick-up for the local park, since all the volunteers' time could be counted in the
donation threshold calculation, regardless whether the volunteers were working a hard
eight-hour day or picking up litter between conversations about the weather. A standard
valuation system, however, could appropriately discount the value of the labor in certain
categories to offset this tendency.
248 Government grants, however, would be included in the denominator of the
threshold fraction (gross revenues) since like other revenues, government grants provide
funds to increase the output of goods and services and therefore negate government failure.
See generally supra Part ]'.C.3. and Part II.B.1.
249 We recognize that elimination of government grants from the calculation of the
donation threshold would cause many research organizations currently exempt from tax
under § 501(c)(3) to fail our test.of exemption. Of course, the government might well
decide to exempt grants from the tax base anyway, since it makes little sense for the
government to tax its own money. As noted above, note 22, supra, we have no objection to
the government deciding to found exemptions on bases other than the charitable status of the
organization. One such separate basis for a noncharitable exemption is that the government
should not tax itself. Such an exclusion could be crafted simply by excluding grants from
income (which is not presently done, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 102 (1988); see generally B.
BrrrKTR & L. LOKKEN, supra note 95, chs. 10 & 11). Another possibility is to add such
organizations to the list of entities in § 501(c)(4)-(26) that are granted exemption on some
noncharitable basis. Cf. § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1988) (singling out medical research
organizations as qualifying for the higher deductibility limit).
Finally, one could exclude government grants from both the numerator and
denominator of the donation threshold (as we propose for "innocent" disproportionate gifts,
see infra text accompanying notes 259-63), thus permitting such organizations to meet the
donation threshold independently of grants. Assume, for example, a research organization
that receives $900,000 in government grants and $100,000 in private donations. While
donations account for only 10% of total revenues of this organization, if the government
grants are excluded from gross revenues, donations make up 100% of the narrowed
revenue base. The argument for this treatment proceeds from a combination of the theory
that the government should not tax its own money and of the donative theory. In essence,
this hybrid approach attempts to avoid the "penalty" that occurs when an organization falls
partly under both theories, but fails to qualify under either.
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On the other hand, as is the case with current law, we would count grants
from other private entities as donations. One might object that these gifts suffer
from no free-rider disincentive because they are often made by private
foundations organized under terms that require them to make gifts to certain
causes.25 0 But grants by private foundations are not entirely lacking in the
ability to signal deservedness because, similar to the case for reputation-driven
giving discussed in Part II.A.3.d., there are fewer such funds than the
recipients who seek them. Therefore, a market in altruism is at work that
assures us that such grants go to worthy causes and to those that the grantor
perceives as being most needy.25 '
d. Large Versus Small Gifts
Earlier, we suggested the possibility of altering the measurement of
donations to depart from a system that counts all donations equally in favor of
one that weights some donations more than others. 252 The suggested rationale
was that such an adjustment might be advisable to account for predictable
variations in the degree of free riding that attends different types of gifts. The
one area where we think the case for this adjustment is most compelling
concerns the minimum number of donors necessary to achieve charitable status.
A donative threshold that does not require a minimum breadth of support
suffers under both the worthiness and the neediness criteria. The aberrational,
idiosyncratic desires of a single individual may not reflect the desires of any
significant portion of society and thus may not be worthy of a public
subsidy. 25 3 Moreover, as the number of donors decreases, the risk of
significant free riding, which in turn causes undersupply of the good or service,
declines because factors such as peer pressure, group cohesiveness, implicit
250 This requirement might come not only from the trust instrument but also from tax
law itself, which prohibits private foundations from engaging in excessive accumulation of
earnings. I.R.C. § 4942 (1988) (excise tax on failure of private foundation to make
minimum distributions). See generally P. TREUSCH, supra note 154, at 497-509.
251 Still, there is a valid argument that gifts by private foundations suffer from less free
riding, and therefore signal less neediness, than do other private gifts. Nevertheless, this
concern is offset by observing that most private foundations themselves receive the vast
majority of their assets from gifts, typically a single large donor. Therefore, they serve as
donative conduits. That is, the signaling quality of the original gift should pass through to
the foundation's distribution of that gift.252 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
253 The same point can be made in less absolute terms under the proportionality
criterion. Even if a very large gift signals an activity valued by others, an idiosyncratic large
donor may place a far greater value on the activity than do others. Therefore, even if the
entity should be exempt to some extent, using that person's gift to form the entity's donative
base would allow it to obtain a disproportionate subsidy by founding a much larger
commercial, nondonative enterprise on the larger donative base.
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reciprocity and other external inducements likely play a larger role in
motivating the donation.254 Thus the smaller the donative pool, the greater the
probability that an additional government subsidy is not needed to provide the
optimal level of goods and services.
On the other hand, the donative theory by definition primarily assists
insular groups in society, since a widespread interest group presumably is
better able to achieve direct government subsidy through the political system.
Hence, requiring too great a number of donors would undermine the very
purpose of the exemption to correct for government failure. Moreover, the
donative theory creates no objections to large gifts per se,255 only to a very few
gifts being the virtual sole source of donative support for a single entity. For
example, the donative theory applies with equal force to an entity that receives
100 percent of its $100,000,000 in revenues from twenty gifts of $5,000,000 as
to one that receives $1000 from twenty gifts of $50. The concern is not with
the absolute size of gifts but their size relative to the exempt entity's overall
operations.
These considerations lead us to adopt some minimal "screening" device to
weed out aberrational giving. A simple numerical test (such as requiring fifteen
separate donors), however, does not serve the purpose, because it could be met
with one $20,000,000 gift and fourteen $1 gifts. Obviously, such a situation is
so close to a single donor that worthiness and neediness concerns (or, at least
proportionality concerns) 256 are still present. Instead, a preferable system is one
that both requires a minimum number of donations and guards against
disproportionate gifts.
Fortunately, section 170 already contains such a system, including
donations in the numerator of the threshold calculation only to the extent they
do not exceed two percent of total support for the year.257 This limitation
effectively requires at least seventeen roughly equal donations in any one year
254 See generally supra Part II.A.3.
255 We have no empirical evidence that the absolute size of a gift bears any predictable
relation to worthiness or to a free-rider disincentive to give. As for worthiness, one might
argue that a donative subsidy gives disproportionate weight to the hobbies of the rich, who
obviously tend to make larger gifts. But, as discussed in the text accompanying notes
124-29, supra, the reciprocity inherent in the charitable exemption means that rich
taxpayers will provide proportionally more tax support (in part due to the progressive tax
rates, but even under a flat tax) for the favored activities of the poor. As for neediness,
obviously, all things being equal, a large gift "hurts" more than a small one. However, one
might speculate that larger gifts come from richer donors who are therefore more inclined
to give, but, then again, they are giving more, so these two speculative possibilities tend to
offset.
256 See supra note 225.
257 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e)(6) (1986).
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to satisfy the threshold limitation.258 Such a limitation appears well-suited to
the purposes of the donative theory, with one important exception. The
consequence of excluding ninety-eight percent of a disproportionately large gift
from the numerator but not the denominator is to penalize, in effect, a charity
for receiving a single large gift, since it is then more difficult for the remaining
gifts to satisfy the one-third threshold. 25 9 An alternative approach to accounting
for large gifts would be to exclude them from both halves of the fraction,
thereby avoiding a penalty effect while also not counting them toward
satisfying the threshold. In fact, the current regulations adopt this bifurcated
approach, distinguishing between what might be called "innocent"
disproportionate gifts and those that are "suspect," according to criteria such as
whether the donor is related to the organization's management, whether the gift
258 Mathematically, the § 170 threshold will always require at least seventeen gifts.
Under this section, the threshold is more than 33% of the total revenue base, or 33 % of
100%. Since each donation "counts" only up to 2% of the revenue base, a minimum of
seventeen 2%-gifts are needed to meet the threshold (17 X 2 = 34). The 2% limitation also
guards against cases in which one gift is a disproportionate percentage of total donations.
For example, assume an entity with $1 million in total revenues. The 33% threshold will be
met with seventeen $20,000 gifts. The threshold will also be met with sixteen $20,000 gifts
and one $500,000 gift. Suppose, however, that there is one gift of $500,000 and sixteen
gifts of $100. In this case, the entity fails the threshold (33% of $1 million is $333,333. The
$500,000 gift counts in the numerator up to 2% of $1 million, or $20,000. The total
numerator, therefore, is $21,600, far less than the required one-third). Of course, the
threshold also can be met with three hundred and twenty thousand $1 gifts and one
$500,000 gift, but in this situation, the $500,000 is not as disproportionate a percentage of
total donations as it is in the case of the sixteen $100 gifts.
We prefer this approach to the limit contained indirectly in § 509(a)(2), which credits
donations to the extent of the greater of $5000 or 2% of total donations over the life of the
entity. Under the § 509(a)(2) system, an entity that had "built-up" a donation record could
meet the threshold with very few large gifts in later years. Suppose, for example, that total
donations to an entity for years 1-20 were $20 million, and that in year 21 total revenues
are $1,200,000. The one-third test would be met in year 21 with a single donation of
$400,000; such a donation would be one-third of total support and would "count" in full
since the donation does not exceed 2% of total donations for all years. n our view, an entity
ought to demonstrate its need for subsidization on a regular basis and not be able to use
prior donations to obtain an exemption forever. See supra Part I.A.5.
259 Assume, for example, that a rich alumnus donates $10,000,000 in a single year for
a new university building, and that other donations (all less than $10,000 each) equal
$500,000. Under our definitional scheme, the revenue base would be $10,500,000 and the
donations would count toward the threshold only to the extent of 2% of the base, or
$210,000. The total amount included in the threshold for this year, therefore, would consist
of the small gifts totalling $500,000 and $210,000 of the $10,000,000 grant, for a total of
$710,000, well below the one-third threshold. While this problem is ameliorated to some
extent by the four-year average test of donative status used by current statutory provisions,
see infra text accompanying notes 273-75, it may not cure it altogether.
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is only tangentially relevant to its operations, and whether the organization
would have met the threshold in the absence of the large gift. 260
This bifurcation in the remedy for disproportionate gifts is well suited to
the donative theory. 261 An "innocent" gift deserves more lenient treatment
because it appears to be a true donation; therefore, there is some level of
neediness, and some indication of worthiness comes from the fact that there are
a sufficient number of other, smaller gifts supporting the activity to qualify it
for donative status absent the gift. Thus, we would not want a rule that revoked
an entity's charitable status merely because it happened to receive a very large
gift one year. The only concern is one of proportionality-we do not wish a
single, aberrational gift to determine the size of the subsidy by setting the
donative base on which the organization might found a commercial,
nondonative enterprise. 262 A "suspicious" gift, however, is one that either
lacks entirely an independent indication of worthiness, or for which there are
doubts about its neediness because of indications that there might be a hidden
quid pro quo. 2 6 3 Such gifts therefore should be given the status of nondonative
income rather than being simply ignored.
260 Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(c)(3) (1976).
261 However, we would adopt somewhat different indicia for "innocent" versus
"suspect" gifts. For instance, we would not give more credit to gifts by bequest than to inter
vivos gifts, and we would add additional factors that attempt to ferret out hidden quid pro
quos for a gift.
262 Assume, for example, that an entity receives one $1 million gift and sixteen $100
gifts. If large gifts were counted in full in both the revenue base and in the donation
threshold, the entity could use such a gift to receive an exemption on $2 million of other
income per the one-third threshold. On the other hand, if this gift is included in the revenue
base but limited in counting toward the threshold to 2% of the revenues, the entity will fail
the exemption test even though it received nothing but donations (total revenues of
$1,001,600, but "donations" of only roughly $22,000 ($1600 of small gifts and 2% of the
large gift)). If the large gift is excluded from both the revenue base and the donation
calculation, however, the entity is not penalized for having the large gift and also is not
permitted to use the large gift to shield nondonative income. In the example, the entity
would be 100% donative (revenue of $1600, all from donations) but to meet the one-third
threshold it could not have other income of more than $3200 (in which case, total revenue
would be $4800, and it would just meet the one-third test).
263 Nevertheless, disqualifying such gifts almost entirely (98% worth) based on these
concerns is in tension with the analysis in Part II.A.3 that demonstrates that motive is
irrelevant to whether donations deserve a tax subsidy. This tension can be resolved by
observing that the prior analysis acknowledged possible doubts in its conclusions, which we
set aside because of their minor nature in the run of donations and the administrative
inconvenience of isolating the doubtful cases. Here, though, we have defined a class of
doubtful cases for which the correct outcome is quite important (because of the size and
determinative status of disproportionate gifts). Therefore, it is justifiable to, in effect,
reverse the benefit of the doubt by disqualifying these gifts absent a demonstration that they
are in fact "innocent." If this still seems to treat large gifts unduly, a compromise might be
struck that counts such gifts entirely in the denominator but only to a discounted extent in
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We also would keep two other exceptions to the breadth limitation that are
part of current law. Both section 170 and section 509(a) credit grants from
other publicly-supported entities in full toward the donation threshold (that is,
these amounts are exempted from the two percent limit). We would keep a
slightly-modified version of this exception and credit donations or grants from
other donative entities in proportion to the entities' donative status (for
instance, recipients of gifts from eighty percent donative institutions would be
counted in the numerator at eighty percent of their value), following a conduit
theory that attaches to gifts from tax-exempt donors the same deservedness-
signalling qualities they possessed when they were originally given to the
exempt donor for redistribution.2 64
Second, under a reverse conduit theory, we would exempt from the
breadth limitations organizations that expend most of their income for the year
as grants to donative entities. This exception would be similar to the current
law's treatment of private operating foundations, 265 and is based upon our view
that an entity that gives all its income each year to other organizations that have
already established their worthiness and neediness does not itself need an
independent check on worthiness and neediness. Since the donor institution is
not itself engaging in any supply of an end good or service, it can be viewed
simply as a holding tank for money and therefore engaged in the same activities
as the donee institutions.
e. Capital Assets Versus Operating Expenses
Another important aspect of measuring the donative base is whether
donations for capital projects, such as a new hospital wing, should "count" the
same as donations to cover operating expenses, and, related to this issue,
whether capital gifts should be credited over some time period (say, the
the numerator, much as we suggest elsewhere the possibility of discounting other categories
of gifts. See supra note 249.
264 Moreover, the current statutory and regulatory schemes contain a number of
"backup" rules which we would keep to avoid abuse. The regulations under § 170 and §
509(a)(2), for example, both state that "earmarked" gifts (i.e., gifts given to one entity
which are earmarked for redistribution to a second entity) will be treated as having come
from the original donor, and thus are not excepted from the breadth limitations. We would
keep this rule under the donative theory to avoid end-runs around the breadth limitation
through use of a donative entity conduit.
265 I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) and 170(b)(1)(E) give preferred status to "private
operating foundations" as defined in I.R.C. § 49420)(3). To highly simplify an incredibly
complex statute, private operating foundations are those foundations which expend virtually
all their income each year in making grants to public charities. The statute, of course,
provides exceptions to the general rule of mandatory distribution, such as permitting income
accumulations for special projects. I.R.C. § 4942(g)(2) (1988). For a short general
discussion of private operating foundations, see P. TREUSCH, supra note 154, at 567-72.
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depreciation period of the asset they purchase) since presumably they are not
"used up" during the current year. Our starting assumption is that each type of
gift is equally worthy. Typically, an organization must have both a capital base
and a means of meeting operating expenditures in order to produce goods and
services. No significance should attach to the fact that a donation is used to
purchase a building for Local U. rather than defraying the electric bill, because
both are integral parts of the delivery by Local U. of its educational services.
In fact, one can surmise that any given entity will "target" solicitations for
donations to those areas in which the entity most needs help to continue its
production of goods and services.266
On the other hand, because we favor an implementation of the donative
theory that tests donative status on a periodic basis, proper measurement of the
importance of donations to the output capacity of an entity in any one year
suggests that some type of amortization system for capital gifts is appropriate.
In effect, such a system attempts to match the portion of the donation used in a
particular year for production of the undersupplied good or service to other
revenues available that year. Moreover, because of the two percent limitation
on counting gifts, simply including gifts for capital purchases in the year the
donation is made might unfairly skew the donation threshold calculation for a
year in which the entity recieves a large donation. 267 We do not want a system
that forces entities to structure donations to eliminate such skewing, such as by
having the gift made in portions over a number of years. 268 Finally, common
266 As we have stated before, however, empirical or other evidence might show that a
given class of gifts, such as gifts to capital campaigns, suffers proportionately less free-
riding than other classes of gifts and therefore is less in need of an additional tax subsidy.
The donative theory obviously can accommodate such variances by using separate
thresholds for different classes of gifts, or by "weighting" such gifts in the calculation of the
donation threshold differently. See, e.g., supra note 233.
267 This skewing, however, exists only for gifts that are classified as "suspect," under
the criteria discussed in text accompanying notes 260-63, supra, since "innocent" large gifts
are excluded from both numerator and denominator. Thus, one might respond to the
skewing concern that this effect is precisely what is intended for these kinds of gifts.
However, the degree of skewing is unfair if it all occurs in a single year rather than being
spread out over the economic life of the gift. The amortization remedy we adopt does not
avoid all such skewing since even the amortized portion of a large capital gift could exceed
the 2% threshold. If so, and if the gift fell into the "suspect" category, the amortized portion
would still be treated under the rules set out above.
Observe also that the concern over unfair skewing does not exist for disproportionate
gifts used for operating expenses (say, to pay off a whopping lawyer's bill), since in such
cases the entity in fact receives the full economic benefit of the gift in a single year.
268 Under § 509, items are included in the support denominator and the donation
numerator for the threshold fraction under the cash method of accounting. Treas. Reg. §
1.509(a)-3(k) (1986). Thus a pledge for a contribution, even if legally binding, is not
counted until actually received. Id. This permits an entity to spread one large contribution
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intuition suggests that donors to capital campaigns view their gifts as having
some measure of lasting effect-the current gift of $1,000,000 to the children's
hospital wing is prompted by the long-term nature of the asset purchased with
the gift.
Amortizing capital gifts into the donation threshold fraction (both
numerator and denominator) over some predefined period, such as the
depreciation period for the assets purchased with the capital gift, solves each of
these concerns. 269 This approach would avoid undue pressure to structure the
donation as a series of several smaller gifts. It also is a better fit with the
donative theory: to the extent that the amortization period approximates the
economic useful life of the asset purchased, the tax subsidy is made more
proportionate by being applied as the asset is expended in producing the
undersupplied good or service rather than all in one year. Finally, amortizing
this gift into the donation threshold calculation would more closely align the
treatment of the gift for exemption purposes to the expectations of donors that
their gift will in fact have an extended effect.
A third facet of this issue is how to count contributions made to
endowment funds and the interest earned on those funds. A case can be made
to treat gifts to an endowment similarly to capital gifts and to amortize them
into the donation threshold calculation over some period of time. Donors to
endowment funds, like donors to capital campaigns, probably believe their gift
has a lasting quality. Moreover, like capital items, endowment funds are not
"used up" in the current year. Such an approach, however, would present far
more difficult issues of administration than amortizing capital gifts.270
over a number of years, and we would presume that entities would choose this route as a
matter of course if exempt status depended on it.
269 The tax depreciation period is one obvious choice, although we are mindful that
the tax depreciation system only rarely attempts to approximate economic useful life. The
ADR system-in place prior to ACRS (and still used for certain definitional purposes)-
might be a good starting point, since that system attempts to define an economic useful life.
See generally B. BrTKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 95, at 23.6.4. GAAP (Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles) depreciation lives might be another starting point, although
again we must consider the trade-off between administrative simplicity and theoretical
purity.
Some accommodation would need to be made for assets that are not depreciable, such
as land. Perhaps the cost of such capital items would be amortized over the longest available
depreciation period.
270 Whereas accounting for capital assets gifts easily plugs into depreciation schedules
that exempt entities already keep for financial accounting purposes, amortization of
endowment gifts would require creating new accounting systems that apply the amortization
schedule to each year's gifts. This kind of annual segregation requirement would become an
administrative nightmare. Moreover, an amortization system would have to account for
what happens when endowment funds are used to meet extraordinary operating expenses:
presumably, the unamortized amount of the gift would be immediately included in the
denominator and numerator of the donation threshold calculation, but determining which
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Therefore, we would count gifts to endowment in full in the year received. 271
Under this system, interest from endowment funds would be part of the gross
revenue denominator of the threshold fraction, but would not be counted in the
donation numerator (any more than rental income on a donated building would
be).
3. Timing and Identification Issues
So far we have outlined the basic system for identifying donations and
measuring them against an entity's revenue base. What remain are some
general issues of implementation, such as whether the classification of donative
entities should proceed on an individual or industry-wide basis, when the
measurement of donative status should occur, and how to deal with start-up
entities that have no support history.
a. Implementing the Classification: Entity Versus Industry
An industry-wide measurement has the advantage of the administrative
simplicity of a one-for-all decision. What statistical compilations exist on
donations generally are assembled on an industry-wide basis, permitting fairly
easy implementation of such a system. Nevertheless, we believe that an entity-
by-entity system is preferable.
To be valid, industry-wide data would have to come from reports by all or
most of the individual industry participants; if each entity has to report its
position for purposes of an industry-wide survey anyway, little administrative
advantage is gained by avoiding scrutiny of specific entities. In addition,
organizations may not be capable of convenient pigeonholing: exactly what
sector is the United Way associated with, for example? Perhaps most
important, however, is the fact that a given organization's support base may
vary widely depending on its exact activities and geographic location. The
finds are immediately included would require tracing the funds used or adoption of some
accounting convention such as first-in-first-out.
271 However, this presents the possibility of unduly penalizing recipients of large gifts
to endowment-those that violate the 2% rule set forth in the text accompanying notes 257-
59, supra. Like capital gifts, the penalty effect will be larger than the actual economic
benefit of the gift in the time-span that the penalty is felt. See supra note 267. Therefore,
there is a good case for modifying the approach just outlined in text to allow amortization of
disproportionately large gifts to endowment that exceed the 2% limit. Observe, though, that
this is an issue only for such gifts that are classified as "suspect," which is more likely for
the donation of capital assets than for the donation of cash. See supra note 260. Thus, there
are likely to be few such exceptions. However, if the leader of a local Boy Scout Troop
donates his limited partnership interest in a highly-depreciated Texas oil well and the Troop
sells the interest to create an endowment, then it might be unfair to impose the entire
penalty effect from this gift in a single year.
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statistics for an entire industry say little about what funding situation a
particular entity faces. For example, the hospital industry as a whole does not
receive high levels of donative support, but a particular institution, or a
particular service within many institutions, may be fully deserving of charitable
status. 272 Finally, an entity-by-entity approach is already used in classifying
publicly-supported organizations under the Code. The administrative machinery
for individual decision-making, therefore, already exists in current law.
b. When Is Donative Status Tested?
The donative theory requires that entities justify their exemption on some
regular basis. The fact that a charity received substantial donative support in
one year does not preclude social conditions from changing in the future. In
fact, the history of nonprofit hospitals recounted in our earlier work illustrates
a dramatic shift from an industry reliant on donations to an industry reliant
primarily on direct government subsidies and income from sale of services. 273
Accordingly, some mechanism is necessary to recheck entities periodically to
ensure that they still meet the donative standard.
On the other hand, donation levels can vary for a given year, and it is
perfectly possible that an entity can miss the threshold requirement in any one
year but still meet it on an average basis over a number of years. Requiring an
entity to meet the donation threshold every year would create undue pressure to
structure donations so that little yearly variation occurs. Moreover, such a
system would be unwieldy from the standpoint of yearly budgeting for
managers of exempt entities: since in any given year an entity could "go
taxable," managers would have to plan for the possibility of tax payments
which might or might not be due that year.
Some level of compromise between the necessity of periodic retesting and
unwieldy "flip-flopping" is already a part of the Code scheme, however. The
regulations under section 170 and section 509 both use a four-year average for
the calculation of the public support threshold. 274 Moreover, once an entity
meets this threshold, it is presumed to satisfy the public support test for the
succeeding two years.275 This system appears consistent with the donative
theory.
272 For instance, Shriners hospitals, which care for children, rely almost entirely on
donations, and cancer treatment for children seems to attract significant donative support for
conventional hospitals. See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 410
n.365.
273 Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 400-03.
274 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-9(e)(4), 1.509(a)-3(c)(1) (1986). In each system whether
an entity has met the threshold is determined on the basis of the aggregate revenue base and
donation total for the previous four years.
275 Id.
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c. Start-Up Entities
The final timing issue deals with the mechanism for handling start-up
enterprises. Since by definition these entities have no operating history, they
cannot demonstrate that they meet the donative threshold requirements. One
method for handling such situations, of course, is simply to withhold tax-
exempt status until the entity satisfies the donation threshold based upon past
operations. Most studies of charitable contributions concede, however, that the
tax deduction for contributions is critical to attracting donations;276
accordingly, withholding exempt status and the corresponding deduction for
contributions would put the entity at an unfair disadvantage in the market in
altruism.
As a result, we favor a system that permits exemption on a trial basis, after
which an entity would be required to meet the donation threshold on the basis
of actual operations. Once again, we are guided by current law. The
regulations under section 170 and section 509 permit newly-created
organizations to apply for an advance ruling that essentially permits the entity
to be classified as a public charity for a two or five year test period.2 77 At the
end of the test period, the entity must demonstrate that it meets the regular tests
for publicly-supported status. 278 This procedure can be adapted wholesale to
the donative theory.
4. Exacerbation of Fundraising Abuse
Another issue of practical implementation that demands some attention is
the effect of the donative theory on fundraising abuse. Obviously, a system that
keys tax exemption to a specific level of donative support encourages
aggressive fundraising campaigns. We do not intend in this space to address the
276 See, e.g., WEISBROD, NONPROFIT ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 93-95 and
sources cited therein; C. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARrrABLE GIVING
141 (1985) (noting that the absence of a tax exemption would result in a decrease in
donations by about 25 %).
277 Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-9(e)(5), 1.509(a)-3(d) (1986).
278 The test period ruling is granted on the basis of a facts and circumstances test
which attempts to determine whether the entity's "organizational structure, proposed
programs or activities, and intended method of operation are such as to attract the type of
broadly based support from the general public" that is necessary to meet the test of publicly-
supported organizations. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-9(e)(5)(ii), 1.509(a)-3(d)(2) (1986). The
regulations list a number of factors to guide the decision, including breadth of public
representation on the governing board of the entity, breadth of initial funding, size of initial
endowment, plans for fundraising solicitation and the like. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-
9(e)(5)(ii) (1986) (cross-referencing § 1.170A-9(e)(3)), 1.509(a)-3(d)(2) (1986) (cross-
referencing § 1.509(a)-3(a)).
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legal aspects of regulation of fundraising by charitable organizations, a subject
that has been examined by economists and legal commentators. 279 We note,
however, that the abuse that has engendered the most legislative action and
critical commentary is the problem of excessive costs of fundraising-that is, a
charitable entity that spends a very small portion of a donation on delivery of
charitable services, with the lion's share covering the costs of fundraising
itself.280 A donative system that counted donations toward the threshold
regardless of the associated costs clearly would exacerbate the excessive cost
problem, since there would be every incentive to spend up to 100 percent of
receipts on fundraising. In fact, one can hypothesize situations in which
fundraising costs exceeding 100 percent of donations would be rational, since
the gross donations so generated might trigger the donative threshold and result
in tax savings that exceed the fundraising costs.281
279 A recent comprehensive treatment of the legal aspects of charitable fundraising is
that of Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed
Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (1991). Other discussions include Rose-
Ackerman, Charitable Giving and "Excessive" Fundraising, 97 Q.J. ECON. 193 (1982);
Note, Regulation of Charitable Fundraising: Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, 24 U.S.F.L. REV. 205 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Regulation of Charitable
Fundraising]; Note, Charitable Fraud in New York: 7he Role of the Professional Fund
Raiser, 33 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 409 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Charitable Fraud in New
York]; Note, Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.: State Regulation of Fundraising
Costs, 5 PACE L. REv. 489 (1985) [hereinafter Note, State Regulation of Fundraising
Costs].
280 Espinoza, supra note 279; Note, Regulation of Charitable Fundraising, supra note
279, at 210; Note, Charitable Fraud in New York, supra note 279, at 411-12; Note, State
Regulation of Fundraising Costs, supra note 279, at 495-97; see Organized Charities Pass
Off Mailing Costs As "Public Education," Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1990, at Al (noting that
90% of money raised by the Doris Day Animal League is used for further fundraising,
specifically for direct mail campaigns). See generally Clurities and Nonprofit
Organizations: What You Get When You Give, Hearings Before the Subcons. on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). These abuses, however
bad, do not defeat the case for the donative theory because they are no worse than those that
afflict market and government mechanisms, which are the primary alternatives. Moreover,
the donative theory may help focus attention on the need for further reforms.
281 Assume, for example, that an entity has gross revenues of $1000, none of which
are from donations, and has taxable income after expenses of $100. The entity owes federal
tax of $34 under the current maximum corporate tax rate of 34%. Donations to the entity of
$500 under our system would invoke charitable status and a tax exemption, saving the entity
$34 in taxes. If the gross donations counted toward the one-third threshold, presumably the
entity would pay up to $534 for fundraising services. That is, at a cost of $534, the
fundraising campaign "breaks even" producing zero net return (a cost of $534, offset by
additional revenues of $500 and a tax savings of $34).
Professor Espinoza notes a number of other situations in which charities may engage in
fundraising campaigns where costs exceed the amount raised. For example, a charity may
want to present a "successful image" by raising as much money as possible regardless of
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The obvious solution to this problem is to count only "net" donations in
the threshold amount. A net system also provides incentives for the entity to
engage in the most cost-effective fundraising, since gross donations will be
included in the total revenue base and will cause a "gross-up" effect that makes
meeting the threshold harder as proportionate fundraising costs rise.282 A
system that counts only the net donation also better matches the level of tax
subsidy to the level of deservedness by insuring that the tax subsidy is not
provided to entities whose primary activity is fundraising. 283 While this system
probably would not eradicate the excess cost problem, at least it insures that the
donative theory does not erode the general economic incentive to control costs
in order to maximize revenues.
5. Controlling Political Activity
As noted earlier, political activities by exempt organizations raise many of
the same issues as fundraising expenses.284 In a sense, political activity is a
form of fundraising, since much, if not all, such activity will be directed
toward improving the financial fortunes of the entity. While the current Code
scheme provides a type of compromise on political activity, permitting some
types of legislative lobbying to some degree, but prohibiting political campaign
cost. Espinoza, supra note 279, at 653. Or a charity might rationally engage in a donor
acquisition program where costs exceed the actual donations. Id. at n.233. In the latter case,
the charity presumably believes that once the donor is "hooked," future contributions will
offset the current excess expenses.
282 Again, take the example set forth in note 281. To meet the one-third threshold on a
net basis, the amount of gross donations needed varies with the fundraising cost. Assume
that fundraising costs are 50% of donations. In order to meet the one-third threshold, gross
donations would have to be at least $2000 (the gross donations would increase total
revenues to $3000, one-third of which is $1000, which is the net donation amount in the
example). If fundraising costs are only 10%, then the gross donations needed to meet the
threshold would go down to $590 (gross revenues are now $1590, one-third of which equals
$530, and net donations are $531). Put algebraically, the gross donations needed to meet the
threshold can be calculated using the following formula:
1/3(GR + D) = FRC x D
where GR is the gross revenues not including donations, D is the gross donation amount,
and FRC is the fundraising cost expressed as a percentage of donations.
As Professor Espinoza has pointed out, classifying expenditures of an entity as
"fundraising" costs versus expenditures on charitable programs raises an inherently
difficult, but not insurmountable, problem of classification and accounting. Espinoza, supra
note 279, at 656-63.
283 Cf. Espinoza, supra note 279, at 672-73 ("Congress could declare that fundraising,
like lobbying, while a legitimate charitable activity, is of such low public benefit that it
should not be subsidized through the tax exemption and deductibility system.").
284 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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activity, 285 the donative theory permits a simpler mechanism for checking
political expenditures. As with fundraising costs, the donation threshold could
be calculated by deducting political activity costs from donations for purposes
of computing the donative threshold. This netting calculation produces the same
incentive to limit lobbying costs as it does to limit fundraising costs, 286 while
avoiding substance-based regulation. 287
C. Swnmary of Practical Implementation
To summarize, we would apply the donative test on an entity-by-entity
basis, using a donation threshold of one-third of total revenues to classify
charitable organizations eligible for tax exemption. 288 This is essentially the
same procedure and threshold tests used by current law in defining publicly-
supported organizations. We would define total revenues in generally the same
manner as is already done in section 509(d), but would include gains from
capital asset sales. The donation threshold calculations would include all those
items currently included for purposes of section 170(b) other than government
grants and would continue to limit the amount any one donation "counted" in
the threshold to two percent of the gross revenues for the year. Because of the
overall importance of donated labor to judging the level of public support of an
organization, we would add labor to the donation threshold calculation (both
numerator and denominator) using a standard valuation system. Unlike current
law, we would amortize gifts for capital purchases into both numerator and
denominator over a predefined time period, such as the asset's depreciation
period. We also suggest a number of other possible refinements that could be
adopted, depending on the results from further empirical inquiry into altruistic
behavior and depending on regulators' appetites for accuracy over simplicity.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 170-73. As noted earlier, we can see no reason
to treat political activity such as campaigning differently from lobbying, inasmuch as both
are methods for accomplishing a given goal: improvement of the fortunes of the entity
engaged in the political activity. One of the strengths of the donative theory is that
normative judgments regarding "good" and "bad" activities for a charity, such as "good"
and "bad" political activity, can be eliminated.
286 See supra notes 282-83.
287 Obviously, determining what costs are attributable to "political activity" will
require some administrative definition, but current law already requires identifying certain
such expenditures for purposes of the I.R.C. § 501(h) safe-harbor rule regarding lobbying.
288 As noted in the text, we would also adopt the four-year average approach of
current law to compensate for fluctuations in gifts that could adversely affect the calculation
of the donation threshold, and we would adopt the advance ruling procedure of current law
for start-up entities. Moreover, to help control fundraising abuses and political activity, we
would calculate the threshold with reference to the "net" donations (that is, the excess of
donations over fundraising expenses and political activity expenses).
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Given the amount of material that can be adapted from current statutes and
regulatory procedures, implementing the donative theory would not require
major overhaul of the tax system. 289 The significance of the change, however,
should not be minimized: the proposed system would completely replace the
current system of administering exemptions under section 501(c)(3),
eliminating activity-specific judgments of "community benefit," "commercial
manner," "relatedness" and the like in favor of more bright-line, quantitative
tests for donative status. Although our proposed system borrows heavily from
federal tax law, states could piggyback on the system by either copying the
federal statutes or by conferring charitable status automatically on anyone that
receives federal approval, as is already the case with most state income tax
laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates both the powerful explanatory force of the
donative theory and its relative ease of administration. The theory gains force
from its generalizeability: it applies to any (significant) instance of giving,
regardless of the particular subjective motive and regardless of the nature of the
market and government defects that give rise to the need to donate. The theory
is also remarkable for its ability to internalize the explanation for various
restrictions on exempt entities to the core justification of the exemption, rather
than maintaining these restrictions based on ad hoc, external concerns. The
donative theory eases the burdens of administration by employing a market-like
mechanism to measure the social worth and need of various organizations
automatically, without the intervention of social value judgments made by
revenue agents. The designation of donative thresholds and the measurement of
actual donations entail several complexities, but they can be just as easily
handled as the designation and measurement problems present under the
conventional conception of the exemption; indeed, most aspects of the existing
regulations are remarkably adaptable to this task.
Adoption of the donative theory-or, more accurately, its recognition,
since it can be revealed to be in place already-will solve all of the major
pending controversies surrounding the charitable exemption. The most recent
controversy at the federal level is the legislative debate over the tax-exempt
status of nonprofit hospitals. 290 This skirmish masks a more elemental unease
289 For clarity, we reiterate that the proposed system of identifying 501(c)(3)
organizations would replace the current analysis and would not permit any "presumptive"
categories of donative entities. That is, churches, hospitals and certain educational
institutions automatically would have to prove their own case for exemption.
290 The 1991 legislative calendar saw introduction of two separate bills designed to
further regulate the tax exempt status of nonprofit hospitals. See H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See generally Colombo & Hall, 7he
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about the basic justification for the exemption itself and whether the
commercialization of nonprofits should affect their exemption, an issue
reflected in earlier federal hearings on the UBIT.29 1 The donative theory
readily provides the following answers: the charitable exemption is a means for
providing a shadow subsidy to activities that donations signal as being socially
worthy and in need of further support; the concerns underlying the UBIT are
valid but the tax itself is unnecessary under a scheme that adjusts for the proper
relationship between exempt and nonexempt functions by setting a threshold
that requires a substantial donative base; some degree of commercialization by
nonprofits is necessary in order for the charitable exemption to create a subsidy
effect under the income tax; excessive commercialization dwarfing the donative
base undermines exempt status because it indicates the organization, however
worthy, is no longer suffering from market failure and therefore needs no
additional subsidy. The foregoing is precisely what has occurred in the hospital
industry over the past generation and so, apart from isolated institutions, or
particular services, they no longer deserve charitable status under this
approach.292
This is not to say that the donative theory is the only plausible basis on
which a tax exemption might be conferred, or that society necessarily must
confer an exemption at all. We would not stand in opposition if our legislators
chose explicitly to restrict the charitable exemption to organizations that assist
the poor, or if they chose to repeal the exemption altogether in favor of a more
direct form of social subsidy. To this extent, the donative theory is not a
"strong" justification for the exemption that precludes all other possibilities.
We have meant only to demonstrate that, among plausible accounts, the
donative theory best explains the form of tax exemption that our legislators
have in fact chosen. No other theory as successfully explains: (1) what charities
are consistent with the common sense understandings and the 400 years of legal
history that lie behind this concept; and (2) why they are (a) eligible to receive
tax exempt donations, and (b) exempt from both (i) property and (ii) income
taxation, but (c) only to the extent of their related income and property, and (d)
only if they (i) are nonprofit, (ii) do not violate public policy, and (iii) do not
engage in excessive political activity. A theory that can provide a satisfactory,
Future of Tax Exenption for Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH
MATRIX (forthcoming Spring 1992).
291 Unrelated Business Income Tax, Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on
Oversight of the House Comnittee on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1987).
292 However, we do not oppose granting hospitals exemption under the charity care
theory if they in fact demonstrate that they provide uncompensated care over and above
what similar for-profit hospitals provide, sufficient to earn the total value of the exemption.
See Hall & Colombo, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra note 6, at 357 n.198; Colombo & Hall,
supra note 290 (manuscript at 52, on file with authors). An approach similar to this has
been proposed in recent legislation, although the technical problems in this bill are
numerous. See id. (manuscript at 21-28, on file with authors).
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integrated explanation for each of these components of the present scheme of
tax exemption is too compelling to ignore unless we are willing to abandon
altogether the concept of a charitable exemption.
